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STRONG AND INFORMED ADVOCACY CAN SHAPE THE
LAW: A PERSONAL JOURNEY
MICHAEL M. BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
Without advocacy, there are no rights. Nice words on paper,
perhaps, but not rights. Rights need to be enforced to be meaning-
ful. As the United States Supreme Court has said repeatedly, eco-
nomic advantages do not become rights until they have the law
back of them and when courts preclude others from interfering
with those rights.1 Enforcement of such rights is done by advocates,
because courts are not self-starters. Someone has to bring cases to
themlawyers.
In the realm of protected rights, the rights of property owners were
for many years strangely orphaned creaturespoor relations, as
the Supreme Court once noted.2 Ensconced in the Bill of Rights along-
side the rights to life and liberty, property rights found few defend-
ers. Those who were interested in property at all seemed to come at
it from the other side. The Sierra Club, for example, has been around
since 1892, but its interest in property is restraining private use, not
enhancing or protecting it. And dont get me started on the ACLU
either. Organizations with a dedication toward protecting the rights
of private property owners did not come into being until quite a bit
later. The Institute for Justice, for example, was founded in 1991; the
Cato Institute and the Washington Legal Foundation were both estab-
lished in 1977; the Pacific Legal Foundation came into being in 1973.
And I graduated from law school in 1967.
Thus, while it is not unusual today for us to see one or more of
those recently formed organizations filing suit to protect the rights of
private property owners, that occurrence is a current phenomenon.
* Partner and co-Chair of the Appellate Practice Group, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips (Los
Angeles office).
1. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (quoting with approval
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)).
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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In 1967, there was just me and the small firm I practiced law with
and a few other hardy individuals, including some academics who
were prior honorees at this conference.
Specialized practice helps. It allows lawyers to become familiar
with the ins and outs and complications of a particular field. Tak-
ings has always been a complicated area of the law and a difficult one
to fathom. As Justice Stevens once put it, even the wisest of lawyers
would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this
Courts takings jurisprudence.3
When seeking to push and shape the contours of the law, it be-
hooves one to actually have a firm grasp on the field. I have repeatedly
urged that friends dont let friends file takings claims. I was not kid-
ding. My concern is that too many lawyers tend to view a takings
claim as simply some sort of catchall to add as a tag line at the end of
a multicount complaint (which may or may not have a valid claim at
its core ab initio). Bad idea. It leads to cases in which lawyers make all
sorts of wild claims, irritating judges (who may, in any event, be hear-
ing their first takings cases4) and making bad law by continuing to
make judges think that takings law is not a legitimate subject. Claims
like these: that a phone call made by a police officer during an arrest
was a taking;5 that forcing exotic dancers to stay four feet away
from customers was a taking of the bar owners interest in the four-
foot circle of property surrounding each dancer;6 that precluding a
murderer from collecting on a life insurance policy on his victim was
3. Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
That was actually putting it mildly. Professor Van Alstyne described takings law as a mass
of obtuse decisional law. Arvo Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative
Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 4 (1967). Professor Sax found a welter of confusing and
apparently incompatible results. Joseph Sax, Takings and Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37
(1964). Professor Dunham saw only a crazy quilt pattern. Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.
63. For a collection of similar conclusions, see Gideon Kanner, When is Property Not Property
Itself: A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in
Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 57, 58 (1969).
4. My experience has been that few judges came in contact with takings (or even more
generic land use) cases when they were lawyers. And most of those with any experience repre-
sented states or municipalities.
5. Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290 (1st Cir. 2003) ($1.60 phone call on arrestees phone
is not a taking).
6. Sands North, Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Alaska 2007). I am sure
that counsel thought that was very clever. The court disagreed.
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a taking;7 that prohibiting nude dancing in bars is a taking;8 or that
castrating pet dogs is a taking.9 Cases like these can only push the
law in the wrong direction by convincing judges that the concept of
takings is not to be taken seriously.
In this sense, I was blessed. I had spent a full year of graduate
work researching the rights and obligations of airports and their
neighbors, and had read and digested everything on the subject from
across the country. I then joined a law firm that was engaged in vir-
tually all of that kind of work in California (on the side of the neigh-
boring property owners) and was able to spend the next ten years or
so actually using all the material collected during my LL.M. studies.10
Not many can say that. But that was not all our firm did. It did a lot
of eminent domain work and related real estate litigation. So, when
I was finished with the airport work (i.e., a specialized form of phys-
ical taking), I was able to transition seamlessly into regulatory tak-
ings, other kinds of physical takings (e.g., floods and landslides), and
direct condemnation.
I. THE AIRPORT NOISE CASESPHYSICAL TAKINGS
Since becoming a member of the California bar in 1967, I have
handled every airport noise case in the California Supreme Court
7. United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Severson, 151 P.3d 824 (Idaho 2007).
8. McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 2007) (demonstrable drop
in earnings after prohibition not sufficient to show taking).
9. Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles, 194 Cal. App 4th 1219
(2011). Perhaps the outcome would (should?) have been different if the plaintiff had been the
dog, rather than the owners. But would dogs have standing? Compare id. with Christopher
D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S.CAL.
L. REV. 450 (1972).
10. The best part of the research was published as Michael M. Berger, Nobody Loves An
Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970). The remainder of it, augmented by materials and expe-
rience acquired in practice, eventually appeared as Jerrold A. Fadem & Michael M. Berger,
A Noisy Airport Is A Damned Nuisance, 3 SW. U. L. REV. 39 (1971); Michael M. Berger, You
Know I Cant Hear You When the Planes Are Flying, 4 URB. LAW 1 (1972); Michael M. Berger,
The California Supreme CourtA Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 199 (1973); Michael M. Berger, Airport Operator Liability:
Continuing Liability for Continuous Tortfeasors, 9 L.A. LAW. 27 (Dec. 1986); Michael M.
Berger, Airport Noise in the 1980s: Its Time for Airport Operators to Acknowledge the Injury
They Inflict On Neighbors, 1987 INST. ON PLAN.ZONING & EMINENTDOMAIN, ch. 10 (SW. Legal
Foundation). This, along with the prolific output of my law partner Gideon Kanner, led one
prominent Los Angeles land use lawyer to say of our firm, You guys must have a publish or
perish requirement!
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except one.11 The one exception was a case in which I had appeared
as amicus curiae and later obtained rare permission from the Court
to file a post-argument letter brief providing my suggested answers
to questions that had been posed by members of the Court, but to
which I believed had received insufficient answers.12 There were also
numerous matters handled in the various branches of the California
Court of Appeal and other courts in other parts of the country.
The airport cases had two post-war13 U.S. Supreme Court cases
to provide a basis for analysis. In United States v. Causby,14 the Court
held the federal government liable for the destruction of a chicken
farm beneath the landing pattern at a federally owned airport.15 The
Court had to deal only with the question of whether the government
or the underlying landowner had to bear the burden of damage caused
by multiple low flights. It was spared the need to go further, because
the United States owned and operated both the airport and the mili-
tary aircraft using it. The key holding, however, clearly placed respon-
sibility on the government.
A few years later, the Court revisited the question and concluded
that it was the airport operator that bore the responsibility. After all,
said the Court, it is the local authority which decides to build an air-
port vel non, and where it is to be located.16
But that was it. And, in fact, one might have thought that should
be enough, as it plainly laid out the liability for damage to underlying
11. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920 (1972) (government agencies are liable
for nuisance); City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974) (claim for airport noise
damage may be filed on behalf of class, but class lawsuit is not appropriate because each parcel
is unique); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844 (1978) (statute of limitations must be lib-
erally applied so as to permit trial); City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860 (1977) (mea-
sure of compensation; ethicalduties ofgovernment lawyers); Greater Westchester Homeowners
Assn v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86 (1979) (victims of airport nuisance may recover
damages for emotional disturbance). There had only been one such case before I started my
practice (and it dealt only with noise liability as between airport owner/operator and airline
owner/operator) an issue already decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, which left the field pretty
open. See Loma Portal Civic Club v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 61 Cal. 2d 582 (1964).
12. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-PasadenaAirport Auth.,39 Cal. 3d 862 (1985). The opinion
generally accepted the analysis in my post-argument letter.
13. WWII, for our younger readers.
14. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
15. Actually, the farm was not so much destroyed as rendered useless. The chickens were
so frightened by the noise that they committed suicide by flying into the walls of their coop. See
the trial court opinion in Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
16. Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962).
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property caused by aircraft overflights, both as to general liability and
as to the party to be charged.
But it was not to be that easy. The causes were several. First, each
state jurisdiction believed that it was in charge of its own law. It was
all well and good for the U.S. Supreme Court to make statements
about the federal constitution, but these cases involved precepts of
state property law, and that was the province of the state courts to
decide.17 Second, airport operators were reluctant to accept responsi-
bility. Let me give you just two illustrations.
A full two decades after Griggs had plainly placed liability on the
airport operator, opposing counsel made this argument in a Los An-
geles Superior Court filing in one of my cases:
Standing by itself, Los Angeles International Airport is basically
a mass of concrete and steel. Any problems with respect to the
Plaintiff only arise when jet aircraft land and take off from the
Airport. Therefore, it is the jet aircrafts use of the airport that
actually generates Plaintiffs cause of action for negligence, not
the operation, management and control of the Airport by the
Defendant.18
For sheer brass, such a statement may have been the highor
lowwatermark since Cain shot a guilty glance Heavenward and
asked, Who, me?
That attitude was epidemic. For example, after I convinced the
California Supreme Court in 1972 to hold that airport operators could
be liable to their neighbors under theories of nuisance, negligence,
zoning violation, and inverse condemnation (in a case involving the
Santa Monica Airport),19 two things of note happened. First, a senior
lawyer for Los Angeles International Airport told me that his client
would never stop litigating until the Supreme Court reached a conclu-
sion of liability in one of its own cases, not one involving some other
facility. Second, while a petition for rehearing was pending in the Su-
preme Court in the Santa Monica case, the Los Angeles City Attorney
17. Remember the concept of independent state grounds as a basis for avoiding the U.S.
Supreme Court.
18. Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 3334, Malandrinos v. City of Los Angeles (1983) (No. 138136) (emphasis
in original).
19. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920 (1972).
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leaked a confidential, attorney-client memo to the Los Angeles
Herald-Examiner. In that memo, he purported to advise the City
Council that if the Supreme Court did not reverse its decision on air-
port operator liability, the city would have no alternative but to close
Los Angeles International Airport. The leak resulted in the issuance
of an EXTRA edition of the newspaper (this was 1972, after all, and
print newspapers were still important) bearing the following eight-
column double-banner headline, in letters two inches high:
L.A. AIRPORT FACES
SHUTDOWN IN 30 DAYS
The whole sordid story is detailed elsewhere.20 Suffice to say that
the threat was a ploy to stampede the Supreme Court. It wasnt seri-
ous; it didnt work. I note it here only to show why much litigation
was needed to bring civility to the relationship between airports and
their neighbors.21
My first exposure to the reality of airport noise litigation involved
the smallish airport in Santa Monica. That airport had been used by
Douglas Aircraft as the jumping-off point for the many DC-3 aircraft
that it built for the military, particularly during World War II.22 After
the war, it became a general civil aviation airport serving small, pri-
vate aircraft and flight schools. Eventually, some of the private pilots
using the airport acquired early generation jets (e.g., Lear Jets and
Jet Commanders).That was when trouble with the neighbors erupted.
The jets were loud. Very loud. In fact, they were similar to military
fighter jets in that sense, because they had no sound mufflers. The
noise problem was exacerbated at Santa Monica because the takeoff
end of the runway was at the edge of a bluff high above a residential
20. See Michael M. Berger, The California Supreme CourtA Shield Against Governmental
Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 199, 24452 (1973).
21. For other illustrations from other airports, see Michael M. Berger, Airport Noise in the
1980s: Its Time for Airport Operators to Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict On Neighbors, 1987
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 10, pp. 10-6010-62 (SW Legal Foundation).
22. An intriguing part of the litigation that is not specifically discussed in the Supreme
Courts opinion is the basis for the zoning violation claim. The eastern 400 feet of the runway
is located in the City of Los Angeles on land zoned for residential purposes. However, Douglas
Aircraft obtained a variance from Los Angeles in 1942 to operate the runway on that land until
the end of the national emergency [i.e., WWII]. Thus, the trial record included copies of peace
treaties with all the belligerents to demonstrate that World War II had indeed ended by the time
the case went to trial in the late 1960s.
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neighborhood. The jets would roll down the runway and then explode
off the bluff over the homes below. The noise was shattering.23
That is when I got my start at shaping the law and using the
massive amount of research I had just concluded in graduate law
school. For better or worse, at that time the California Rules of Court
specified no limit to either the pages or words one could include in a
brief. Today, we have a word (and font) limit that is the rough equiv-
alent of a fifty-page brief. I had a lot to say and, with no restriction,
filed a 231-page brief. If you want to shape the law, it helps if they
give you a lot of leeway to discuss it. It also helps if you have a court
that is receptive enough to read it.24
The Santa Monica case was actually a wonderful starting point,
as it contained four related, yet different, causes of action. Any one
of them could have provided substantial recovery for the airports
neighbors: inverse condemnation (physical taking by aircraft over-
flight or noise intrusion), nuisance, negligence, and violation of zoning
23. We demonstrated this in the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal with acoustically
calibrated tape recordings played by a sound engineer. On appeal (my introduction to the case),
I decided that we needed to find a way to actually expose the Justices to the reality of the noise.
As one of the bases of the appeal was that the judgment was not supported by the evidence, and
the tapes were a crucial part of the evidence, I made a formal motion in the Court of Appeal for
leave to have our engineer properly calibrate and play the tape for the court. (I did not want
any Justice simply taking the tapes home and playing them on his domestic recorder (with
the sound level incorrectly set), so I made up this otherwise unheard-of motion.) To the
surprise of many (including my partners), the court granted the motion. We were allowed to set
up speakers during a noon recess. There must have been at least a dozen speakers in each of the
two banks that were set up to provide a stereophonic image. When I concluded my argument,
I simply turned to the engineer and said hit it. Which he did. A low rumble began in the back
of the courtroom and increased in loudness as a Lear Jet literally flew through the courtroom
and over the Justices heads. The Justices (obviously knowing something was afoot) sat stone-
faced. The court personnel were another story. The court reporter did not take stenographic
notes but simply recorded the proceedings on a simple tape recorder. When the noise from the
overflight began to build in intensityand the jet flew overheadthe reporter dove under the
table while the clerk leapt for the tape recorder in an effort to turn it off before its little brain
exploded. With everyones ears ringing, I turned to the airports lawyer and said, Its all yours.
That was very early in my career, but it may have been the most fun Ive had in a courtroom
(other than the more generalized joy of arguing to the U.S. Supreme Court).
24. A demonstration of that receptivity came in a strange way at oral argument in the Court
of Appeal. Between pages 195 and 196 in the brief, I had inserted a cartoon from a recent issue
of the New Yorker that I thought aptly illustrated the testimony being discussed, i.e., about how
the noise was driving ordinary people to do crazy things. The cartoon showed a man sitting in
his back yard astride an anti-aircraft gun and his wife explaining, Walter has decided to handle
sonic booms his own way. At oral argument, the Justice who ended up writing the opinion
castigated me for the humorous insertionand said the space could have better been used for
legal argumentation. One hundred ninety-five pages into a 231-page brief and he wanted more
legal argument. We later became good friends and were able to laugh about the incident.
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ordinance. We had gone to trial on the merits on the inverse claim
and lost. The other claims had been dismissed as a matter of law. So,
I briefed the heck out of each of them. My opening brief discussed
165 cases and 22 texts and law review articles (in addition to various
constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules). To the greatest extent
possible, it was a primer on both the substance of the underlying legal
theories and their application to the facts in the airport v. neighbor
context. I firmly believed that the courts needed such a primer on the
inverse condemnation claims25 and that they were not well educated
on the law of nuisance either.26
When the opinion came down, we got a 50/50 split: the court af-
firmedthe dismissal of our inverse condemnation and nuisance counts
(acknowledging that such an inverse condemnation claim could be
made but that the evidence supported the trial courts ruling against
us) but reversing the dismissal of the negligence and zoning counts.
So, we carried on, seeking review from the State Supreme Court.
The court granted review, and the case was again heavily briefed. The
fundamental substantive change is that I convinced them that nui-
sance was a viable claim against a government agency. The issues
were hard fought, but the law gained a lot of substance from this Su-
preme Court opinion, explaining that airport operators are no dif-
ferent than ordinary tortfeasors and have the same constitutional
obligations as other government organizations.
Class action issues also became important due to the sheer number
of people living around major airports.27 Several such cases were liti-
gated, advancing the law in various ways. The most interesting may
have been a federal case in which we had been hired by the City of
Inglewood (which lies just east of Los Angeles International Airport)
to file a class action on behalf of all its property owners and resi-
dents.28 In addition to alleging inverse condemnation and nuisance
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for comments about the general state of
takings law.
26. Prosser once denigrated the nuisance concept as this: There is perhaps no more
impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word nuisance. It has
meant all things to all people. . . . WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
ch. 15 at 616 (5th ed. 1984).
27. My firm preferred large group actions in which we individually represented each
plaintiff. Some of these had nearly 1000 named plaintiffs. However, we became involved in
class actions either because a client insisted on it or because we became involved in cases after
someone else had already filed them that way.
28. City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).
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claims, this case raised the question whether airport neighbors are
third-party beneficiaries of the grant contracts entered into between
airport operators and the federal government. Under these con-
tracts, the federal government supplies massive funding to construct
airport improvements.
The federal grant contracts contain provisions by which the airport
recipient of funds promises, in essence, to be kind to its neighbors, as
required by statute: No airport development project may be approved
by the Secretary unless he is satisfied that fair consideration has been
given to the interest of communities in or near which the project may
be located.29
In upholding the right of Inglewood to sue as third-party beneficiary
(or at least as representative of the class of such beneficiaries), the
court concluded:
If Los Angeles made the assurances required by sec. 1716(c) (3)
and sec. 1718(4) in applying for various grant agreements, then
Inglewood must certainly be included within the category of
intended beneficiaries of those assurances. Congress had some
purpose in enacting these two sections of Title 49. It is not to Los
Angeles benefit to be required to give the Secretary those assur-
ances; nor are the assurances of any independent benefit to the
Secretary. The Secretary merely receives them for the benefit of,
and in the place of, the surrounding communities and residents
of the area. Any other interpretation of sec. 1716(c) (3) and
sec. 1718(4) deprives them of any meaning or effect.30
An intriguing bit of good law was made in the losing cause of City
of San Jose v. Superior Court.31 That class action had been filed by an-
other law firm, which brought me in to handle the citys appeal to the
Supreme Court. The case presented two issues: (1) may a claim under
the California Tort Claims Act be filed on behalf of a class, and, if so,
(2) may a class action be filed in an airport noise case? The California
Supreme Court answered these questions (1) yes, and (2) no. What
was intriguing and what became the most important part of the deci-
sion was the reason for denying the class action: because the plain-
tiffs sought only property damages in their claim for nuisance, they
29. 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(3).
30. City of Inglewood, 451 F.2d at 956.
31. 12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974).
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failed to adequately represent the class, because plaintiffs in nuisance
cases may recover damages for personal injury and annoyance as
well.32 The case then became authority in lower courts for the propo-
sition that plaintiffs in nuisance cases may recover damages for per-
sonal injury and annoyance, a proposition that had not firmly been
established before. The reasoning was that if these class plaintiffs
were inadequate for not pursuing such claims, then the claims must
be valid.
By the time the Supreme Court considered the Greater Westchester
case, the lower courts had repeatedly applied the Nestle conclusion
that inverse condemnation was a viable claim for airport neighbors.33
The major contribution of Greater Westchester was to solidify the ap-
plication of nuisance law. Nestle only dealt with nuisance law in the
abstract as a legal issue of whether such a claim could be made at all.
Greater Westchester had gone to trial on the merits and resulted in
a judgment for the airports neighbors, who recovered a substantial
amount for personal injuries and annoyance, in addition to property
damage.34 Thus, by the time the case was concluded, the Supreme
Court had raised the dictum of San Jose v. Superior Court to a firm
holding: In addition to damages for property impacts, airport neigh-
bors could also recover under an expanded nuisance theory for per-
sonal suffering and annoyance.
The other interesting thing about this field was that there had been
little published scholarly work at the time, leaving the area open for
all my graduate research to fill the void. I still remember one day
when Gideon came running into my office waving the latest appel-
late court advance sheet and proclaiming: Youve got to see this. This
guy has taken your law review articles and stitched them together
into a binding court opinion! And indeed he had. The case was Aaron
v. City of Los Angeles.35 Only people like Gideon and me who were
familiar with the contents of my articles would have realized the
32. Id.
33. For citations to both California and non-California cases see, for example, Aaron v. City
of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471 (1974).
34. The trial record was large and solid. The trial judge had insisted that anyone who
claimed such personal damages had to testify individually. Many of the neighbors were chil-
dren. A large number of the adults and children in this 900-odd plaintiff case had taken the
stand and testified as to the devastating impact the noise, dust, and fumes from the airport had
on their, his, or her life.
35. 40 Cal. App. 3d 471 (1974).
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extent to which the opinion relied on them. Of course, the opinion
cited the articles, as well as a couple of others that had been pub-
lished by that time. But the flattering reality was that either the judi-
cial author of the opinion or his research attorney had actually lifted
a substantial amount of the text and, in Gideons words, stitched the
pieces together to create the bulk of the opinion. For someone writing
advocacy pieces in academic journals, it doesnt get much more satis-
fying than that.
By then, airport litigation was slowing down. Major liability
holdings had been affirmed at the highest state court level. It was
time to move on to something else. Fortunately, activist governments
and their agents were moving in other directions, sparking the regu-
latory taking litigation that continues apace to this day.
II. REGULATORY TAKINGSTHE MORE COMPLEX BRANCH
Regulatory takings will doubtless receive more attention from the
panel. The topic is tougher and sexier than airports, and it is still very
much in flux. Two aspects are critical: (1) can there be a regulatory
taking, and (2) what does it take to ripen a regulatory taking case?36
I was involved in many of the early (which is to say post-1978, when
the Supreme Court got interested in takings cases after its fifty-year
layoff37) regulatory taking/ripeness cases as the law developed. In the
takings course that I have taught for years, mostly at the University
ofMiami Law School, I have insisted that my students study the cases
in chronological orderthe way those of us in the field actually lived
themso they can see how the law developed and how the judicial
lineups changed as we progressed from Agins in 1980 through First
English in 1987. I continue to believe that you cannot truly under-
stand how, and possibly why, the law developed as it did if you merely
try to extrapolate black letter rules.38 Suffice to say that, that period
36. I have been litigating regulatory taking cases for decades in state and federal courts.
I will confine this discussion to the U.S. Supreme Court work.
37. Little of consequence appeared between Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922) and Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
38. For one, you would have missed the years during which Agins was said to set the rule
for regulatory takings with its two alternatives for liability, i.e., failure to substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest or denying economically viable use. Twenty-five years later, the
Court admitted the error that most of us had seen at the outset, i.e., that the first alternative
was a due process test, not a takings test. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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was excruciating. If you look at the dramatis personae in that batch
of cases, you will largely find the same people, on both sides, fighting
the same fight on behalf of different clients every year or so, while
the Supreme Court struggled to find five Justices who could agree on
an answer.
Being involved at the U.S. Supreme Court level often means filing
amicus curiae briefs. There are not a lot of slots available to actually
argue cases, and many of those are filled by lawyers at a few promi-
nent D.C. law firms. Wise or not, many clients believe that they are
better off with one of the pros rather than with someone who may
be more specialized substantively. So, I participated through the ami-
cus process in Agins39 and MacDonald40 while waiting for cert to be
granted in First English.41 By the time I briefed First English, we had
a pretty good idea what all of the arguments were on all sides of the
issue, and I felt confident that I could put together both a good peti-
tion and sterling briefs on the merits.42
In a sense, I was fortunate to be practicing in California and the
Ninth Circuit. You may not have noticed, but California is really on
a different planet. In much the same way as the Federal Circuit that
includes California, the courts of that state tend to go their own way,
regardless of guidance from a higher authority.43 So, the theme of my
Cert Petition was twofold: (1) the country needed an end to the legal
confusion about regulatory takings that had begun with Agins, and
(2) California was openly defiant of U.S. Supreme Court authority
and needed to be reined in. The arguments were easy to construct
39. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
40. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
41. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
42. I also spent some of my downtime writing articles about how the law of regulatory
takings ought to work. In addition to the ripeness articles, infra note 48, see, for example,
Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not to RegulateIs That the Question? Reflections on the
Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 253 (1975); Michael M. Berger, The States Police Power Is Not (Yet) the Power of
a Police State, 35 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST, No. 5, p. 4 (May 1983); Michael M. Berger
& Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the Gang of
Fives Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A.L.REV. 685
(1986); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988); Michael M. Berger, Vindi-
cating the Rights of Private Land Development in the Courts, 32 URB. LAW. 941 (2000).
43. The odds of having the U.S. Supreme Court review any decision are extremely low, so
one suspects that few judges lose sleep over that prospect.
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once it was decided that those were the keys to the case). The first
was demonstrated by the growing conflict and confusion in courts
around the country on what it took to establish a regulatory taking
(and whether there really was such a legal animal), and the second
was the subject of a growing pile of critical commentary, all of which
was collected and quoted in the petition.
After a years-long wait for the Supreme Court to actually decide
the merits of the regulatory taking issue, First English provided the
key the Court had sought. The opinion begins with what appears to
be an embarrassed apologia for having ducked the issue before, but
concludes that this is the proper case. We had, I confess, what I always
thought was significant help from the Court of Appeal. Although the
opinion was unpublished,44 the author, Justice Robert Thompson,
plainly stated that because the United States Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on the question of whether a state may constitutionally
limit the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief, this court is obli-
gated to follow Agins[s]45 rule of noncompensability. The rule, when
it finally came down, was simplicity itself: a taking is a taking, re-
gardless of how accomplished and how long it lasts, and the 5th
Amendment mandates compensation for all takings. A lot of us won-
dered why it took so long for the Court to say that, or, indeed, for gov-
ernment agencies to acknowledge it.
In the meantime, the Supreme Courts evasion of the general rule
of regulatory takings had led it to developquite unintentionally
the rule of ripeness that continues to vex the legal system. I say it
was unintentional because it was not announced as such until the
Court had proceeded some way through the process. It simply began
by refusing to decide regulatory taking issues because the specific
case was not ripe. And it continued to do so. Eventually, I concluded
that the Supreme Court had created a ripeness rule for regulatory
takingsand for regulatory takings alonethat contained two prongs
and seven branches.46
44. After all, it decided nothing of substance as California law since Agins had held that
there could be no claim for damages in California because of regulatory action.
45. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, No. B003702
(June 25, 1985).
46. Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Su-
preme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING &
EMINENT DOMAIN.
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My participation in the ripeness mess was largely as an amicus47
and as a contributor to the scholarly journals.48 I was one of the first
to criticize Williamson County,49 and I continued to do so from that
day in 1985 to the present.50 One of my critiques was as a co-author
with my old law school mentor,Professor Daniel Mandelker of Wash-
ington University Law School.Although we respected each other, Dan
and I disagreed on most aspects of regulatory taking law.51 Except in
the area of ripeness. Finding that we both agreed that issues of fed-
eral constitutional law ought to be subject to litigation in federal
courts, we joined forces to express that view.52 It was not that I failed
47. I handled one case as a test case. A developer felt so strongly about the inanity of the
ripeness rules that he offered his case as a possible way to reach the Supreme Court. Thus, we
filed suit with the expectation of losing quickly in the district court and having that dismissal
affirmed quickly, thus setting the stage for our petition to the Supreme Court. The first two
stages went according to plan: the case was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed.
Kottschade v. CityofRochester,319 F.3d 1038 (8thCir. 2003). But notwithstanding substantial
amicus support, including support from leaders of Congress who urged the Court to straighten
out the mess because Congress seemed unable to do so, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
48. Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39
(1985); Michael M. Berger, Ripeness Test for Land Use CasesNeeds Reform: Reconciling Lead-
ing Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1988);
Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The SupremeCourtEstablishes New Ground
Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 78695 (1988); Michael M. Berger, The Civil
Rights Act: An Alternative for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the Procedural Traps and
Pitfalls in Traditional Takings Litigation, 12ZONING& PLAN.L.REP. 121 (May 1989); Michael
M. Berger & Daniel R. Mandelker, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Reg-
ulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L.& ZONING DIG. 3 (Jan. 1990); Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness
Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit
Peddlers, 1991 INST.ONPLAN.ZONING&EMINENTDOMAIN; Michael M. Berger, Regulatory Tak-
ings Under the Fifth Amendment: A Constitutional Primer, WASH.LEGALFOUND. 1319 (1994);
Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View From the
TrenchesA Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837
(1998); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings,
3 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 99 (2000); Michael M. Berger, Property Rights and Takings Law: Y2K
and Beyond, 2002 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN [hereinafter Property Rights &
Takings]; Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Cant Get There from Here:
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody
Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004); Michael M. Berger, What Has San Remo Done to the Ripeness
Doctrine?, 2006 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN.
49. Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39
(1985).
50. Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO
L. REV. 297 (2014).
51. He had once described himself as a police power hawk, indicating general sympathy
for the position of regulating entities. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, at v (5th ed.
LexisNexis 2003). I, of course, have always been on the property owners side.
52. Berger & Mandelker, supra note 48.
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to try to attract the Supreme Courts attention to this issue. I simply
failed to get the four necessary votes to have certiorari granted. So
I bided my time writing and supporting other peoples petitions. We
seem to have made a breakthrough in 2005 when four Justices signed
an opinion saying that Williamson County may have been wrongly
decided and ought to be reconsidered.53 I had filed an amicus brief in
that case, strongly attacking Williamson County in as many ways
as I could. I could do no more than sit mute at oral argument when
Justice OConnor asked the lawyer I had supported whether he had
challenged Williamson County. When he replied that he had not, her
rejoinder was [p]erhaps you should have. The Court has yet to do so,
although many of us have tried to get it to follow through.
During this time, I also got involved in the fascinating real property
issues raised by the Federal Rails-to-Trails statute.54 In a nutshell,
when railroads were being laid across the country in the nineteenth
century, right-of-way agents fanned out and acquired property inter-
ests on which to lay the tracks. While they sometimes acquired fee
simple interests, most of the rights-of-way were acquired as ease-
ments. More than that, they were acquired as restricted easements
that were to remain in existence so long as the property was used for
railroad purposes. Fast forward to the twentieth century. The rail-
roads that had tied the country together were now yielding to other
forms of transportation and seeking to divest themselves of tracks
and rights-of-way that were becoming costly to maintain. At the same
time, people had developed an interest in recreational hiking and bik-
ing and needed trails on which to do so. Acquiring linear rights-of-
way is neither cheap nor easy. Especially in the twentieth century.
Trail proponents sought to acquire rights-of-way that the railroads
were already eagerly abandoning. They ran into one problem: settled
state real property law. In virtually all states, when a restricted ease-
ment ceases to be used for its intended purpose and the owner of the
dominant tenement abandons it, full use and enjoyment returns to
the underlying property owner. Thus, the railroads had nothing to
sell, and state courts repeatedly struck down attempted transfers at
the urging of the underlying fee owners.55
53. San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351 (2005) (Rehnquist,C.J., concurring,
joined by OConnor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
55. For discussion and case citations, see Michael M. Berger, Is the Rails-to-Trails Statute
a Taking? Only the Claims Court Knows, 13 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT 33 (May 1990);
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Enter Congress. Responding to the pleas of trail organizations, local
governmentagencies,andrecreational users, Congress decided to deal
with the property law issue by defining it out of existence. Congress
declared that as long as a railroad intends that it might one day de-
cide to re-lay the tracks and ties it had torn up and resume railroad
use, then its cessation of use will not be considered abandonment.
There, thought Congress, that ought to do it and make a lot of
constituents happy to boot. But most courts would not stay fooled
long.
I became involved in two such cases in the late 1980s. My intro-
duction came in a plea from a group of property owners in Missouri
who owned land over which the M-K-T Railroad had long run a line.
When they approached me, I told them that my small California firm
would not be capable of handling such a large trial in Missouri, but
I urged them to come back to me when the case went up on appeal,
as I was certain that it would. Indeed, as I examined this piece of
Congressional handiwork, I told my partners that we needed to main-
tain contact with this group of people because the issue had Su-
preme Court written all over it. The idea that Congress couldwith
the stroke of a penupset settled property law from coast to coast
would have to be addressed at the highest judicial level. When that
group of clients lost at trial, they remembered me and returned.
Where handling a trial in Missouri would have been difficult, han-
dling an appeal in the Eighth Circuit would be no different than any
other appeal anywhere. I was convinced that the statute was in-
valid, but I ultimately lost that appeal.56
While working on the Eighth Circuit case, I was in contact with
other lawyers and property owners fighting similar cases in other
parts of the country. One was a couple in Vermont whose case was
proceeding through the Second Circuit. They also lost. Their lawyers
asked for assistance in drafting the Cert Petition, promising that if we
could get certiorari granted they would step aside and substitute me
into the case. Essentially, I was drafting two petitions dealing with
virtually the same issue at the same time. They were so close in time
Michael M. Berger, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: Has Congress Effected a Definitional Taking?,
1990 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 8 (SW. Legal Foundation); Michael M.
Berger, Not So Fast: Rail-to-Trail Conversions Could be More Costly than they Appear, 37 RIGHT
OF WAY, no. 5, at 4 (Oct. 1990).
56. Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1989).
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that each petition referred to the other, urging the Court to grant at
least one of the petitions while perhaps holding the other in reserve.
Whatever went on inside the Court, we got the Justices attention. Al-
though they denied certiorari in the Glosemeyer case from Missouri,
they granted the petition in the Preseault case from Vermont.57
Preseault was a fascinating caseas much for its procedural
nuances as for its substance. On a technical level, I lost that case 90.
But that doesnt really tell the story. When the Second Circuit decided
the case, its opinion was as unfriendly to the underlying fee owners as
it was possible to be. Paraphrasing, the court said that nothing in the
Rails-to-Trails Act is now of will ever be a taking of private property
in any way shape or manner. Period. Case closed. However, although
the word at the end of the Supreme Courts opinion is affirmed, that
general ruling was gone. In its place was another ripeness ruling:
the underlying fee owners could not seek to invalidate the statute
until they had first sought compensation from the federal government
(because of the impact of that statute) in the Court of Federal Claims.
Not much about takings at all until you get to the concurring opin-
ion. Three Justices, led by Justice OConnor, took the opportunity to
reconfirm the enduring validity of First English, holding that all
takings require compensation. It may be noteworthy that Justice
OConnor was one of the dissenters in First English but took this
opportunity to confirm the priority of stare decisis and the control-
ling nature of an earlier opinion that she did not join.
The upshot of Preseault was that many people have asked (and
continue to ask) whether I won or lost. It is hard to say. I know that
if you read the transcript or listen to the tape of oral argument you
will find three places in which the Justices asked opposing counsel
questions that caused those who were in attendance to break out in
laughter. I also know that the general holding of the Second Circuit
disappeared, and the matter was essentially sent to the Court of Fed-
eral Claims for a determination of the takings claim. And I know that
after much litigation, the matter settled with the Preseaults being
awarded $1.5 million for the quarter-mile of trail that traversed
their land.58
57. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
58. The total includes compensation for the property, interest for the sixteen years during
which the Feds strongly denied liability, and reimbursement of the substantial attorneys fees
the Preseaults had to pay lawyers to defend their rights.
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A final thought about Rails-to-Trails. Remember what I said earlier
about airport operators refusing to face facts and deal with the legal
realities they faced? That same disease appears to have stricken the
federal defenders of trail rights. Even after Preseault should have
made the liability issue clear, the Feds continued to fight claims by
the owners of fee interests underlying rights-of-way. Lately, reported
cases have seemed to swell.59 The Supreme Court needed to take one
more case last year to finally slap down the federal claims and, in the
process, castigate the Solicitor General for arguing contrary to argu-
ments his office had made years before:
More than 70 years ago, the Government argued before this Court
that a right of way granted under the 1875 Act was a simple ease-
ment. The Court was persuaded, and so ruled. Now the Govern-
ment argues that such a right of way is tantamount to a limited
fee with an implied reversionary interest. We decline to endorse
such a stark change in position, especially given the special need
for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned.60
I handled two other Supreme Court cases that had been referred
by other counsel. I have always respected counsel who had strong
enough egos to be able to say that someone with more background
and experience ought to step in. In addition to Preseault, that hap-
pened in Del Monte Dunes61 and Tahoe Sierra,62 each of which pro-
vided different ways to help shape the law.
Del Monte Dunes was both exhilarating and terrifying. It was
exhilarating because it was an excellent case with a strong factual
record after trial, yet it was terrifying because the Ninth Circuit had
ruled in favor of my clienttwice, once procedurally and once on the
merits. As you surely know, that is a virtual kiss of death from a court
that is widely known as the most reversed court in the country. So
I focused on the positive. The case had a fascinating ripeness aspect.
It arose in California before the U.S. Supreme Court decided First
59. E.g., Farmers Cooperative Co. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 797 (2011); Biery v. U.S., 99
Fed. Cl. 565 (2011); Brandt v. U.S., 2011 WL 6076190 (Fed. Cl. 2011); Capreal, Inc. v. U.S., 99
Fed. Cl. 133 (2011).
60. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014) (citing Leo Sheep
Co. v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1403 (1979)).
61. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
62. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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English. Thus, there was no compensatory remedy available under
California law for the regulatory taking at the heart of the case. That
allowed plaintiffs counsel to avoid the California courts and file suit
in U.S. District Court.63 Initially, that did not help, as the District
Court dismissed the case as unripe. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. It examined the procedural history of the case, including
the five separate development applications made by my client, ac-
companied by nineteen different site plans, all of which were denied
by the city, and concluded that the only thing this case was ripe for
was litigation.
The case went to trial in a procedurally strange way. The takings
claim was submitted to the jury, along with an equal protection claim.
The substantive due process claim was tried to the court alone. The
jury ruled in favor of the property owner. The judge ruled for the city,
noting that the citys burden in defending against a substantive due
process claim was significantly lighter than defending against the
others. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and then the Supreme
Court granted the citys cert petition.
This turned out to be a first impression case, and an unusual op-
portunity to shape the law, but not in the way we initially supposed.
The constitutional claim was brought under the Civil Rights Act.64
What nobody realized until we began researching the brief on the
merits was that there was no Supreme Court precedent dealing with
the right of a civil rights plaintiff to have a jury decide liability. Thus,
although retaining overtones of takings law, the case turned into a
Seventh Amendment case.
As a regulatory taking case, it caused quite a buzz between the time
of oral argument and the release of the opinion. The reason was that
one of the Justices asked the citys lawyer, in a seemingly innocent
voice: if we apply the three-factor Penn Central test, what if the
character of the government action is bad faith? So, for a period of
months, the takings bar waited to see how bad faith would factor in
with the Penn Central analysis. It turned out to be a dud, as there
was no mention of bad faith as part of the analysis.
63. Even Williamson County made clear that suit in state court was required only if state
law provided a remedy. Here, the California Supreme Court had made clear that there was
no remedy.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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But the thought was picked up in Tahoe-Sierra. No way to white-
wash that case; it was a clear loss all around. It was a moratorium
that lasted for decades. I dont know how the government was able
to spin that into anything other than a massive admission that the
planning process had failed, so everything had to stopindefinitely.
It always seemed to me that, that was a taking of some sort. The Su-
preme Court phase of the case began with a game by the Supreme
Court: it changed, indeed reversed, the question I had presented to
the Court. Where my question was whether a temporary morato-
rium can never require compensation, the Court told us to brief and
argue whether a temporary moratorium always requires compensa-
tion. A very uphill question, even though I still believe that it could
be answered in our favor. The issue would be whether there was any
compensation due if the temporary part were so short that it did
no damage.65
The most maddening part of the opinion (from my perspective, at
least) is that, after concluding that this temporary moratorium
could not be a taking, the opinion (drafted by Justice Stevens) in-
cluded a section in which the theme was that considerations of fair-
ness and justice might call for a different result. The opinion then
discusses seven other ways in which the analysis might have been
made so that it produced a different result. I say it was maddening
because the first alternative was that the Court might have consid-
ered the series of moratoria as a singular rolling moratorium that
had lasted for decades. That was precisely the question that I had
drafted and presented in the petition. But the Court declined to grant
review on that issue and then said that if review had been so granted
it might have altered the result. I was, and remain, at a loss for words.
For the future, the opinion contains these intriguing items. First,
it says that any moratorium in existence for more than one year is
automatically suspect. Second, it dropped the other shoe from Del
Monte Dunes and said that bad faith by the government may have
65. Another sidelight to the Supreme Court phase of the case was that the agency hired
John Roberts to represent it. Yes, that John Roberts. I have lost track of the clipping, but I recall
reading in the Washington Post that the White House had arranged that assignment because
Roberts nomination to the D.C. Circuit was being held up in the Judiciary Committee by a
Senator who doubted his environmental creds. So they got him an environmental case. All I
know is that shortly after the argument (which was also supported by Solicitor General Ted
Olson), the nomination cleared the Committee, and the rest is history.
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resulted in a taking (except there was none demonstrated here). The
authority for that citation? Del Monte Dunes, which had tantalized
the bar with the concept and is now remembered by the Court as the
source of that rule.
CONCLUSION
When I graduated from law school, I never dreamed that I would
spend most of my career dealing with cutting-edge constitutional law.
But that is what it has been. It has been one heck of a ride, and it is
not over yet. I am not ready to hang em up yet. I plan to continue
writing, teaching, lecturing, and writing appellate briefs. There are
still too many ripe targets that need to be dealt with, and I would like
to be there when the Court finally deals with some of the issues that
have plagued us for years.

MICHAEL M. BERGERA CAREER DEVOTED TO
PROPERTY RIGHTS
DANA BERLINER*
2014 marks the first time a practitioner has won this award, and
it is fitting that it goes to Mike Berger.
Advocates do much to shape the law of property. Good advocates
carefully select their cases to present issues directly and sympatheti-
cally. They identify the questions presented on appeal and, of course,
at the Supreme Court. They formulate the theories and identify the
lines of cases that they suggest the Court follow or reject. They intro-
duce the evidence that either is or is not sufficient to prove their
clients side of the story. All of these decisions then have a direct role
in shaping the outcomes of cases.
The goal of the Brigham-Kanner prize is to identify those who have
made a difference in property law. It is therefore fitting that it go to
a practitioner, particularly one who has had the impact that Mike
Berger has had.
What has made Mike such a powerful force in shaping takings law?
He combines everything you needstrategic judgment in case selec-
tion, a well-developed theory of the law, and excellent advocacy skills.
And Mike has been part of every major debate taking place in tak-
ings law today.
Mike has been able to make such a difference for many reasons.
These include adherence to principle, perseverance, and a deep knowl-
edge of the law.
 Principle. Mike has a firm belief that people whose property
is taken, either by physical taking, by noise, or by regulation,
deserve to be compensated. This principle has infused all of
his litigation and all of his writings.
 Perseverance. Mike has been litigating and writing about
these issues for more than forty years. He has litigated re-
peatedly in the Ninth Circuit and the California courts, prob-
ably the most unfriendly venues for property rights litigation
in the entire country. He has also litigated in other parts of
the countryIm sure that was a relief for himand at the
* Litigation Director, Institute for Justice.
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U.S. Supreme Court. And takings cases last foreverfifteen
to twenty years is not an unusual amount of timeso perse-
verance is of course critical in seeing ones view of the law
realized.
 A comprehensive knowledge of the state of the law. Mike
understands every aspect of takings laweminent domain,
regulatory takings, inverse takings, physical occupation, the
many permutations of compensation questions, ripeness, and
mootness.
But Mike has other qualities that make him uniquely effective. He
is able both to work within the system and to criticize it from without.
And he brings incisive wit to his presentations in court and in aca-
demia. In an area that often does not get the attention it deserves,
humor is important.
Mike excels at working within a maze of illogical precedent while
arguing for a little more sanity in the law. There are many aspects of
takings law with which Mike disagrees, but when he litigates a case,
he argues within the case law as it is. I witnessed this when I watched
Mikes argument of Tahoe-Sierra.1 Virtually everything that was
going on made no sense at all. It made no sense that we were talking
about a tiny segment of an endless moratorium. It made no sense
that there was no way to challenge the total destruction of the plain-
tiffs property values. It made no sense that their neighbors could
build, yet they couldnt. Yet Mike betrayed no irritation with this state
of affairs. He argued against it, but with respect and even humor, and
worked from the Courts own precedents.
When he is outside the confines of the courtroom, however, Mike
offers clear-eyed academic criticism. Mike has written at least two
dozen articles about takings law. Unlike his arguments before courts,
his articles pull no punches, containing such lines as the ripeness rule
was nonsense when first articulated and it remains nonsense today.2
Indeed, Mike is able to combine a sense of humor with a summary
that cuts to the heart of things. From his early article Nobody Loves
an Airport3 to his most recent, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still
1. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
2. Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO
L. REV. 297, 298 (2014) (footnote omitted).
3. Michael M. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970).
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Forced to Play?,4 he is able to capture everything you need to know
simply in the title.
Anyone who has ever listened to Mikes presentations at ALI-CLE
(formerly ALI-ABA) has probably found himself or herself laughing
out loud. Mike is able to encapsulate the absurdity of so many prop-
erty law decisions while teaching at the same time. Thats a real gift.
For example, in his 2014 materials, Mike quoted from the Horne case
and then commented: Accordingly, whether an alternative remedy
exists does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court.5 Although
that has been said before, it does no harm to repeat it now and then.
Perhaps someone will listen.6
Mike is even able to use incisive humor under pressurea difficult
feat. My favorite moment in Tahoe-Sierra was when the high court
asked Mike about a state appellate case that conflicted with a posi-
tion he was asserting. Mike replied, I would submit that that court
erred. It happens. Lower courts do that sometimes.7 It was a perfect
response, and I have used variations of it in many legal briefs since.
Mike has argued four takings cases at the U.S. Supreme Court,
and he has won two. In any other area, this would sound like a mixed
record. In takings, winning two cases at the Supreme Court is a
near miracle.
The two wins established key precedents that changed the direc-
tion of takings litigation and continue to shape it today. In First En-
glish, the Court held there was actually a remedy for a temporary
taking, and that remedy was compensation.8 Then, in Del Monte
Dunes, the Court held that takings cases brought under Section 1983
get a jury trial.9
Mikes two losses, Preseault10 and Tahoe-Sierra,11 were really
victims of the Courts determination to force every takings case to be
heard on the specific facts of the particular case. No one is allowed
4. Berger, supra note 2.
5. Horne v. Dept of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013).
6. Michael M. Berger, Update on Takings Cases2014, ALI-CLE PROGRAM: EMINENT
DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 737 (2014).
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/00-1167.pdf.
8. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cnty., 482 U.S. 304,
31819 (1987).
9. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 70911 (1999).
10. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commn, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
11. 535 U.S. at 302.
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to challenge laws on their face; no one can get a ruling that a law or
policy is a taking. This is one of the bizarre but unfortunately consis-
tent features of regulatory takings law. It may be plain as day that
a law affects hundreds or thousands of people in exactly the same
way. It should therefore be perfectly possible to rule that there has
been a compensable taking on the face of the law or as a general mat-
ter. The quantity of compensation may well differ for each individual,
but the rule of law should be identical. However, this would make it
too easy for owners. Courts want to require each one of them to liti-
gate every single issue of right to compensation and then every single
issue of compensation.
Thats what happened in Preseault, in which the Court admitted
that a Rails-to-Trails conversion could be a compensable taking, but
then sent the owners back for another ten or fifteen years of litigation
to finally get redress. They did finally get compensation.12 And thats
what happened in Tahoe-Sierra, in which the court told all the owners
around Lake Tahoe that theywould just have to litigate individually.13
Unfortunately, so many of them had passed away or grown tired that
few, if any, ever secured redress.
Mikes other litigation has been similarly impressive. As I read the
decisions in Mikes cases about whether airport noise was a taking,
I realized something. Mike had taken a position at the beginning
that the operators of airports needed to pay people who lived nearby
for the damage to their homes and peaceful living. And over the course
of years of litigation, he won. Indeed, he won so completely that this
isnt even an issue any more. Its actually a settled legal question. In
any area that involves takings, that in itself is pretty amazing, be-
cause when you get to regulatory takings, of course, no question ever
appears to be finally settled. It always comes back.
Certainly, things are going well on Mikes issues these days. The
2012/2013 Supreme Court term heard three major takings cases that
all saw a ruling in favor of the owner. In Arkansas Game & Fish,
which involved repeated flooding by a state agency, the Court relied
on the decision that Mike won in First English and held that when
the government takes land even temporarily, as by flooding, it can
12. See Preseault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (documenting the
aftermath including judgment on the takings claim issued in May 2001).
13. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342.
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indeed be a taking.14 Although First English held that temporary
takings could still be takings, courts had not always followed it, and
there was a line of cases that seemed to exempt floodings from the
general rule. That loophole has been closed, at least for now.
In Koontz v. St. Johns River District, the Court resolved an issue
that had generated massive splits in the circuitswhether exac-
tions of cash from people in exchange for permits was subject to
Nollan/Dolan analysis.15 Courts were all over the map on that. Mike
filed an amicus, as did my organization. The case was litigated by
Pacific Legal Foundation. As usual in such cases, it was a 54 de-
cision. But it held unequivocally that cash exactions also had to be
examined for whether they made sense.16 Of course, there are many
more issues that will come up in this arena, but it is heartening that
the court actually occasionally subjects government action to judi-
cial scrutiny and then requires it to make some sense.
Mike is one of the leading critics of the Williamson County doc-
trine,17 cogently explaining why finality and ripeness do not require
someone to actually litigate an issue in the state court system to be
able to bring a federal claim. This is of course a continuing and vital
issue. Many cases raise it every year. And the decision last year in
Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture hinted that it might be roll-
ing back the Williamson County doctrine. It clarified that it was a
prudential doctrine, and it actually allowed someone to raise his or
her takings claim as a defense to an enforcement action without re-
quiring administrative exhaustion first.18
That was promising. But Williamson County remains a major
barrier to takings litigation, and no lawyer can litigate a case about
it without first reading Mike Bergers and Gideon Kanners excellent
14. Ark. Game & Fish Commn v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012).
15. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); see also Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Commn, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (prohibiting the government from taking land
by imposing conditions on land use permits that do not advance the legitimate purpose of the
land use permitting scheme); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that an oth-
erwise legitimate condition on a land use permit must be roughly proportional to the impact of
the proposed development).
16. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 259899.
17. See Williamson Cnty. Regl Planning Commn v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 19295 (1985) (holding a regulatory takings claim premature where the plaintiff,
according to the Court, had neither obtained a final decision about the applicability of the or-
dinance nor exhausted state procedures for obtaining just compensation).
18. Horne v. Dept of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 206164 (2013).
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article You Cant Get There from Here19 explaining the utter folly of
the Williamson County doctrine, or Mikes latest article, The Ripe-
ness Game.20
For those who havent succumbed to the pleasure of reading
articles about ripeness, I particularly enjoyed the analysis of compar-
ing the ripeness rules for property to the ripeness rules for other
rights. Of course, Mike was right. We have ripeness questions arise
in many casesnot just property. And we rely on all sorts of evidence
to establish ripeness, including cease and desist letters, enforcement
actions, responses to correspondence, refusals to allow application for
licenses, agency advisory opinions, and even filing notices of claim
that are then rejected. Each of these can be sufficient to show that the
agency in question has taken a definite stand. Often, something must
be done to obtain ripeness, but that something is never going through
an entire litigation in another court.
Mike has litigated and commented on this issue for decades. When
the Supreme Court finally changes this ridiculous rule, I know that
Mike and every other property litigator will breathe a huge sigh of
reliefif it doesnt provoke dancing in the streets.
Even Tahoe-Sierra, which was Mikes only real loss at the Supreme
Court, is not the end of its story. The Supreme Court and other courts
continue to struggle with the mess that the Court has created on fa-
cial and as-applied claims. This is an enormous problem in all litiga-
tion, but it is particularly problematic in takings. But the Koontz
decision creates a new opportunity in this regard. If you can challenge
an exaction of cash, perhaps you can challenge a law that exacts cash
from everyone who is subject to itthus allowing a facial challenge.
Thats exactly what happened in the district court in the recent Levin
case.21 There may still be a chance though to correct some of what
happened in Tahoe-Sierra if we are all as persistent as Mike.
Because I agree with so much that Mike has said in his articles and
his briefs, I found it a little challenging to identify a point of disagree-
ment or discussion. But I do have one. In what he and Gideon called
their response to the White River Junction Manifesto, they discuss
19. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Cant Get There from Here:
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-
Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004).
20. Berger, supra note 2.
21. Levin v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 2014 WL 5355088 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2014).
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the issue of the appropriate remedy for a taking.22 The White River
Junction Manifesto asserted that the remedy should be invalidation
of the law,23 while Mike and Gideon say that it should be compensa-
tion. As a practical matter, I guess that Mike is rightcourts seem
to prefer compensation, so perhaps were stuck with that. Yet I find
that in some ways I agree that the proper remedy ought to be invali-
dation or at least invalidation most of the time. And I was surprised
that Mike argued against it. It is one thing to admit that compensa-
tion is, in practical terms, more likely to work and another thing to
say that it is actually a more appropriate remedy.
So let me make a pitch for invalidation, albeit one that is totally
unsupported by Supreme Court precedent.
The Takings Clause requires that takings be for a public use. If
courts were to actually evaluate the claimed purposes, which they
virtually never do and have done even less after Kelo, they would
find that few takings or land regulations are for a public use. They
are for pie in the sky theories of how land use works that are untrue.
They are to benefit existing owners who have developed their lands
at the expense of those who want to develop. They are to keep out
middle or lower-income people that current residents dont like. All
of those laws should be invalidated. And even when there is a public
use, they should all be subject to a nexus and proportionality require-
ment like Nollan and Dolan. That would result in invalidation of
even more laws. We would then have land use policies that were not
punitive and that made sense, and that would be enormously benefi-
cial to owners and to the public. And certainly to law.
I want to conclude on a personal note. Ive known Mike for more
than a decadeless, I know, than many who litigate property cases,
but still a significant period of time. Ive called Mike many times to
discuss all kinds of takings issues, from California procedure to pub-
lic use to exactions. Never once, in all that time, has Mike been too
busy to talk to me. His knowledge, his kindness, and his practical
good sense make him a joy to deal with and to work with. Im de-
lighted that he is the first practitioner to win the award, and Im
honored to be speaking on this panel.
22. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto:
A Reply to the Gang fo Fives Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property,
19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986).
23. Norman Williams, Jr. et al., The White River Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984).

MICHAEL M. BERGERA PATH TO FAIRNESS
JANET BUSH HANDY*
The awarding of the 2014 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize
during the Eleventh Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Con-
ference at William & Mary Law School to Michael Bergerprovided the
opportunity to recognize that the path which he followed to reshape
our countrys property rights jurisprudence was set in his seminal law
review article, To Regulate, or Not to RegulateIs That the Question?
Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma between Environmental Protec-
tion and Private Property Rights.1 After writing this article Mr. Berger
spent the next forty years working on the cases that would provide
the path to an understanding that the only valid understanding of con-
stitutional property rights must recognize the concept of fairness. The
themes that he would repeat to the Supreme Court in both winning
and losing cases were well established and explained in the 1975
Reflections. Those themes continue to resonate in constantly evolv-
ing jurisprudence of property rights.
Mr. Berger explained that his thoughts on property rights issues
needed to be understood as coming in a time when even the newly
appointed Attorney General recognized that there was an enormous
amount of cynicism about the administration of justice in the United
States.2 This cynicism had grown, growing to the point when even
judges commented on the growing number of people losing faith in
Government and questioning the quality of justice dispensed in the
courts,3 while other judges took judicial notice of the fact that a
* Deputy Counsel to State Highway Administration, Assistant Attorney General,
Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland. I am grateful to the Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference for the invitation to present a condemnor litigators per-
spective. I would like to thank my husband, Robert A. Handy, Ed. D., for his encouragement and
editing suggestions.
1. 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Reflections].
2. Id. at 300 (citing Ostrow, Levi Calls Broad Distrust of Law System a Problem, L.A.TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1975, pt 1, at 4, col. 1 (quoting Attorney General Edward H. Levi)).
3. Id. (citing Thompson, Appellate Court ReformThe Near Term, 6 BEVERLY HILLS B.J.,
Sept., 1972, at 9, 13, 18; Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?, 47
CAL.ST. B.J. 294 passim (1972); Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 1262, 1268 (1972)).
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large cross-section of the citizenry entertained an opinion that the
Government is no longer representative of the people.4
Despite this atmosphere of cynicism, Michael Berger fearlessly
called for action, explaining,
[i]n the old days we had such abundant land and the land was so
rich that waste didnt seem to matter. But millions of acres of our
prime agricultural land has fallen to the tract builders and much
more is doomed. Litter, endless billboards, honkytonk commer-
cialism, and banal slurb construction line the highways. Poisons
and sewage pollute our bays, lakes and rivers. Smog chokes Los
Angeles, but what the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central
Valley can anticipate will make Los Angeles seem desirable. And
this is but part of the story.
Despite the awesome political power of those who make money
in the process of polluting and destroying the resources of Cali-
fornia, we have it within our power to halt the spread of blight and
to return this bright land to the splendor it once was. Right now,
today, we have the constitutional right, the technology and the
money. The problem is how to muster them.5
The author recognized there were problems with reaching this esti-
mable goal, and, seeing there was no easy path to solutions, he ex-
plained that anyone who was interested in rational problem-solving
must borrow a phrase from Justice Cardozo and make [his] knowl-
edge as deep as the science and as broad and universal as the culture
of [his] day.6
It is clear from the beginning that Mr. Berger understood that the
government, whether federal, state, or local, had the responsibility
to respond to the needs of the public. He did not advocate that private
property should be free from all government regulation or that the
government should be given free rein to regulate that property until
its value was negated. The theme of his 1975 article and the core of
his notable career was set forth concisely and elegantly:
What is urged is that the public take a long, hard look at what its
needs are, assess all the costs involved, and proceed accordingly.
4. Id. at 301 (citing Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 25758, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628,
634 (1972)).
5. Id. at 253.
6. Id. at 263 (citing Cardozo, Our Lady of the Common Law, 13 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 231,
232 (1939)).
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If the public wants land uses (or non-uses) which benefit the
public generally, then the public should buy the property, or an
appropriate interest in the property, rather than attempt to force
individual property owners to devote their property to public use
without compensation.7
How extraordinary is it that he was able to write a thesis for his en-
tire professional life that can be reviewed forty years later and con-
firms that this thesis provided a map, not only for his own personal
career trajectory but a map for the major property rights Supreme
Court jurisprudence of that forty-year period? The thesis not only
remains an accurate summary of his professional mission but con-
tinues to be important to all who care about the constitutional pro-
tection of our fundamental right to own property.
Many discussions of property rights start with the proposition that
property rights are fundamental, but the young Michael Berger began
by explaining why they are fundamental. Long before the Bill of
Rights, man had these primordial instincts, and the bottom line was
that we needed property rights so that we were not forced to protect
our space by killing each other.8
When Mr. Berger first argued in the Supreme Court, he may have
looked up at the Ten Commandments represented in the courtroom
and remembered the connection that he made between the Bill of
Rights protection of property and his 1975 explanation of why the
Bible endures as a present day social guide:
Thus, we find the Tenth Commandment: Thou shalt not covet
thy neighbors house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbors wife, nor
his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor
anything that is thy neighbors.9 As Justice Holmes expressed it,
Property is protected because such protection answers a demand
of human nature, and therefore takes the place of a fight.10
Thus, we have developed systems of title recording and title
insurance (not to mentionstatutesof limitation) inorder to provide
security of land ownership to allay these otherwise deep-seated
universal anxieties and, intertwined with personal ownership,
satisfy the need for social stability. The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly so recognized: No class of laws is more
7. Id. at 257.
8. Id. at 266.
9. Id. at 267 (citing Deuteronomy 5:1217).
10. Id. (citing Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)).
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universally sanctioned by the practice of nations and the consent
of mankind, than laws which give peace and confidence to the
actual possession and tiller of the soil.11
Later in 2001, when he and Gideon Kanner rephrased the Supreme
Courts question in the Petitioners Brief in the Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council v. TRPA to whether the Court of Appeals properly deter-
mined that government action freezing all productive use of private
land does not constitute a taking,12 he must have wondered why this
question was still being debated, because in 1975, he understood that
it was uniformly settled law that zoning which deprives the land-
owner of all reasonable use of his property is deemed confiscatory
and hence constitutes a taking, such zoning gives rise to relief by
inverse condemnation.13
Reading the many cases that were and continue to be fought to
establish the applicability of the Fifth Amendment, it is striking how
many obtuse parties were able to convince equally obtuse judges as
to the invalidity of the fundamental conclusion that was so obvious
to Michael Berger in 1975: if the government wants your property, it
should pay for it. This is so fundamental that every attorney repre-
senting any government agency in land use or acquisition matters
whose client disputes this conclusion should consider themselves obli-
gated to remind their client that the Constitution of the United States
establishes that the government cannot take private property with-
out the payment of just compensation.
There is no valid constitutional argument that there is no compen-
sable taking if the government does not have enough money, if the
government has a better use for it, if the government decides the envi-
ronment needs to be protected, or if the taking is for a limited period
of time.
These are just a few of the exceptions which Mr. Berger was
required to rebut in courts across the country and, ultimately, in his
briefs and amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court.14 He did not
11. Id. at 267 (citing Hawkins v. Barneys Lessee, 30 U.S. 457, 466 (1831)).
12. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
13. 1975 Reflections, supra note 1, at 279.
14. Mr. Berger represented property owners before the U.S. Supreme Court in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999), Preseault v. ICC, 494
U.S. 1 (1990), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
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argue that the government should avoid all regulations or that it was
always acting with an evil intent. Instead he recognized that the need
to plan for our future would require limitations on development. He
did not argue for no government but reasonable government. He did
not argue that there was no public use which could justify an eminent
domain taking, only that there really is a limit to what a public use
can mean.15
While many government lawyers have struggled with the concept
that temporary takings must be compensable, government attorneys
who acquire property for roads have long understood the concept.
Mr. Bergers argument before the Supreme Court in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles16
addressed the fundamentals that every highway lawyer knows well.
JUSTICE. A major bridge or a freeway construction or something
could deprive a property owner of access for a good while.
MR. BERGER. Yes, they can. And under
JUSTICE. And in your view that would require compensation.
MR. BERGER. Under settled law, Your Honor, if access is totally
deprived to property, that is the taking of the property interest
and requires compensation.
UNKNOWN SPEAKER. Even though it is admittedly for a tempo-
rary duration?
MR.BERGER. Yes, maam. The highway people routinely condemn
temporary easements so that they can perform just that kind of
construction without having to litigate with people over inverse
compensation cases.
They acknowledge that they are taking their access and inter-
fering with their use, and they directly go ahead and buy that
interest.17
(1987), and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Mr. Bergers amicus briefs in defense
of property rights included Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), Lingle v. Chevron
USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Commn, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
15. Berger asked the Supreme Court to recognize the Fifth Amendments limitation that
the awesome power of eminent domain be used only to acquire property for public use, not
for private economic development. Brief Amici Curiae of the Am. Farm Bureau Fedn & the
Farm Bureau Fedns of the Following States: Cal., Conn., Fla., Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Mich., New
Haven Cnty., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Penn., R.I., Tex., Utah, and Va. in Support of Peti-
tioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
16. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
17. Oral Argument of Michael M. Berger, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases
/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1199.
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Perhaps there would be fewer obtuse litigants if the government
attorneys who advocate that there should be no compensable tempo-
rary takings should take Mr. Bergers suggestion and talk to the gov-
ernments road department who well understand that even if the
entry onto the property is only for a period of construction, a tempo-
rary easement must be acquired and compensation paid for that
interest.
Having the opportunity to write briefs on behalf of petitioners as
well as amici for submission to the Supreme Court, Mr. Berger has
been steadfast in his efforts to make the Fifth Amendment protec-
tions of real property more than mere words. To make his point, one
quote which Mr. Berger has repeated in his briefs before the Supreme
Court is [a]s Justice Brennan aptly put it: After all, if a policeman
must know the Constitution, then why not a planner? (San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 661 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting on behalf of four Justices)).18
This question is not broad enough. A police officer must know the
Constitution because it defines the officers job. In keeping the peace,
she may only make arrests or conduct searches within constitutional
limits. While Americans are not renowned for their constitutional
knowledge, the majority can recite their rights if they are arrested.
They may not know the basis for the Supreme Courts decision in
Miranda v. Arizona,19 but most Americans can recite that before
being questioned they have the right to remain silent, that anything
that they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, that
they have a right to an attorney, and if they cannot afford an attor-
ney one will be appointed for them.20 Despite this general knowledge,
the police officer must still advise every suspect of his or her rights,
or the state will suffer the constitutionally mandated consequences.
Fewer citizens can also recite the limits on government taking of
property without just compensation, and even fewer can explain their
rights in a temporary takings situation as established by the Supreme
Court. Since these rights are so fundamental, should not only the
18. Brief for Petitioners at 24, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167); Brief for Respondents at 30 n.39, City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-1235); Brief of Amici Curiae at
11 n.5, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warn-
ings have become part of our national culture. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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planner but every government representative who deals with land
use regulations or acquisitions of real property be familiar with these
basis constitutional fundamentals? And should they not also be able
to explain those concepts to the individuals whose property is sub-
ject to a taking, either regulatory or direct?
The litigation about whether a criminal defendants Miranda rights
have been granted did not end with the decision of the Supreme Court.
Instead numerous cases have been brought since 1966, as defen-
dants have challenged their convictions because of deficiencies in the
application of those rights.21 So too will the challenges to the govern-
ments regulatory and direct takings continue. But those arguments
will forever be framed by Mr. Bergers hard-fought victories. Today,
as in 1975, our citizens are cynical, and environmental problems are
pressing. Today, as in 1975, Michael Bergers conclusion identifying
what needs to be done to face those challenges will provide a path to
be followed to a fair application of the constitutionally protected prop-
erty rights. As he explained:
There is room for regulation. More than that, there is a need for
regulation. But if it is truly to serve our best interests as a peo-
ple, it must be a balanced regulation; a type which is fair to all.
In a way, those calling for a change are right: we do need new,
flexible tools to deal with the modern world. The problem is that
they really propose nothing new. Their new regulation is really
no more than old-hat Euclidean zoning without any safeguards.
That just will not wash. What will work is a realistic look at the
governmental powers involved, an abandonment of fascination
with labels and an effort at purchasing the hard-earned property
which society wants to preserve. That may not be the most sugar-
coated message to deliver, but, in the late Chief Justices words,
its fair.22
21. The 1966 Miranda decision has been reviewed throughout the years. The most recent
Supreme Court discussion of this case is White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2013).
22. 1975 Reflections, supra note 1, at 301.

NOVEL TAKINGS THEORIES: TESTING THE BOUNDARIES
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CLAIMS
JAMES S. BURLING*
INTRODUCTION
In the past seventy-five years, property rights litigation has
transformed from a constitutional afterthought to a major force in
the defense of a fundamental right. It did not happen overnight, and
it did not happen without some very heavy lifting, fortuitous circum-
stances, and an intellectual revival in the Academy. For the first third
of the past seventy-five years, arguments suggesting limits on govern-
ment action based on property were routinely unsuccessful despite
vague suggestions from the Supreme Court in the 1920s. For the mid-
dle twenty-five years, the courts were largely silent, with property
rights litigation barely registering on the Supreme Courts radar. But
for the past quarter century or so, arguments that would once have
been considered novel and concomitantly futile have gained sub-
stantial traction in the courts, especially the Supreme Court.
So, what accounts for the transformation of novelty into doctrine?
And how does one avoid appearing too novel, such that courts will
avoid a favorable ruling at all costs? This article will explore the elu-
sive boundary between novelty and viability in property rights cases.
The thesis is simple: some novelty is good, but too much is doomed to
failure. And it is only when a novel idea is accompanied by compel-
ling facts and intellectual heft that the law is likely to be advanced.
The underlying premise of this essay is that the protection of
property rights is overall a benefit to both societal needs and individ-
ual liberty. Property rights are a fundamental attribute of the liberty
that the Federal Constitution is designed to protect. In arguing for
cases that advance the cause of property rights, one must never forget
that neither the Constitution nor the courts will care about property
* Director of Litigation, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. An earlier
unpublished version of this paper was presented at an ALI-CLE course on Eminent Domain on
February 7, 2015.
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for its own sake; rather the defense of property must be consistent
with the defense of larger societal concerns. As the Supreme Court
put it over a decade before the dawn of the property rights revolution:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is
a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a personal
right, whether the property in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.1
This sentiment was not new. It was an essential ingredient of intel-
lectual thought from John Lockes Second Treatise on Government2 to
James Madisons A Property in Our Rights.3 But the Courts recitation
of this principle after a long dormancy during the heyday of pro-
gressivism signaled a new respect and new opportunities for a long-
ignored principlea principle that was not novel in the larger sweep
of history, but somewhat novel in recent history: that property rights
deserved vigorous protection by the courts from infringements by
government agencies.
1. Lynch v. Household Fin., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
2. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT §§ 124, 201, 222 (Whenever the
legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People . . . they put themselves
into a state of War with the People, who are there upon absolved from any further obedience.).
Locke is cited in Lynch for support of the Courts thesis.
3. James Madison, A Property in our Rights, THE NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792,
reprinted in 1 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION Ch. 16,
Doc. 23 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1987), Madison wrote:
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies
in various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses.
This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his. According to this standard of
merit, the praise of affording a just security to property, should be sparingly be-
stowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the possessions
of individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their
opinions, in which they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more
valuable property.
Id. For more on the role of property thought during the founding of the republic, see JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998).
2015] NOVEL TAKINGS THEORIES 41
I. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN PROPERTY RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCEPENNSYLVANIA COAL V. MAHON TO THE
MODERN ERA4
The first Supreme Court recognition of the potential of regulatory
takings, the foundation ofmodern propertyrights jurisprudence, came
in 1922 with Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.5 In that case, the land-
owners had sold their mineral rights to various coal mining compa-
nies. Included in those sales were the support estate. In other words,
the coal companies bought not only the coal but the right to allow
the surface to collapse after mining withdrew the coal. Being that
there were far more surface landowners than coal companies, the
Pennsylvania legislature adopted a statute forbidding companies
from removing coal that might cause a surface collapse. The coal com-
panies objected. Justice Holmes, the great progressive, Lochner dis-
senter, and not a great friend to business, ruled in favor of the coal
companies, saying, [t]he general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.6 Thats it. There was no in-depth analysis
4. For a more complete summary of modern takings law, see James S. Burling, Private
Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C.ENVTL.AFF.L.REV. 1 (2002). For
a complete treatment of regulatory takings law, see STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS
(25th ed., 2012).
5. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Despite the common assertion that the doctrine of regulatory
takings began with Pennsylvania Coal, it is much more accurate to say that the doctrine was
revived with that case, and that it was developed a century earlier in state courts and then
forgotten. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211 (1996). As a dissenting Montana Supreme Court justice
recently explained:
Contrary to the Courts assertion in ¶ 67, the notion of a regulatory takingwhere
the government regulates private property rights, as opposed to condemning or
directly appropriating private propertywas recognized in this country long before
1922. Indeed, recognition of this sort of taking may be found in the 19th century
decisions of numerous state courts and even the Supreme Court. See generally
Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211; Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent:
The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis Goes Too Far, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 22838
(1999); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003); David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Tak-
ings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497,
51933 (2004).
Kafka v. Montana Dept of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 43 (2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
6. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
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of the Takings Clause, or the Due Process Clause for that matter.7
Nor was there much in the way of guidance beyond the test of too
far. But this sentence stands out from the other rhetorical flourishes
of the opinion and has come to stand for the beginning of modern era
of takings jurisprudence. Justice Brandeis dissented from the holding,
saying that the defendant has failed to adduce any evidence from
which it appears that to restrict its mining operations was an unrea-
sonable exercise of the police power.8 This was a reflection of the
belief that any valid exercise of the police power could absolve any
takings liability.9 In addition, Brandeis surmised that there might be
an average reciprocity of advantage,10 negating any liability for an
uncompensated taking. For a dissent, this formulation has been given
great weight and is often trotted out to deny takings liability for land
use regulationsin other words, reciprocity of advantage has been
a thorn in the side of regulatory takings cases and has coexisted un-
easily with the evolution of regulatory takings doctrine.
In looking at the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts opinion in Mahon
v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,11 there is no indication that the parties ac-
tually raised a regulatory taking or even a Takings Clause violation.
So this is not a case in which it is apparent that the parties brought
a novel takings claim or any sort of regulatory takings claim at all.
But it does illustrate the two key elements that any novel takings
claim must have to succeed: it must have compelling facts, and it
must be a fairly logical extension of existing doctrine. On the former
point, the facts might not seem terribly compelling todaywith coal
companies causing the collapse of the surface under buildings. But
the early part of the last century, environmental consciousness was
not at the forefront of prioritieseconomic survival was.12 Moreover,
the Court would have been reminded that the companies actually
bought and paid for the right to do this and that the surface owners
had essentially convinced the legislature to renege on the deal. On the
7. Which is significant because a number of the property rights cases from this era do not
separate out these two constitutional clauses.
8. 260 U.S. at 41920 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. Most famously articulated in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (no government
takings liability from the prohibition of the manufacture of alcohol).
10. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co. 118 A. 491 (Pa. 1922).
12. By the time of Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987),
however, the public consciousness had changed enough for the Court to reach a different result
in a case of almost identical facts.
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doctrinal front, the Court had already ruled that state judicial action
can result in a taking or due process violation (the two concepts were
used interchangeably during this period).13 So it was not a huge
stretch to say that an action of a state legislature could result in a
takings claim as well.
From Pennsylvania Coal to the 1980s, the idea that a regulation
could result in takings liability was more of an academic curiosity
than a useable doctrine in the hands of landowners and their attor-
neys. It was not for want of trying.
In 1926, the Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty upheld a
scheme of land use zoning against a claim that it violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.14 The Court held that zoning plan lawful because
it was not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.15 As
to the facts, the Court was not convinced that the unproven financial
impact to the landowners outweighed the negative effects of not
zoning. The Court was particularly concerned about the blight of par-
asitic apartment buildings on residential districts and felt no compul-
sion to extend property protections in this circumstance.16 A couple
of years later, the Court did strike down a zoning regulationthis
time because on the facts there was no practical use for the property
and not an adequate return on the amount of any investment for the
development of the property.17 However, this seems to have been a
one-off decision not to be repeated by the Court (outside the context
of non-property rights and related civil rights violations).18
A few years after Pennsylvania Coal, in 1928, the Court found no
problem when the owner of cedar trees was forced to destroy his trees,
without compensation, to prevent the spread of blight from the cedar
trees to the more valuable apple trees.19 Again, the facts in favor of
13. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235
(1897) (If compensation for private property taken for public use is an essential element of due
process of law as ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the final judgment of a state
court, under the authority of which the property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the
State within the meaning of that amendment.).
14. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
15. Id. at 395.
16. Id. at 394.
17. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928).
18. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
19. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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the landowners were not compelling to the Court: either the cedar
trees would have to be removed (and the timber sold), or the more
valuable apple trees would die. The Court found no need to apply or
extend a Takings or Due Process theory to these circumstances.20
Following this relative flurry of activity, nothing much of any sig-
nificance happened in regulatory takings for the next half century.21
What happened next, beginning in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, has
been written about extensively elsewhere.22 In short, through a series
of cases, the Court managed to evade finding the existence of a regu-
latory taking, although it established a number of tests, some of which
have withstood the test of time, others of which have not.23 With the
exception of Loretto, each one of these attempts to establish a regu-
latory taking failed.24 But they certainly represented what had to be
considered novel or at least bold attempts to claim a taking in light
of over fifty years of silence from the Supreme Court.
II. THE 1987 TRIFECTA
What happened next in 1987 was the culmination ofgood facts, good
theories, and a change in the intellectual currents. With the cases
20. For more on the background of the dispute between the competing owners of these two
types of trees and why the claim may have failed, see William A. Fischel, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation in Miller v. Schoene, 3 REV.
L. & ECON. 133 (2007).
21. One possible exception could be United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), a case in
which airplane overflights made property unusable and lead to government takings liability.
But that case was more akin to a physical invasion, like flooding or commandeering the use of
the property, rather than a taking caused only by the regulation of the property.
22. See Eagle, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (the beginning
of the amorphous regulatory takings tests of economic impact, investment backed expecta-
tions and character of the regulation); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 17980
(1979) (physical invasion taking of private waterway); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (establishing the substantially advances a legitimate state interest and economically
viable use tests for regulatory takings, the former of which was rejected later in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (explaining that the substantially advances test
of Agins is a Due Process test)); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (physical invasions
are always takings); Williamson Cnty. Regl Planning Commn v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (setting in motion a jurisdictional bar to bringing federal constitutional
takings claims in federal courts unless there is final agency action and state compensation rem-
edies have been utilized); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Cnty. of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986)
(takings claim not ripe because alternatives not pursued).
24. Of course, to be precise, Loretto was not actually a regulatory takings case but rather a
physical invasion taking more along the lines of Causby than Pennsylvania Coals too far test.
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through the late 1970s and 1980s that got close to finding a regulatory
takingbut not close enough for property ownersthe Academy
had begun to stir. There were law review articles across the ideologi-
cal spectrum with most giving some degree of credence to the idea of
a regulatory taking, albeit often in limited terms.25
Most significantly, in 1985 Richard Epsteins The Takings: Private
Property Rights and the Power of Eminent Domain was published,
and Epsteins libertarian view of regulatory takings reached a more
general audience. Thus, by 1987, the academic foundations had been
built that made it possible for the Court to recognize and articulate
the doctrine of regulatory takings.
The first case of 1987, Keystone Bituminous,26 was an inauspicious
beginning to the 1987 takings cases. There, Pennsylvania passed a
regulation requiring that coal miners leave some coal in the ground in
order to prevent the collapse of the surface. This was, of course, quite
similar to the facts that animated Justice Holmess decision in Penn-
sylvania Coal. Nevertheless, the Court distinguished Pennsylvania
Coal and rejected a facial regulatory taking claim. The coal operators
making the takings argument thought they had some controlling au-
thority in Pennsylvania Coal, yet their claim could hardly be called
novel in such circumstances. If anything, the governments argu-
ment could be considered novel in light of that precedent. Neverthe-
less, the passage of time and the publics embrace of environmental
values led the Court to reach a different conclusion. When it came to
the argument that the regulation would require twenty-seven million
tons of coal to be left in the ground, the Court essentially reasoned
that the overall economic impact was not that great.27
But,with First English EvangelicalChurch v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,28
the Justiceschanged course. With Justice Scalia writing the opinion,29
25. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV.L.REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971), William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA,
THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL
(Council on Envtl. Quality) (1973).
26. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The opinion was
written byJustice Stevens, joinedbyJustices Brennan, White, Marshal, and Blackmun. Justice
Rehnquist wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Powell, OConnor, and Scalia.
27. Id. at 499.
28. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
29. He was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia.
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and OConnor. The point of
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the Court held that if a regulation takes property, even for a short
period of time, compensation is due for the period of the taking.30 This
was a shot in the arm for property owners who had been enduring
an endless sue-and-start-over scenario for decades in California and
elsewhere.31 In other words, after First English, landowners could
seek compensation, rather than just invalidation, as a remedy for a
regulatory taking, giving landowners and their attorneys an incen-
tive to sue and governments an incentive not to take.32
The most telling victory for property owners in 1987 came with
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.33 With that case, the Court
required that government permitting agencies must show a nexus
or relationship between impacts caused by a development project and
the mitigating demands imposed on the developer. This too was not
much of a novelty in the law; most states required such a relationship.
Indeed, so too did California in a number of published decisions. But
what had happened in California was that this relationship test was
listing out the names of the justices is simply to note that there was no change in personnel that
explains the shift towards more favorable property rights opinions; it was more the combined
weight of the various justices reactions to the particular facts and doctrines being advocated
in each case.
30. Id. Ultimately, on remand to the lower courts, no taking was found. But the principal of
compensation for a temporary taking remains intact.
31. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 65557 n.28 (1980).
Justice Brennan seemed particularly peeved with the following advice given by a California city
attorney to his fellow city attorneys at a 1974 annual conference of the National Institute of Mu-
nicipal Law Officers in California:
IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START
OVER AGAIN.
If legal preventative maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim
attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, dont worry about
it. All is not lost. One of the extra goodies contained in the recent [California] Su-
preme Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura appears to allow the City
to change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it more
reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again. . . .
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and
still win the war. Good luck.
Id. (citing Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations,
38B NIMLO MUN. L. REV. 19293 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
32. Of course, California, being California, devised a rule wherein invalidationof a regulation
might only be part of the normal permitting process, during which no compensation is due.
See, e.g., Landgate v. California Coastal Commn, 936 P.2d 472 (1997), cert. denied, 575 U.S.
876 (1998).
33. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). This time Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, White, Powell, and OConnor. The dissenters included Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
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being justified by increasingly tenuous or imaginative relationships
at the behest of increasingly aggressive agencies, such as the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission. In Nollan for example, the state argued
that its demand of some thirty percent of the Nollans property in ex-
change for a permit to replace one home with a somewhat larger home
was justified because of general policies in favor of public access and
because building the home would create a psychological barrier be-
tween people and their coastline. Even taking these arguments as
true, however, the Court found that there was no relationship be-
tween these harms and the particular land that the Nollans had to
surrender.
While none of the successful takingsarguments before the Supreme
Court could be characterized as particularly novel, they did wake up
lawyers across the country to the possibility that (1) money could
be made in regulatory takings cases, (2) there was another cause of
action in the lawyers quiver, and (3) the arrow could be pulled out
when nothing else would seem to work. These factors, combined with
the adage that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, have led to a
plethora of interesting takings arguments since 1987. While many
regulatory takings claims filed since 1987 have had a solid basis in the
law and fact, and while some have even been successful, the remain-
der of this article will focus on some novel claimsclaims that could
be characterized as ranging from creative to bizarre. Much has been
written on the more normal run of the mill regulatory takings claims,
but not as much on those that are truly novel and idiosyncratic.
To a property rights advocate, there is a problem with claims that
seek not to push the boundaries of the law, but rather to shatter those
boundaries. Claims with bad facts or bad law lead to bad decisions
that affect cases with good facts or good law behind them. Advocates
for government authority and judges sympathetic to government ar-
guments will use these cases to develop precedents that make it eas-
ier for the government to win future cases.
III. COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED NOVEL TAKINGS CLAIMS
This section is written from the perspective of an attorney who
seeks to advance the cause ofproperty rights by carefully litigating the
best facts available in cases that may push the boundaries of the law
but never push the boundaries beyond the realm of reasonableness.
From the perspective of a property rights advocate, the best cases are
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those that highlight the adverse consequences of bad government
behaviorcases that will make the judiciary take notice that there
is something wrong that must be fixed. Cases with unsympathetic
clients or clients with bizarre grievances do not advance the cause of
property rights.
A. Satellites and Takings
One pervasive theme that lawyers should take away from the
study of regulatory takings is that the first step in any property rights
analysis, whether the asserted claim being considered sounds in reg-
ulatory takings or due process, is to understand and define the prop-
erty right at issue. Most importantly, there has to be a property right
at issue. In United States v. Willow River Power Co.,34 the government
raised the water level downstream from a hydroelectric plant and
thereby reduced the distance the water could fall through the tur-
bines and, therefore, the efficiency and profits from the plant. The
Court held this was not a taking because not all economic interests
are property rights; only those economic advantages are rights which
have the law back of them,35 and they must be legally protected
interests.36 Because there was no property right in any particular
downstream water level, there was nothing to be taken and no due
process to be denied. The lesson here is that a property owner contem-
plating a constitutional claim over the regulation of property must
first understand what property interest is actually implicated before
proceeding to court.
This same theme was repeated nearly a half century later in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council37 in which the Court reiterated this
point from the opposite perspective. It found that when government
asserts a nuisance defense to a takings claim, the government must
demonstrate the existence of the common law nuisance limitation:
Any limitation [on the use of property] so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the States
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.38
34. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
35. Id. at 502.
36. Id. at 503.
37. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
38. Id. at 1029.
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With these principles in mind, we turn to Howard v. United States.39
In that case the plaintiff alleged that satellite surveillance of Howards
property as well as the governments failure to accept a late contract
bid were takings. Think about itif the government were to find
some kind of property right not to have a satellite go whizzing by a
few hundred miles overhead every couple of hours, and then to find
that the violation of that right implicated a takings claim, the results
would portend astronomical levels of government liability. While it
is true that property rights were once defined to extend from the cen-
ter of the earth skyward to the heavens, that doctrine existed before
air flight. Thus, while Causby found that aircraft overflights at
eighty-three feet could cause a physical invasion-style taking, the
Court there did so on the basis of the impact of the flights on the
ground, not on an anachronistic reliance on property definitions
originating in the middle ages.40 Now, to be fair, in addition to more
traditional Causby-like claims,41 Howard wasnt only claiming a strict
physical invasion or a claim based on an anachronistic definition of
property, but rather a taking of the plaintiffs privacy, peace of mind,
and ability to secure gainful employment.42 Clearly, a new age claim
for a cadet of the space age. However, the court suggested that if
these allegations were true, they might implicate criminal acts or
tortsclaims that were not cognizable in the court.43 As for the
contract-based claims, the claimant failed to assert a valid offer, so
there was no contract claim or taking of any such contract.44
39. 21 Cl. Ct. 475 (1990).
40. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
41. Well, sort of. Plaintiff also claims a taking of his personal property by agents of NASA
who flagrantly, maliciously and loudly fly commercial and smaller aircraft at low altitudes con-
stituting a nuisance, and cause aircraft contrails that resemble rocket launches. 21 Cl. Ct.
at 477.
42. Id. at 479. Moreover, NASA harassed him, watched his person, and listened to his
private conversations continuously over the past seventeen years and, by unexplained actions,
was to blame for his lack of gainful employment. Id. I suppose I should point out that this claim
was brought pro se, and that no attorney was responsible for its contents. Surprisingly, Howard
did not live in California where such claims might be considered more credible: All of this activ-
ity allegedly occurred from 1973 to present in Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, Massachusetts;
Chicago, Illinois; and Gary, Indiana. Id.
43. The intersection between torts and takings, it should be noted, can be somewhat murky.
See, e.g., ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, TAKINGS AND TORTS: THE ROLE OF INTENTION AND FORE-
SEEABILITY IN ASSESSING TAKINGS DAMAGES SS036 ALI-ABA 437 (Feb. 1719, 2011).
44. 21 Cl. Ct. at 478.
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B. Dancing and Takings I: Lap Dancing the Takings Claim Away
Attorneys are always hoping the next big damages case will put
them into the lap of luxury. Connoisseurs of dance may wish to be up
close and personal to the dancers, especially dancers engaged in the
constitutionally protected art of lap dancing.45 And the dancers of
this aesthetic understand that proximity breeds tips. So when a mu-
nicipality imposes proximity restrictions on the exercise of this art
form, separating dancers from their customers, the dancers income,
among other things, may shrink. But does this rise to a taking of the
foregone tips?
After all, we know that money is property, the taking of which can
give rise to a valid takings claim.46 But what if it is not money itself
that is taken but the hope to earn more in the future from satisfied
customers? In Gammoh v. City of La Habra,47 the Ninth Circuit found
that the dancers had not shown they had any sort of property inter-
est in that alleged loss of income. Thus the takings claim was prop-
erly dismissed.48 This claim was clearly an act of desperationa quick
Westlaw perusal of the fate of proximity restrictions on lap dancing
makes it plain that while the Supreme Court, in all of its wisdom, has
deemed that the Constitution protects certain sexually oriented ar-
tistic endeavors, that protection is not absolute, and various proximity
regulations are permissible.
C. Dancing and Takings II: Raisins Back in the High Court
One of the truly great contributions to late twentieth-century
American culture was the mash-up between pop music, claymation,
and commercial television. We are talking, of course, about the tri-
umphant dancing raisin commercials brought to us by the California
Raisin Commission that featured Heard It Through the Grapevine.49
Raisins may be cute when they dance, but government control
of the raisin market is not, and it has engendered much litigation.
45. According to plaintiffs in one case, so-called lap dancing, [is] arguably another unique
form of expressive conduct. Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 556 (9th Cir. 1998).
46. See, e.g., Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
47. 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2005).
48. Id. at 1122.
49. See Video, Heard It Through the Grapevine, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pM2OK
_JaJ9I (last visited June 10, 2015) (original version); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
sDkA1pCQFOo (last visited June 10, 2015) (Michael Jackson version); https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=nhIvBZmQUWY (June 10, 2015) (Ray Charles version).
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First, there was a First Amendment challenge to the fee assessed
raisin growers to finance marketing programs, such as the Grapevine
commercials.50 It lost. Then there was an unsuccessful antitrust
challenge.51 Neither of these challengesmade it to the Supreme Court.
But now a takings claim has made it there twice.
The underlying question is whether a requirement to give a portion
of a farmers raisin crop in exchange for permission to sell the re-
mainder is a taking of those raisins. In the cases first trip to the Su-
preme Court, the government and the raisin growers argued whether
the takings case should have been brought in the Court of Federal
Claims or federal district court.52 The Ninth Circuit had tried to get
rid of the case, but the Supreme Court said the district court was just
fine. But along the way, members of the Court had some scathing
characterizations of the statute. Notably, Justice Kagan remarked at
oral argument that perhaps the best course would be for the Ninth
Circuit . . . [to] try to figure out whether this marketing order is a
taking or its just the worlds most outdated law.53
But a return to the district court, and eventually the Ninth Circuit,
was no guarantee of relief. After dealing with some preliminary stand-
ing issues, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to find that a Penn Central
claim was not before the Court and that there was no physical inva-
sion of the raisins.54 The court reasoned that physical invasion cases
like Loretto involved only real property, and since the Court in Lucas
suggested that Takings Clause protections for personal property were
less robust than for real property, there was no physical invasion
50. See, e.g., Delano Farms v. Cal. Table Grape Commn, 586 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 159 (2010) (holding that mandatory assessments under state law do not violate
the First Amendment), as discussed in Jeremiah Paul, Is a Grape Just a Grape? California Table
Grape Commissions Mandatory Assessment Funded Generic Advertising Scheme vs. Growers
First Amendment Rights, 21 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 207, 212 (2012). Such schemes had
been previously upheld in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (nut
tree assessments), but later were called into question in United Foods v. United Foods, 533 U.S.
405 (2001) (mushroom marketing orders violated First Amendment because the advertising
was the principal object of the regulatory scheme).
51. Delano Farms v. California Table Grape Commn, 655 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 644 (2012).
52. See Horne v. United States Dept of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013).
53. Oral Arg. in Horne v. Dept of Agric., 2013 WL 3132218, at *49 (2013).
54. The Hornes, however, have intentionally declined to pursue a Penn Central claim.
Instead, they argue the Marketing Order, though a regulation, works a categorical taking.
Horne v. U.S. Dept of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, Horne v. Dept
of Agric., No. 14-275, 2015 WL 213643 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015).
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taking of the portion of raisin crop (or cash in lieu) confiscated by
the government.55
Quite disingenuously, the Ninth Circuit also suggested that the
Supreme Court itself had eschewed finding a physical invasion
could apply to personal property when it justified its holding with
this citation:
See also Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d
835, 854 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), affd sub nom., Brown v. Legal
Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 155 L. Ed.2d 376
(2003) (The per se analysis has not typically been employed out-
side the context of real property. It is a particularly inapt analysis
when the property in question is money.).56
What makes this disingenuous was that the parenthetical following
the citation to Brown above was not from the Supreme Courts opin-
ion but from the Ninth Circuits and that the Supreme Court had ex-
pressly rejected the Ninth Circuits assertion:
We agree that a per se approach is more consistent with the
reasoning in our Phillips opinion than Penn Centrals ad hoc
analysis. As was made clear in Phillips, the interest earned in the
IOLTA accounts is the private property of the owner of the
principal. If this is so, the transfer of the interest to the Founda-
tion here seems more akin to the occupation of a small amount
of rooftop space in Loretto.57
Having dispensed with the physical invasion claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit turned to considering whether the expropriation of raisins was
an exaction proscribed by the Supreme Courts unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine. Here, the Ninth Circuit also found no taking, finding
that the tests of Nollan and Dolan were both met.
While Nollan itself asked whether the exactions served the public
interest of alleviating a harm caused by the home building project,
the Ninth Circuit here asked simply whether the exaction served
the government end of stabilizing the market. But Nollan held that
55. 750 F.3d at 113940 ([W]e see no reason to extend Loretto to govern controversies
involving personal property.).
56. Id. at 1140.
57. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (citation omitted.).
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the condition must do more than advance a governments purpose;
it must advance a government regulation designed to ameliorate a
harm caused by the project itself. Thus in Nollan, the Court wrote,
here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original pur-
pose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something
other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose,
but without payment of compensation.58 In contrast, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded in Horne that the Marketing Order program furthers
the end advanced: obtaining orderly market conditions.59 One could
add that obtaining orderly market conditions without tying them
to any disorderly market conditions caused by Hornes raisin crop is
akin to merely some valid government purpose. Therefore it is no
surprise that the raisin seizure passed the Ninth Circuits bowdler-
ized Nollan test.
Turning to Dolans rough proportionality requirement, the Ninth
Circuit surmised that because all raisin producers are treated
equally60 and because the percentage of raisins expropriated is ad-
justed annually, the Dolan standard had been met. But the equal
treatment and annual adjustment rationales are non sequiturs:
neither has anything to do with finding proportionality between the
adverse impacts caused by selling raisins and the demand to fork rai-
sins over to the federal government. The Supreme Court is expected
to issue its ruling by the end of its 2014 term in June of 2015.
Most importantly, all this botched analysis of Nollan and Dolan
begs the question: What does the demand for a portion of a raisin crop
really have to do with context of Nollan and Dolan? Is it the regula-
tion via conditions of the use of real property? This is the sort of con-
fusion that the Supreme Court will need to sort out.
D. Takings by Lawyers in Black Robes
We know it is possible for the Executive and Legislative Branches
of government to take property. It happens all the time. A Depart-
ment of Transportation may condemn property for a road, or a local
municipality may zone a parcel into inutility, giving rise to liability
58. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
59. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143.
60. Id. at 1144 ([T]he use restriction is imposed evenly across the industry.).
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under an inverse condemnation claim. But what about the Judicial
Branch? Can it take property?61
The idea that a court can be responsible for a taking is not new or
novel. It has been kicking around at least since 1897 in Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago.62 In that case, the Court
obliquely referred to a state court being involved in the taking of
private property:
[A] judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute,
whereby private property is taken for the state or under its di-
rection for public use, without compensation made or secured to
the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due pro-
cess of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the constitu-
tion of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by
the highest court of the state is a denial by that state of a right
secured to the owner by that instrument.63
But since then, the doctrine of judicial takings has not had much
tractionuntil perhaps now. It did get a major boost seventy years
later in Hughes v. State of Washington,64 in which Justice Stewart, in
a concurring opinion wrote that a State cannot be permitted to de-
feat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without
due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that
the property it has taken never existed at all.65
Hughes dealt with questions about how the State of Washington
viewed accretions of riparian property. Justice Stewart continued that
to the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable expectations,
we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that
it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in
61. For a more extended discussion on the arguments leading up to Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida, see James Burling, Bacchanalian Beach Parties, Property Rights,
and Judicial Takings: Argument in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, ALI-CLE PROGRAM: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITI-
GATION (2010), available at http://www.ali-cle.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=online.chapter_detail
&paperid=266347&source=2.
62. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
63. Id. at 241.
64. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
65. Id.
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terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference would be
appropriate.66
Although the State in this case made no attempt to take the
accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by
effecting a retroactive transformation of private into public
propertywithout paying for the privilege of doing so. Because
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than
through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended
than when it is deliberate, I join in reversing the judgment.67
Finally, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection,68 the Court actually took up a case
premised solely on a judicial takings theory. In this case landowners
claimed that the states assertion of title over beachfront property
created in part by the addition of sand to the beachwas a taking.
But the unique and novel twist here was that the landowners as-
serted that the Florida Supreme Courts rejection of the takings claim,
and its assertion that the property belonged to the state, effected a
judicial taking. The United States Supreme Court ultimately re-
jected this claim based on its reading of Florida land use law. But in
doing so, a plurality of the justices opined that in the right set of
circumstances, there could be a judicial taking:
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private
property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the in-
strument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action
may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is
always a taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restric-
tion of property use may or may not be, depending on its nature
and extent. But the particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legis-
lature or a court declares that what was once an established right
of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property,
no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed
its value by regulation. [A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform
private property into public property without compensation.69
66. Id. at 296.
67. Id. at 298.
68. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
69. Id. at 715.
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This formulation doesnt exactly give a practitioner a whole lot of
guidance. Moreover, the possibility of a judicial taking gives rise to
a host of questions such as: What court gets to decide that another
court took property? Who pays the compensation? From what budget?
Indeed, because no judicial takings claim has actually succeeded, any
attempt to bring one could be considered novel, if not daring. So, to
the extent that the Court had referred to the possibility of a judicial
taking, is that something a practitioner should actually bring? Only
hindsight can answer that question.
E. Gambling on Government Contracts and Licenses
As noted above, having a definable property right is essential to a
viable claim that property has been taken. While it is easy to under-
stand that real property is covered, other less tangible assets can be
problematic. Government contracts and licenses are a case in point.
While one may take a broad Madisonian view of propertythat a per-
son has a property right in many things70one must be cautious in
equating the same degree of right to a government contract or a gov-
ernment-issued license, because the rights in that contract or license
can be limited by the very terms of the instrument itself. Thus, if the
terms of the contract or license allow for future interference or restric-
tion by the government, then there may be no property right to com-
plain about when that interference or restriction occurs.71 Moreover,
the contract or license may be limited not only by its express terms
but also by the implicit understanding that the terms may be altered
by future legislative or administrative acts.72
For these reasons, disputes based on the regulation of licenses do
not make for the best vehicle for developing new precedents sup-
porting property rights. Because of the inherent malleability in li-
cense rights, judicial decisions on license cases might yield negative
70. See supra note 3.
71. It is also important to note that if one has a viable contract remedy for an alleged
government breach, that remedy must be pursued before any takings claim. See, e.g., Allegre
Villa v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 11 (2004).
72. See, e.g., Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that the unmistakeability doctrine means that a contract may be im-
plicitly altered by later legislative actsunless the contract in unmistakable terms says other-
wise and that the contracting parties had the authority to so limit the governments ability
to make future alterations).
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understandings in other casesthat is, broad and imprecise language
in license cases may well bleed over into the realm of more tradi-
tional property rights, making the latter more vulnerable to govern-
ment manipulation.
In Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack,73 the owners of
video lottery machines brought claims sounding in contract, takings,
equal protection, and due process when the Iowa legislature ended
the lottery games. With respect to the contract claim, it was undis-
puted that the owners had invested heavily in the video machines in
anticipation of carrying out their contracts with the state. But that
was not enough. Assuming that there was a contract here, the regu-
lated nature of the gaming industry was enough for the court to con-
clude that the parties should have anticipated that the legislature
could step in and impose new regulations in the future.74
As for the takings claim, this too was a novel claim. There is no
precedent holding that regulation of the gaming industry, or even its
outright prohibition, can lead to takings liability.75 Here, the court
found that the machines and the business of operating them were in-
terests in property.76 The state never took possession of the machines;
it just disallowed their use. And the business operation, although a
property interest, was limited by the requirement to obtain a license
to operate. And because [t]he possession of . . . [a] license . . . is a
privilege personal to that person or entity and is not a legal right
and because Hawkeyes . . . license cannot be sold, assigned, or trans-
ferred, it lacks the indicia of a property interest.77 Along the way to
finding no taking violation, the court also, and unnecessarily, found
that Lucas applies only to real property, and that in a Penn Central
analysis one factor can be dispositive: that is, despite the near total
destruction of the business, the lack of reasonable expectations in not
having the legislature shut the business down, combined with the an
amorphous third-prong analysis, was enough to obviate any Penn
Central takings.
73. 486 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 2007).
74. Id. at 438 (finding diminished contract expectations based on this understanding and
in the language of the contract itself).
75. The same company lost a similar argument in South Carolina in an opinion that did not
provide much of a rationale for rejecting a takings claim. See Armstrong v. Collins, 621 S.E.2d
368 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
76. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 43 (8th Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 440.
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F. Takings and the Aryan Brotherhood
It is not often that one gets to discuss the Aryan Brotherhood in an
article on regulatory takings. But takings lawyers had that opportu-
nity in Schneider v. California Dept of Corrections.78 For those not
familiar with the lead plaintiff in this takings case, Paul Cornfed
Schneider, here is a brief excerpt from the San Francisco Chronicle:
Paul Cornfed Schneider, a high-ranking member of the Aryan
Brotherhood prison gang who came to prominence as the owner
of two dogs that killed a San Francisco woman, was sentenced to
a third life term in prison Monday during a hearing that was se-
cretly rescheduled to protect him from an assassination plot by
fellow gang members.79
In other words, he is not the sort of person one would want for a neigh-
bor, especially considering the locale of his present neighborhood. But
he is a property owner, of sorts, and has been willing to bring a novel
takings claim to protect his propertywhich happens to be the inter-
est he insists that he earned on his prison trust account. Under Cali-
fornia Penal Code, that interest was to be deposited in the Inmate
Welfare Fund, the moneys of which would be applied to certain ame-
nities for the prisoners.80 The court, however, did not find that this
penal code provision answered the question of whether a property
78. 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. The article continues:
Schneider, who is already serving two life sentences in the California prison system
for a variety of crimes, was sentenced in U.S. District Court in San Francisco for
his part in a drug smuggling operation he ran from Pelican Bay State Prison and
the 1995 murder of Sonoma County Sheriffs Deputy Frank Trejo.
He told The Chronicle during an interview at the Santa Rita Jail in Dublin on
Saturday that he hopes his federal prison sentence will keep him safe from the
gang he belonged to for 15 years. He said when he arrived at Santa Rita, guards
told him the gang knew he was coming and had repeatedly asked if he had
arrived yet.
State and federal authorities confirmed last week that the man called the most
dangerous man in California in the wake of Diane Whipples brutal death in
January 2001 has been marked for assassinationor placed in the hat, in the
parlance of the white supremacist gang.
Charlie Goodyear, Cornfed Draws 3rd Life Term . . ., S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2003, http://www
.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Cornfed-draws-3rd-life-term-Inmate-in-2580493.php.
80. Schneider v. California Dept of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998).
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right had been created, noting that many property interests exist
wholly independent of statutes.81 Ultimately, the court found that
Schneider and his fellow travelers did have a property interest in
whatever interest their accounts earned, despite the lack of statutory
recognition. In response to the states argument that because prop-
erty is defined by state law, and a state can define away a property
interest, the court noted,
Rather, there is, we think, a core notion of constitutionally pro-
tected property into which state regulation simply may not intrude
without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny. The States power
vis-a-vis property thus operates as a one-way ratchet of sorts:
States may, under certain circumstances, confer new property
status on interests located outside the core of constitutionally pro-
tected property, but they may not encroach upon traditional old
property interests found within the core.82
This is clearly a case of bad factsbecause who really cares about
petty amounts of interest accruing in the accounts of a collection of
bad and very bad people? But what this case did have going for it
was the application of some very well defined law holding that gov-
ernment cannot withhold interest on accounts of money held by the
government.83 But, in the end the bad facts led to a dissatisfying re-
sult for the prisoners: on remand, the court found that whatever in-
terest had been earned was subsumed on average by the costs of
administering the funds and that the compensation owed amounted
to nothing.84 On further appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that each fund
had to be looked at individually, but also noted that the state stopped
putting any of the funds into interest-bearing accounts in order to
avoid the problem altogether.85
81. Id. at 1199.
82. Id. at 120001.
83. See, e.g., Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Brown v.
Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (interest on lawyers trust accounts subject to
takings analysis).
84. Schneider v. Cal. Dept of Corrections, 91 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 2000). On appeal of
this decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that each individual account had to be con-
sidered separately for purposes of comparing costs to expenses. 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003).
85. Id. at 722 n.3. There are no further reported decisions explaining what, if anything,
Schneider got out of this litigation.
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G. Up in Smoke IWeeding Out Takings Claims
If the sheriff takes your pot plants, is there a taking? In Young v.
Larimer County86 the local police raided Kaleb Youngs leased property
and seized forty-two marijuana plants, cutting them down and killing
the plants. Young claimed the plants were for medicinal purposes
under that states medical marijuana law, and he was acquitted. The
dead plants were returned to Young, but they had been taken before
they were ready to be harvested. Young sued for damages to his plants
based on a 1983 claim for just compensation under federal law and
a state takings claim. On his federal takings claim, the court found
he had no property right in what is contraband under federal law.87
On his state takings claim, the court held that no right of action ac-
crued when property is temporarily seized for evidenceand that
there was no public use of his plants when they were seized as evi-
dence. One suspects that this is the result the court wanted to reach
otherwise the judicial process itself would be upended if compensation
were to be required for damages caused to seized evidence or damage
to anything belonging to a defendant who is eventually acquitted. So
after dragging someone through an unsuccessful prosecution, the
government isnt going to be held responsible for its attempt at mak-
ing the world a safer place, even if it is not actually doing that.
H. Up in Smoke IISmoking Bans and Takings
With the advent of indoor smoking bans across the country, a
number of somewhat desperate bar ownersalong with their tobacco
industry allieshave tried some unconventional approaches to fight-
ing smoking bansincluding bringing takings challenges. In the most
recent of these, Big Johns Billiards, Inc. v. Nebraska,88 the court
began where it should have begun, by analyzing the nature of the
property right alleged to be taken. Here, Big Johns Billiard Parlor
alleged that it had a vested property right in its ability to operate
86. Colo. Ct. Apps., Case No. 13CA1339, 2014 WL 449513 (2014).
87. Along similar lines is Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 448 (1996), in which Mr. Bennis used
his wifes car for purposes inconsistent with his marriage vows, and the car was seized under
the law of asset forfeiture.
88. 852 N.W.2d 727 (Neb. 2014).
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a premises that allowed smoking.89 Unfortunately for Big Johns, the
court was not convinced that this was a vested rightfinding that
[t]he only right Big Johns had to allow its customers to smoke was
created by statutethe prior version of the act.90 Now I suppose that
one could make an academic argument that under ancient common
law principles an innkeeper or establishment owner had the right to
regulate conduct itself within the establishment, but it appears that
no such arguments were made here. Nor would it have done much
good. Bringing a taking claim here was simply a matter of despera-
tion combined with an ignorance of the realities of takings and prop-
erty law. Put another way, this one was never going to fly.
The same argument arose in D.A.B.E. Inc. v. City of Toledo,91 in
which a group of restaurant owners alleged a smoking ban effected
a regulatory taking. Here the court didnt focus on the nature of the
property interest, if any. Instead it moved right to a Penn Central par-
tial takings analysis and focused on the character of the government
regulation prong of that test, finding that there were serious adverse
impacts on employees working in establishments where smoking is
permitted. The court then mentioned, but was not particularly moved
by, what was unquestionably . . . an adverse economic impact on
plaintiffs businesses, two of which closed their doors. Lastly, it found
the owners should have anticipated the increasing regulation of smok-
ing, thus negating the existence of any reasonable investment-backed
expectations in maintaining the status quo.92 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit found that the restaurant owner plaintiffs failed to show that
the law denied them economically viable use of their property.93
I. Up in Smoke IIIand Shrapnel
In National Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra,94 the owner
of a flea market was distressed to find unexploded ordnance on his
89. Id. at 954.
90. Id. at 955. The prior act had an exemption for billiard parlors regulating, but not
banning, smoking.
91. 292 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ohio 2003), affd, 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 973. Of some historical interest, at around this time the Second Circuit held that
there were takings implications when a tobacco company was told to divulge its trade secrets
in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
93. 393 F.3d at 695.
94. 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013).
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propertyproperty that had been at one time used as a firing range.
After the borough closed the flea market to the public so that clean-up
operations could be conducted, the owner sued for due process and
takings violations. The court did not buy it. On the due process claim,
the court found the owner was not entitled to a predeprivation hearing
because of the public health and safety necessity of moving rapidly to
clean up the danger. As for the takings claim, the court found that the
five months of cleanup did not constitute a temporary taking, because
this was a reasonable exercise of the police power and not a taking.95
Unfortunately, the courts analysis was rather cursory and mislead-
ing. There is no dichotomy between exercises of the police power and
takings. Indeed, most compensable regulatory takings do involve legit-
imate exercises of the police power.
What the court should have focused on was whether the so-called
public necessity doctrine created an emergency exception to the
Takings Clause. Thus, when a fire threatens to consume a city, and
the city destroys private buildings in order to create a firebreak, no
compensation is due. But there certainly is no police power excep-
tion to the duty to pay just compensation. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Lucas, at least since Pennsylvania Coal, the courts have
recognized that if the uses of private property were subject to unbri-
dled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the natu-
ral tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappear[ed].96 There
are, however, discrete instances at common law in which extraordi-
nary circumstances render the taking of damaging of property non-
compensable. Governments prerogative to destroy, take, or damage
private property without paying compensation is limited by the doc-
trine of public necessity. In extraordinary situations, not only the
government but everyone ha[s] the right to destroy real and personal
property without incurring liability to the owner.97 Thus in times of
imminent perilsuch as when a fire threatened a whole community
the sovereign could, with impunity, destroy the property of a few
95. It is difficult to imagine an act closer to the heartland of a states traditional police
power than abating the danger posed by unexploded artillery shells. Palmyras emergency action
to temporarily close the Market therefore constituted an exercise of its police power that did not
require just compensation. 716 F.3d at 63.
96. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 415).
97. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1979).
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so that the property of many and the lives of many more could be
saved.98 [I]n virtually all of the decided cases, the property destroyed
had temporarily become dangerous itself and was likely to have been
destroyed anyway.99 In the case of setting aside private property for
five months in order to clean up unexploded ordnance, it is debatable
whether the necessity doctrine could applybut the court surely
failed by not considering the matter.
National Amusements is not unique. In Warren Trust v. United
States,100 two family trusts acquired roughly 18,000 acres of property
near the city of Hammond, Louisiana. Of this, approximately 11,200
acres were inside a World War II bombing range. The trusts had used
the property for timber harvesting and had plans to develop some or
most of it. But with adoption of CERCLA in 1980 and amendments in
1986, the Department of Defense inspected the property and found a
possibility of contact by human receptors to unexploded ordnance.
This put a kibosh on development plans. The trusts sued for a taking
and lost. At least the court here engaged in a meaningful takings
analysis. Holdings include:
1) The fact that the trusts sued first in the court of federal
claims and later in another suit involving same underlying
facts allowed the claim to move forward under 28 U.S.C. §
1500.101
2) The trusts did not allege allegations of tort such as slander
of title.102
3) There is no taking because trusts did not establish interfer-
ence with property interestprohibitory regulations did not
apply to non-government property.103
4) No categorical taking because:
a) Parcel as a whole is the larger 18,000 acres.104
b) Some use and value left.105
98. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) (World War II destruction of property
before falling into enemy hands).
99. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 at 146 (5th
ed. 1984).
100. 107 Fed. Cl. 533 (2012).
101. Id. at 552.
102. Id. at 555.
103. Id. at 562.
104. Id. at 56366.
105. Id. at 56667.
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5) No Penn Central taking because:
a) Diminution in value is only between 62% and
82%.106
b) Owners knew property had been used for bombing
range when they acquired it.107
c) Government acted properly in inspecting property
and warning public.108
The fact that both of these cases lostone with a meaningful inquiry
and the other withoutindicates that courts are going to have dif-
ficulty finding novel takings in cases where the property had been
heavily damaged and constitutes an inherent public danger.
J. Home Sweet HomelessTakings of the Possessions of
the Homeless
In Lavan v. City of Los Angeles,109 the Ninth Circuit held that there
was a taking in the removal and destruction of the property of a class
of homeless persons who were momentarily away from their posses-
sions on Skid Row in Los Angeles. This certainly qualifies as a novel
takings claim. But it was a successful one. The Citys petition for writ
of certiorari was denied, but it did ask some provocative questions:
In a divided opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that even in the face
of a posted law expressly prohibiting such conduct, personal ef-
fects left unattended on the public sidewalk are constitutionally
protected. Thus, the majority concluded when city employees dis-
pose of these unattended items during a scheduled cleaning oper-
ation, the city commits both an unreasonable seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and a deprivation of procedural due
process in violation the Fourteenth Amendment. The profound
effect of this opinion is that a city can no longer fulfill its obligation
to protect the public health. The interest in safe, clean, passable
sidewalks has been supplanted. In its place, as the photographs
in Appendix E illustrate, are public sidewalks that become home
to mounds of tarp-covered items, often tagged with a sign reading
not abandoned. If a city wants to protect the publics health by
removing this accumulation of stuff piling up on the sidewalk, yet
106. Id. at 56869.
107. Id. at 56970.
108. Id. at 57071.
109. 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012).
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not violate the Constitution, a city must dedicate resources to
sort through these items for contamination, fend off lawsuits
alleging illegal search, and then bag, tag, and provide the facilities
to store the remainder for retrieval by their owner. Do the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment extend to these personal effects inten-
tionally left unattended by the owner on the public sidewalk in
violation of an express law, such that city workers cannot dispose
of these items during routine street cleaning without violating
the Constitution?110
It is telling that in the Ninth Circuit novel Takings Clause-based
claims fare better when brought by prisoners and the homeless than
more traditional claims brought by owners of farm commodities and
real property.
K. Relaxing of Rules on Mandatory Union Membership
After Indiana passed its controversial right-to-work statute,
wherein no individual can be required to join or remain a union mem-
ber or pay any sort of dues or assessments to the union or other third
party, the labor unions sued. In Sweeney v. Pence111 the question arose
whether the combination of a federal statute requiring a union to pro-
vide fair representation to all employees and the state law prohibiting
the union from collecting dues from nonmembers somehow took the
unions property. It argued nonpaying nonmembers were free-riders,
enjoying the benefits of the unions collective bargaining efforts with-
out compensating the union. The court held that to the extent the
union was tasked with the duty of fair representation, it was justly
compensated by federal laws grant to the union the right to bargain
exclusively with the employer.112
It seems disingenuous not to recognize that the Unions position
as a sole representative comes with a set of powers and benefits as
well as responsibilities and duties. And no information before us
persuades us that the Union is not fully and adequately com-
pensated by its rights as the sole and exclusive member at the
negotiating table.113
110. City of Los Angeles v. Lavan, 2013 WL 796022, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2012).
111. 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
112. Id. at 666.
113. Id. at 666.
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The dissent suggested was that forcing the union to provide services
without compensation was a taking.114 But in a convolution of takings
doctrine, the dissent continued that [h]ere, no public purpose was
even alleged,115 forgetting those cases in which compensable takings
were not found despite lack of a public purpose.116 And the dissent
continued that this would be like gasoline retailers being required to
give away gasoline to customers who did not want to pay.117
With all due respect to the court, missing in the discussion by
either the majority or the dissent is anything resembling a cogent dis-
cussion of takings law based on established principles or precedent.
First of all, there is very little attempt to identify the property right
that was taken. Is there a property right to represent nonmembers?
Is there a property right in the incidental benefits received by the
nonmembers? Perhaps there is. Perhaps there isnt. But some mean-
ingful discussion could help explain why there is, or isnt, a property
interest that can be taken in the first place. Next, the dissents con-
fusion over the impact of a lack of public purpose reflects a lack of
understanding of whether this case is actually a claim for an uncom-
pensated taking or something else perhaps more akin to a substantive
due process challenge. Finally, the dissent ever so closely skimmed
the edge of a Nollan and Dolan unconstitutional conditions argument
but never quite connected the dots. In other words, this court is about
as confused about takings law as every other court generally is.
L. Animal Law I: Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My
Takings Claws
After an Ohio man released over fifty exotic animals before com-
mitting suicide,118 the State of Ohio passed the Ohio Dangerous and
114. Id. at 683.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., text accompanying footnote 86 (discussion of Young v. Larimer).
117. Id. This brings to mind Justice Whites dissenting hypothetical of requiring a grocery
store to give away groceries to the poor in Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). There the
Court denied certiorari to a rancher who was denied the right to terminate a marauding bear.
118. Wikipedia described the incident this way:
Muskingum County Animal Farm was a private zoo located in Zanesville, Ohio,
United States.
The zoo received world-wide attention on October 19, 2011, when dozens of
exotic animals were released from their enclosures. Bears, lions, tigers, and wolves
were among those who escaped, and were hunted by local law enforcement out
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Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Among the provisions was
one requiring that certain exotic animals be microchipped. This in
turn led exotic animal owners such as the plaintiff-appellants in
Daniels v. Wilkins119 to allege a host of constitutional infirmities,
including a physical invasion Takings Clause claim.
The Sixth Circuit addressed first whether it had jurisdiction to
hear the claim in light of Williamson County and the fact that the
plaintiffs-appellants did not seek compensation in state court. Noting
that Williamson County is a prudential ripeness doctrine, it found
that there would be no point in sending the case to state court if it
were clear that there had been no taking.120 Turning to the Takings
Clause claim, the court was not convinced that the implantation of
microchips effected any kind of physical invasion. It is, after all, one
thing to force someone to allow cable wires and boxes onto ones build-
ing, but a microchip implanted in an animal is distinguishable both
in degree and kind:
But even after appellants implant the microchips, they retain the
ability to use and possess their animals and the implanted micro-
chips. Indeed, the Act is close kin to the general welfare regula-
tions that the Supreme Court ensured were not constitutionally
suspect. There is little difference between a law requiring a micro-
chip in an animal and a law requiring handrails in apartment
buildings. Both are regulations of individuals property properly
challenged as regulatory takings, Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440, 102 S.
Ct. 3164, and neither law effects a government occupation of
property or a government-authorized occupation of property by
a third party. As appellees point out, were the Acts micro chipping
of fear for public safety. The animals were killed or captured and taken to the
Columbus Zoo and Aquarium. Owner Terry Thompson set free fifty-six of his
exotic animals before shooting himself in the head. Forty-eight were killed by the
local police. The animals freed included lions, leopards, wolves, primates, bears,
and eighteen tigers. The animals confirmed to be dead were the eighteen tigers,
six black bears, two grizzlies, two wolves, one macaque monkey, one baboon, three
mountain lions, nine male lions, and eight lionesses. Three leopards, one grizzly
bear, and two monkeys were left caged inside Thompsons home. These animals
were tranquilized and sent to the Columbus Zoo. One of the surviving leopards was
subsequently injured in an accident at the zoo and was euthanized. One monkey
was eaten by a tiger, and a wolf was killed after being hit by a car.
Wikipedia entry for Muskingum County Animal Farm, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muskingum
_County_Animal_Farm (last visited June 10, 2015) (footnotes omitted).
119. 744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 418.
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requirement to be ruled a taking, laws requiring license plates
on cars, warning labels on packaging, lighting on boats, handrails
in apartment buildings, and ramps leading to restaurants would
be suspect.121
This was surely the correct result. As much as one may or may not
chafe against government regulations of various sorts, not every reg-
ulation effects a taking, no less a physical invasion-style taking.122
While it may be an invasion of some kind, to conclude unassailably
that this invasion rises to a constitutional dimension is a stretch.
Loretto involved the use of a measurable amount of Mrs. Lorettos
apartment building for the benefit of and continuing use by a third-
party utility company. If the animal owners here had asked first what
the nature of the property interest alleged to be taken was, then they
might have saved some time and effort in litigation.123
M. Animal Law II: Big Game and Takings
In Montana, owners of ranches supplemented their income by
promoting hunts of captive big game. Sometimes referred to pejora-
tively as canned hunts, these operations have engendered significant
controversy. They are supported by some hunters and free-market
advocates who claim that exotic animal wildlife ranching can help
conserve threatened species. On the other hand, animal rights advo-
cates and other conservationists doubt the utility of using exotic wild-
life ranches as a means to conserving species. In Kafka v. Montana
Dept of Fish, Wildlife & Parks,124 the owners and operators of livestock
121. Id. at 419.
122. Opinions do vary. See, e.g., Stephen D. Lott, Getting Under Fidos Skin: Analyzing the
Objections to Mandatory Pet Microchipping Laws, 7 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 52 (2011), available
at https://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/files/files/FACULTY/2011okjoltrev52.pdf. The article
concludes, [t]o be sure, mandatory microchipping constitutes a permanent physical invasion
of the pet owners property. Thus, it seems fairly clear that, based upon the Courts finding in
Lucas, pet owners must be compensated. Id.
123. There have been similar, and so far unsuccessful, challenges brought to the Department
of Agricultures requirement for farm animal microchip identification (for the purpose of
tracking disease), althoughmost claims seem to be FirstAmendment religion challenges alleging
that the microchipping is related to the mark of the beast as described in the Book of Revela-
tions 13:1618. For more on one lawsuit, see Tom Leonard, Amish Sue U.S. Government for
Mark of the Beast on Livestock, U.K. TELEGRAPH (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/3473461/Amish-sue-US-government-for-mark-of-the
-Beast-on-livestock.html.
124. 201 P.3d 8 (Mont. 2008).
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game farms sued for a taking of property interests as result of an
initiative that prohibited the charging of a fee to shoot ranched big
game wildlife. They lost. The game owners had licenses to operate the
hunts and the revocation of the licenses after the initiative did not
effect a taking because the licenses were not compensable property
rightsthey were government benefits. Nor, the court held, could the
ranchers demonstrate that the value of their ranches had substan-
tially been diminished. Likewise, continuing with a Penn Central anal-
ysis, the court found the other factors did not militate finding a take.
The dissent was displeased:
At bottom, the Court holds that any individual in this State who,
with the States encouragement, invests capital and resources to
create a going concern, but who does so in a field that this Court
considers highly controversial, simply has no compensable inter-
est in that business. Therefore, when the State up and decides to
legislate the business out of existencethrough the unique expe-
dient of depriving the business of any incomethe State need not
provide any compensation for the owners loss of property.
The injustice in treating Montana business people and property
owners in this manner is manifest, not to mention legally inde-
fensible. I strenuously disagree with the Courts determination
that the Ranchers, and others similarly situated, are without a
remedy for a taking of their property. I also cannot subscribe to
the Courts faulty rationales in reaching this result. I therefore
respectfully dissent from the Courts decision.125
The dissent makes for an interesting read for its detailed Due Process
and Takings analyses, in which it ultimately concludes that there
should be no exception for the compensation requirement just because
game ranches are unpopular businesses in some circles and that the
harm to the ranchers is so substantial.
In Simpson v. Dept of Fish and Wildlife126 an elk rancher sued
after Oregon prohibited hunting elk on private ranches. At issue was
whether the elk were private property. The court said no. First, it
found that elk are wildlife; second, all wildlife belongs to the state; and
third, all elk belong to the state.127 Therefore, there could no taking.
125. 201 P.3d at 3334 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
126. 255 P.3d 565 (Or. App. 2011).
127. Id. at 569.
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Thus in Montana there was no property interest in operating a
trophy-hunting ranch, and in Oregon there was no property in the
wildlife. In neither instance could a taking claim succeed.
N. Taxi Medallions and Takings
In what could be one of the final battles of the last war, taxi com-
panies in New York have complained that increasing the number of
legal taxis will diminish the monopoly power that existing medallion
owners have. Some have gone on to argue that plans to allow more
lawful taxis, especially in the outer boroughs and neighborhoods that
are traditionally underserved by medallion cabs, is a potential
taking. Recently, the established taxi companies brought suit, argu-
ing a taking.128 But what kind of property is a government monopoly
license to drive a car for hire? This has been the subject of some
rather intense debate and speculation. Professor Wyman has sug-
gested that while the medallions may not have started out as prop-
erty in the traditional sense, they have evolved that way.129 Because
of the manner in which medallions are infused with indicia of prop-
erty, she concludes, somewhat pessimistically, that [p]roblematic
property rights should not only be regarded as burdensome in the
present but also potentially burdensome in the future.130 Whether
that burden will consume Uber or be transcended by Uber remains
to be seen.
As noted by Steven Oxenhandler, there is precedent out of Chicago
for treating taxi licenses as compensable property:
In other words, despite the lack of an explicit recognition that a
taxicab license constituted a compensable property interest, the
court reasoned that because the City treated the taxicab license
128. Taxicab Serv. Assn v. New York, No. 102553, at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012)
(Plaintiffs claim . . . that medallions are more than mere licenses. Because they create con-
sistent streams of income, have lasting residual value, and are freely transferable, they have long
been understood to be valuable property. Let us assume that this is so. They are still intangible
property. Plaintiffs intangible rights are not being taken, they are being shared.) (cited in
Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medal-
lions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 187 n.84 (2013)).
129. See, e.g.,Wyman, supra note 128, at 140 (The evolution of medallions underscores the
potential for items to come to be regarded and treated as property absent the benefit of a clear
constitutional guarantee against governmental expropriation without just compensation.).
130. Id. at 187.
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as a traditional form of property, the City implicitly created a
compensable property right in a taxicab license.131
But Oxenhandler also notes precedent from California treating taxi
licenses as a mere privilege.132
Of course, much of this discussion predates what has now become
the elephant in the room: Uber. Wherever Uber goes, it is disrupting
the traditional model of taxi license monopolies. And wherever Uber
goes, Uber gets sued. Whether allowing or at least not banning Uber
will have takings implications for existing taxi licenses will depend on
what those licenses are: protected property interests, mere privileges,
or something else. Central to the academic discussions of whether taxi
licenses should be treated as compensable property interests are ex-
tensive discussions of what constitutes property in the first place.133
CONCLUSION
Suffice it to say for the limited discussion in this short article, any
litigant seeking to extend the protections of the Takings Clause to a
property interest not heretofore protected had better understand and
apply one or more of the various theories on the meaning of property
before embarking on a novel takings claim. This caution applies
across the board: from taxi licenses to smoke-filled billiard halls to mi-
crochipped animals. Short of delving into a comprehensive exegesis
of theories on the origins of property law, there is also the laugh test:
the louder the laugh in reaction to a suggestion that something is a
protected property right, the less likely it is to succeed in court.
131. Steve Oxenhandler, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of A Fifth Amendment, Compensable
Property Interest, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 113, 131 (2000) (comparing Boonstra v. City of Chicago, 574
N.E.2d 689, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding a property right associated with a taxi license), with
OConnor v. City of San Francisco, 153 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no prop-
erty interest in the privilege of a taxi license.)).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 128; Oxenhandler, supra note 131.
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ABSTRACT
City planning in America began as a Progressive Era exercise
intended to preserve property values and implicitly incorporate the
social norms of officials and planners. Over time, rigid zoning was
replaced by flexibility accompanied by opaque bargaining between
localities and developers. Still, even in vibrant large cities, home-
owner preferences for low density largely prevailed over attempts to
enhance agglomeration through increasing density. The effect is to
reduce economic opportunity for individuals and make cities less
prosperous.
One method of increasing agglomeration is the imposition of
densification, utilizing the assembly of transient coalitions that could
impose grand bargains between aldermen and strong mayors. Expert
planners would devise detailed quotas for desirable and undesirable
uses in different parts of the city, and recipients of favorable zoning
would receive regulatory property that is locked in place by proce-
dural and constitutional requirements. Roderick Hills and David
Schleicher advocate this approach in City Replanning.
This Article reviews the history of idealistic, and later pragmatic,
comprehensive planning and zoning. It then analyzes the case for
agglomeration and how it might be obtained through density man-
dates. The Article subsequently reviews undesirable consequences
of such mandates. It asserts that grand bargains attenuate demo-
cratic decision-making, significantly reinforce the perceived evils of
the current system, and are apt to be ineffective.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the engineering and densification of vibrant
American cities. By engineering, I refer to something contrived or
devised,1 as opposed to something arising from spontaneous growth,
as Jane Jacobs or F.A. Hayek might have understood it.2 By densi-
fication, I mean increasing population density. Densification is an
ugly word, having the sole merit of accuracy.3
The Article has three themes. Densification has beneficial effects
on societal productivity to the extent coincident with positive agglom-
eration. The process of engineering densification exacerbates some of
the same problems that it was intended to overcome. The detriments
of agglomeration, conventionally lumped together with the label
congestion, are more broad and deep than generally realized.
I. THE BENEFITS AND LURES OF AGGLOMERATION
Agglomeration theory has its roots in the observation of Alfred
Marshall a century ago that the agglomeration of firms in the same
industrywithin limitedgeographical confines conferred great benefit.4
From this beginning, subsequent scholars explained how talented
1. The word is comes from the Latin ingenium, meaning cleverness. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3rd ed., 2011).
2. See JANEJACOBS,THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (envisioning
cities as naturally growing communities not marked by sterile over-planning); 1 FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) (generalizing theories
of regulatory government from the decentralized character of market norms).
3. Some years ago, the municipal planner working on downtown revitalization in a major
North American city confided in me that his staff used densification only among themselves.
For public consumption, they used the term smart growth.
4. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271 (8th ed. 1920).
When an industry has . . . chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long:
so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from
near neighbourhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no myster-
ies; but are as it were in the air, and children learn many of them unconsciously.
Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in
processes and the general organization of the business have theirmerits promptly
discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined
with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new
ideas. And presently subsidiary trades grow up in the neighbourhood, supplying
it with implements and materials, organizing its traffic, and in many ways con-
ducing to the economy of its material.
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workers flock to areas rich in amenities and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, to areas where they could also interact with existing talented
residents from whom they could learn new skills and thus raise
their incomes.5
Scholars have long contrasted teeming cities with residential
suburbs, where exclusionary zoning has been a barrier to employ-
ment opportunities for low-income residents of central cities.6 More
recently, however, commentators have argued that stringent land
use restrictions in desirable cities themselves constitute the new
exclusionary zoning.7
A recent paper by Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag8 suggests that
anti-growth regulation is a substantial cause of the high cost of hous-
ing in desirable large cities. The authors conclude that the United
States is increasingly characterized by segregation along economic
dimensions, with limited access for most workers to Americas most
productive cities, and that their work might highlight the role land
use restrictions play in supporting this segregation.9
In recent decades, scholars have looked beyond the effects of urban
growth restrictions on excluded socio-economic groups. They have
focused on the effects of restrictions on workers more generally and,
relatedly, upon the prosperity of the cities themselves and the Nation
as a whole. Ganong and Shoag stated that there was a striking con-
vergence in per capita incomes across U.S. states from 1880 to 1980
but that during the ensuing thirty years, that relationship had
weakened considerably, as observed at the metro-area level.10 In
5. See Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 89102 (2013) (summarizing scholarship).
6. See, e.g., Henry A. Span, How Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1, 19 (2001) (noting that exclusionary zoning creates a spatial mismatch between job
opportunities and people with low incomes). But see Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington,
Putting Exclusionary Zoning In Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667 (2013) (urging change of focus from municipal exclusionary practices
to the needs of lower-income households for ready access to attractive mixes of services, taxes,
and employment opportunities).
7. See, e.g., John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 91, 92
(2014) (The anti-development orientation of certain cities is turning them into preserves for
the wealthy as housing costs increase beyond what lower-income families can afford to pay.).
8. Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S.
Declined? (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2013), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2081216.
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id. at 2.
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explaining this shift, they noted the work of Christopher Berry and
Edward Glaeser, who postulated the clustering of skilled people in
metropolitan areas is driven by the tendency of skilled entrepreneurs
to innovate in ways that employ other skilled people and by the elas-
ticity of housing supply.11
Consistent with the caveat of Berry and Glaeser that the benefits
of agglomeration are in part dependent upon the elasticity of hous-
ing supply, research by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti like-
wise indicates that high housing prices in dynamic cities dampens
productivity.12 Its as if we have some of the most productive metro-
politan areas in the world, but we dont allow American workers to
flow to these areas to take advantage of that high productivity.13
The broader point is that preventing more workers from moving to
highly productive cities is holding back the productivity of the U.S.
economy.14 A study by Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko similarly con-
cluded: In the places where housing is quite expensive, building re-
strictions appear to have created these high prices.15 In Manhattan,
density restrictions were found to increase the cost of housing by
almost 50 percent.16
The concerns about growth restrictions in highly productive cities
are buttressed by a recent empirical study by Vicki Been and asso-
ciates.17 Although restrictions on development long have been associ-
ated in the literature with suburban local government, their analysis
11. Id. (citing Berry, Christopher R. & Edward L. Glaeser, The Divergence of Human Capital
Levels Across Cities, 84 REGL SCI. 407, 407 (2005)).
12. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate
Growth (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2015) available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w21154.pdf.
13. Emily Badger, How Big Cities that Restrict New Housing Harm the Economy, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (July 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014
/07/25/how-big-cities-that-restrict-new-housing-harm-the-economy/ (quoting Enrico Moretti).
14. Id. (referring to Morettis research with Chang-Tai Hsieh, supra note 12).
15. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing
Affordability, 9 ECON. POLY REV. 21, 23 (2003).
16. Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven Saks, Why is Manhattan So Expensive?
Regulation and the Rise in House Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331, 35051 (2005).
17. Vicki Been, et al., Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 227 (2014). Their research is based on a database created
by the authors of about 811,000 lots in New York City. Been taught at NYU Law School and
was Director of NYUs Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy when the article was
written. She now is on leave as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development.
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suggests that large cities also are responsive to homeowners desire
for restraints on growth and not, as generally thought, the pecuniary
imperatives of developers, financiers, consultants, and politicians to
foster a growth machine.18
One approach to increasing urban density and agglomerative
benefits is that municipal governments use condemnation to acquire
large tracts of land from their multiplicity of owners and transfer re-
configured super parcels to private developers who would maximize
positive externalities.19 A similar proposal would simply authorize
private takings of land by those who presumably could use it better.20
A frontal attack on regulations resulting in insufficient density in
leading cities has been urged by RoderickHillsand DavidSchleicher,21
who propose city replanning to achieve increased residential density
through grand legislative bargains. Like the original wave of compre-
hensive planning almost a century ago, urban replanning is predi-
cated on a set of experts devising plans to which others would adhere.
However, Hills and Schleichers main operative mechanism would
lock in urban growth through the development of regulatory property
and procedural techniques to make deals politically and legally dif-
ficult to unwind.22
Justice Holmes wrote of our proclivity to place new wine into old
bottles23 in order to meet the felt imperatives of the times.24 In this
manner, land use regulation has evolved from common law nuisance
to Progressive Era comprehensive planning, then turned to flexibility
and deal making, and now perhaps will cycle back to top-down com-
prehensive planning. These swings reflect in part the alternating su-
premacy of our quest for certainty in the law and recognition of the
need for flexibility and for adjusting to changing circumstances.25
18. Id. at 229 ([O]ur results show considerable evidence that homeowners have much more
influence on land-use policy than the received wisdom . . . would predict.).
19. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012) (condemnation for retransfer to private developers for
positive externalities).
20. Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009).
21. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, City Replanning (George Mason Univ. Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 14-32, 2014) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125.
22. Id. at 4559.
23. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
24. Id. at 1.
25. See Michael G. Faure, et al., The Regulators Dilemma: Caught between the Need for
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But who decides if a resurgent growth machine is worth the cost
and whether refurbished comprehensive land use plans or similar de-
vices will achieve that end? Those issues are explored here.
The present author is sympathetic to the removal of artificial
barriers that restrict density in vibrant large cities. As I have elabo-
rated upon elsewhere, limitations on density lead to the creation of
regulatory property, which is of value only insofar as others are ex-
cluded from similar activities.26 Such bounty is conceived in interest
group politics, and its distribution nurtures the culture of crony
capitalism.27 Also, zoning and similar regulations are coarse-grained
instruments, and their effects are elusive.28
The imposition of new municipal regulatory schemes to enhance
local prosperity is problematic. The citywide bargains29 proposed
by Hills and Schleicher would enshrine regulatory property on a
grand scale and likely serve as a straight jacket that would hinder
further city adaptation to change. Furthermore, the positive advan-
tage sought by such grand bargains is not densification as such but
rather agglomeration.
In her recent paper Agglomerama,30 Lee Anne Fennell illustrated
the subtleties of agglomeration and how it differs from densification.
The provision of more housing in large cities is not necessarily coex-
tensive with the synergies to be derived from achieving a critical mass
of talented people. Achieving optimal agglomeration, if possible at all,
would require a plethora of regulations, just as fastening Jell-o to
the wall would require a lot of nails. Moreover, as I have explicated
elsewhere,31 mandates that attempt to mimic spontaneous ordering
are oxymoronic and come about largely through a misreading of Jane
Jacobs classic book The Death and Life of Great American Cities.32
Flexibility and the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle, 24 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283 (2013).
26. See Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Regulation, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2014).
27. Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public Benefit in an
Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (2011).
28. See Steven J. Eagle, Urban Revitalization and Eminent Domain: Misinterpreting Jane
Jacobs, 4 ALBANY GOVT L. REV. 106 (2011).
29. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 26.
30. Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming) (citations omitted),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532270.
31. See Eagle, supra note 28, at 106.
32. JACOBS, supra note 2.
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It is true, of course, that urban land use planning has been a fixture
of American municipal life for almost a century, and there is much
that we have learned from observing it. On the other hand, moving
from the relatively modest goal of preventing nuisance-like land use
incompatibilities to the ambitious goal of optimizing urban prosperity
leaves lots of room for unintended consequences, some of which are
noted here.
Hills and Schleicher argue the common law of property is far less
important than it once was as a method for regulating real property
ownership and use.33 To a certain extent this is true, but the princi-
ple of increasing subordination of property rights to government con-
trols can be self-justifying as well as self-leveraging. As District of
Columbia Circuit Judge Stephen Williams summed up the spiral of
increased regulation and decreased owner expectations that, in turn,
justified more regulationsregulation begets regulation.34
As we contemplate the comprehensive replanning of great Amer-
ican cities, we must ask if we would be doomed to repeat the same
cycle of overly prescriptive regulation followed by tortuous ad hoc
workarounds.
II. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING: FROM IDEALS TO EXACTIONS
This Part discusses the evolution of American land use regulation,
beginning with its origins in common law nuisance. The early twen-
tieth century was marked by the growth of comprehensive planning,
which generally provided rigid requirements with development as of
right if the requirements were met. Later in the century, zoning rules
were modified to provide flexibility. However, development as of right
was replaced by land use approvals conditioned on governmental re-
view based on vague criteria and typically involving bargaining with
developers for development exactions.
A. From Common Law Nuisance to Prophylactic Regulation
Before the twentieth century, American land use regulation was
primarily a function of the private law concept of nuisance, which
33. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 1.
34. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. Pship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Williams, J., concurring).
80 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:073
precluded owners from using their parcels in ways that detracted
from the rights of neighbors to reasonable use and enjoyment of their
lands,35 although, to be sure, it coexisted with the concept of property
as enhancing civic virtue.36 This was based on a non-instrumental
view of property as an expression of human nature,37 a view carried
over from natural rights theory to the United States Constitution.38
However, common law nuisance did not deal well with urban
aesthetic problems or with protecting public health in congested
apartment blocks. Towns in America were largely unattractive,
muddy, cluttered clusters of buildings. Individual residences sported
trash-strewn alleys and yards, and there was little monumental civic
architecture.39 In the cities, reformers such as Jacob Riis denounced
old-law urban tenements, which were bereft of light and air and full
of contagious disease.40
The aspiration to replace urban tenements with standard housing
motivated a significant segment of the Progressive reform commu-
nity in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. These
Progressives believed that changing surroundings would change
behavior. Advances in public health, sanitation, and social science
35. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASEW.RES.
L. REV. 583 (2008). This approach did not preclude uncompensated state prohibitions of uses
that clearly were injurious to the publics health, safety, and welfare. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S.623 (1887) (upholding, pursuant to state prohibition of alcoholic beverages, the uncom-
pensated loss of value of a now-unusable brewery).
36. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM.L.REV. 782, 821 (1995) (asserting that civic republicans, as con-
trasted to Lockeans, see the end of the state as the promotion of the common good and of virtue.
Rights, rather than being prepolitical, are created by the polity and subject to limitation by the
polity when necessitated by the common interest.); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991).
37. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELLL.REV.
1549 (2003). Most modern property theory is strongly utilitarian; the nineteenth-century cases
justified the free use of property as an extension of the moral freedom inherent in being human.
Id. at 1549; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957
(1982) (arguing, from a Hegelian perspective, the instantiation of personhood in property).
38. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
367 (1991); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak
Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.1630 (1988).
39. DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING & LAND
DEVELOPMENTCONTROLLAW 16 (2d. ed. 1986). This discussion borrows from STEVENJ.EAGLE,
REGULATORY TAKINGS § 3-1 (5th ed. 2012).
40. JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1890).
2015] ON ENGINEERING URBAN DENSIFICATION 81
allowed positive environmentalists to theorize about designing urban
environments that would lead people to make better moral decisions
about the structure of their lives.41 Control over land use would be
removed from the amoral hand of the market and entrusted to expert
elites removed from politics and business. . . .42
Against this backdrop, the City Beautiful movement, often traced
to the Chicago Worlds Fair of 1893, led to the creation of over one
thousand municipal associations by the turn of the century. At the
first National Conference on City Planning and the Problems of Con-
gestion in 1909, the renowned landscape architect Frederick Law
Olmsted proposed police rules, which would include building codes
and the districting of land.43
These impulses for reform resulted in now-familiar zoning rules.
[Z]oning is a quintessential Progressive concept because it relied on
experts to design and enforce regulations that would create a more
pleasant environment that, in turn, would foster healthy, responsible
citizens.44 This embodied the progressive movements belief that the
application of expertise to a problem would produce better outcomes,
a notion underlying the Euclid decision.45
Pecuniary interests, as well as public health and aesthetics, drove
the widespread adoption of zoning in the early part of the last cen-
tury. Many Progressives shared the decidedly negative view of the
immigrants, particularly southern and eastern Europeans, who from
the 1880s to the mid-1920s poured into Americas cities in alarming
numbers.46 In New York City, concerns about loft building manu-
facturing and housing for waves of immigrants led business leaders
to protect prosperous residential neighborhoods and upscale retailing
41. Richard H. Chused, Euclids Historical Imagery, 51 CASEW. RES.L.REV. 597, 601 (2001)
(quoting PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 18201920, at 22123
(1978)) (noting that Boyer described positive environmentalism as a strategy to discourage
urban vice by the provision of healthy social substitutes).
42. DENNISJ.COYLE,PROPERTYRIGHTS AND THECONSTITUTION:SHAPINGSOCIETYTHROUGH
LAND USE REGULATION 21 (1993).
43. Id. at 1619. Olmsteads many projects included designing New York Citys Central Park.
44. MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 30 (2008).
45. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 630 (2011) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and
asserting a much more recent transformation to zoning by contract between municipalities
and developers).
46. WOLF, supra note 44, at 3031.
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through a 1916 ordinance, the first comprehensive zoning plan in
the nation.47 The issue involved Fifth Avenue versus the garment
industry and was asserted to manifest racism with a progressive,
technocratic veneer.48
A more general motivation for the widespread adoption of zoning
was that surging ownership of automobiles gave more mobility to
those less well off. Buyers, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders
envisioned zoning as ensuring the stability of eagerly sought-after
new, expensive residential districts.49
The U.S. Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to comprehensive
zoning in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. AmblerRealty Co.50 The opinions
author, Justice George Sutherland, was one of the Four Horsemen
of economic substantive due process.51 Nevertheless, he apparently
thought zoning to be consistent with his conservative philosophy as
a means to protect against urban contagious diseases and overpopu-
lation that would threaten social stability.52
Euclid adjudicated a facial challenge to zoning brought under the
rubric of substantive due process. However, it gave cities considerable
latitude in as-applied cases as well, since it declared that [i]f the va-
lidity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly de-
batable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.53 Even
as Sutherland explained that zoning was a justified use of the police
47. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 39, at 2021.
48. William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in
Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 31, 4041
(Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) (quoting SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA
29 (1969)).
49. Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING ANDTHEAMERICANDREAM:PROMISES
STILL TO KEEP 122, 12627 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
50. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51. See, e.g., Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (opinion by Sutherland, J.,
invalidating minimum wage for women in the District of Columbia as violative of freedom
of contract and due process). For a revisionist view, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of
the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 56061 (1997) (describing Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler as closet liberals . . . who struck a reactionary pose to
remain in the good graces of the conservative sponsors to whom they owed their positions . . .
while in legions of low-profile cases they quietly struck blows for their own left-liberal agendas).
52. See JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE
12627, 166, 24243 (1951); HADLEYARKES,THERETURNOFGEORGESUTHERLAND:RESTORING
A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 7071 (1994).
53. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 294 (1924)).
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power,54 he emphasized its continuity with private ordering through
the doctrine of nuisance.55
B. The Comprehensive Plan
1. From Long-Term Planning to Short-Term Improvisation
One of the most successful model statutes is the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act (SZEA), drafted by a Department of Commerce advi-
sory committee in 1928.56 The SZEA was the prototype of most state
enabling legislation and divides communities into districts, each of
which proscribes uniform use restrictions and size restrictions for
structures.57 SZEA Section 3 provides that ordinances shall be drawn
in accordance with a comprehensive plan. In Charles Haars expli-
cation, [t]hese words appear to be a directive to put zoning on a base
broader than and beyond itself, and a warning that an ordinance not
in accordance with a comprehensive plan is ultra vires the enabling
act.58 The plan is predicated on comprehensive surveys analyses of
existing social, economic, and physical conditions in the community,
and, clarified by planning experts, it directs attention to the goals
selected by the community and selects means to achieve them.59
Professor Haar made clear that the comprehensive plan is a long-
term, general outline of projected development.60 However, that was
easier said than done. Eight years after Haars pronouncement, a
leading planner expressed forebodings in one of the professions
principal journals:
[P]lanning requires relatively long-range projections of future
conditions. . . . Yet, our ability to forecast future conditions in
54. Id. at 387.
55. Id. (In solving doubts, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [use your rights
so as not to injure the rights of others] which lies at the foundation of so much of the common
law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew.).
56. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928).
57. Charles M. Haar & Barbara Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible
Zoning or an Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 155253 (1961).
58. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154,
1156 (1955).
59. Id. at 1155.
60. Id. at 1156.
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society is notoriously poor. The record of population forecasts is
a dismal one. The record of land use forecasting is far worse and
no one correctly foresaw such a major innovation as the automo-
bile or its consequences for urban growth. . . . Until some radical
change in the quality of forecasts becomes possible, only a system
of continuously revising projections and of continuously calculat-
ing the consequences of current investments can provide the best
possible degree of knowledge for current or future decisions.61
The needed radical change in the quality of forecasts did not come
about. Instead, comprehensive planning increasingly has become a
short-term process. Land use planning is sometimes associated with
the now-repudiated practice of dreaming about how a community
might appear on a specific date far in the future.62
By around 1980, virtually all planning professionals had come
to recognize both the limits of rationality and the unpredictabil-
ity of modern civilization. Planners thus have tended to become
less ambitious in the dimensions of space and time. . . . Many
planners also have come to believe that the planning period
should not stretch beyond 25 years (at the very most) and that
detailed planning should concentrate on the next five years or
so. There also is agreement that plans have to be continually
revised to take account of new information and events. In sum,
flexible, middle-range planning has come to replace long-range,
end-state planning.63
One result of this, as predicted in 1965, is that the fundamental
distinction between planning and other specialties is likely to become
progressively more blurred.64 The comprehensive plans increasingly
61. William L.C. Wheaton, Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning, 29 J.AM. INST.
PLANNERS 250, 25657 (1963), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944366308978074.
Wheaton headed the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, taught planning at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard, and was on the
board of the American Institute of Planners, a forerunner of the American Planning Association.
62. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 69 (4th ed.
2013) (noting that, in the middle of the twentieth century, the year 2000 was a popular target).
63. Id. at 70.
64. Alan Altshuler, The Goals of Comprehensive Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 186,
186 (1965), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944366508978165.
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short time horizon makes it hard to distinguish from periodically
adjusted zoning ordinances, if it is not altogether superfluous.
2. Planning and Its Biases
Daniel Mandelker and Dan Tarlock observed that the planning
profession has defined the ideal zoning decision as one based on tech-
nical criteria and accepted by open and informed political debate.65
However, they added that, in practice, zoning decisions are too often
ad hoc, sloppy and self-serving, and this affects the judges sense
of the legitimacy of the institution that produced the decision.66 The
self-serving nature of planning is illustrated by the summary of a
leading planner effectively equating the professions predilections to
natural law:
The planners biases are quite clear. They regard the present
pattern of scattered developmentas inherently evil. Often in plan-
ning literature this needs no demonstration: like natural law, it
is obvious to all right-thinking people. . . .
A second universal planners bias is one in favor of the preserva-
tion of open space. . . . Somehow, if open space can be preserved
and if people will but go to see it, their lives will be elevated and
mankind will be the better. . . .
A third traditional bias of the planner favors the maintenance
of a strong central business district and the preservation of the
density pattern of past cities. Here it is assumed that the city
must have a high-density core, containing a high proportion of the
areas shopping, banking, commercial, managerial, civic, public,
educational, and cultural functions. Becausecentraldistrictshave
in the past provided for a large proportion of the cities tax reve-
nue, it is argued that they must do so in the future. . . .
The fourth planners bias is that the journey to work should be
reduced by shortening the distance between places of residence
and places of employment. . . .
Finally, . . . [m]ost planners will express a greater preference
for row houses, garden apartments, and elevator apartments
than for single-family houses, and most will express a greater
65. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality
in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 23 (1992).
66. Id. at 2.
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preference for central or urban locations as opposed to suburban
locations. It is assumed that the American public has similar
preferences but is deprived by the operation of the housing mar-
ket of opportunities to express them in the purchase or rental
of homes.67
The last statement is particularly remarkable, since it assumes
that any discrepancy between planners preferences for dense resi-
dential living and the existing predominance of single-family homes
surely results from the publics will being thwarted. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, however, there is a strong correlation between peoples
views about housing and residential density and their overall po-
litical preferences.68
Perhaps another reason for popular dislike of densification is its
architecture. For too long, our profession has flatly dismissed the
general publics take on our work, even as we talk about making
that work more relevant with worthy ideas like sustainability, smart
growth and resilience planning.69 Were attempting to sell the pub-
lic buildings and neighborhoods they dont particularly want, in a
language they dont understand.70
Also, regulations ostensibly pertaining to the use of land use
increasingly were designed to achieve social purposes such as man-
dating in lieu art fees as a development condition for private build-
ings in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.71 Dozens of local governments
have adopted anti-agglomeration zoning against undesired busi-
nesses, such as payday lenders, apparently in a misguided effort to
protect consumers by limiting competition among them.72 David
Schleicher refers to the facilitation of social evils, such as crime, as
67. Wheaton, supra note 61, at 25455 (emphasis added).
68. See Press Release, Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization in the American Republic:
How Increasingly Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise
and Everyday Life (June 12, 2014), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12
-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf. For discussion, see infra text accompanying note 207.
69. Steven Bingler & Martin C. Pedersen, How to Rebuild Architecture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2014, at A29.
70. Id.
71. Ehrlichv. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (upholding mandatory fee in lieu
of art as aesthetic control).
72. See Sheila R. Foster, Breaking Up Payday: Anti-Agglomeration Zoning and Consumer
Welfare, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 57 (2014).
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negative agglomeration.73 Socio-economic population patterns and
neighborhood character also sometimes are taken into account74 and
may lead to requiring developer subsidization ofaffordable housing.75
But, the Ehrlich 1 percent art fee did not result from the new devel-
opment using up all of the space for art available to the community.76
Likewise, a blithe statement that a 15 percent set-aside requirement
for below-market housing was simply a land use ordinance, and
therefore a valid exercise of the police power, did not make it so.77
This broad scope of plannings regulatory reach is consistent with
the growth of the administrative state,78 a phenomenon that mostly
eludes judicial review.79 Those facts, coupled with polarization along
political and cultural lines of popular attitudes about ideal commu-
nities,80 also lead to a perceived lack of legitimacy of the land use
planning enterprise.
Perhaps most indicative of the hubris of planning has been the
destruction and recreation of entire neighborhoods in the mid-twenti-
eth century. The leading case of Berman v. Parker81 is a paradigmatic
example.82 There, the Federal government bulldozed a neighborhood
73. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1737 (2013).
74. See Chinese Staff & Workers Assn v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986)
(declaring proposed high-rise luxury condos on vacant lot must be reviewed to determine envi-
ronmental impact on socio-economic character of neighborhood).
75. See California Bldg. Indus. Assn v. City of San Jose, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 824 (Ct.
App. 2013), review granted and opinion superseded by California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of
San Jose, 307 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2013) (conditioning housing development permit on the set aside
of 15% of units for below-market affordable housing). See infra text accompanying notes 32729.
76. See Gideon Kanner, Tennis Anyone? How California Judges Made Land Ransom and
Art Censorship Legal, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 214, 231 (1997) (observing: Just how construction of
new housing and businesses diminishes the availability of artistic resources no one has both-
ered to explain.).
77. California Bldg. Indus. Assn., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 824.
78. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994) (arguing that the post-New Deal administrative state contravenes the Constitutions
design); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J.ECON.LIT.
401 (2003) (asserting that Progressive Era reformers eroded the nineteenth-century belief that
private litigation was the sole appropriate response to social wrongs).
79. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudenceat OIRA and Beyond, 103
GEO. L.J. 259 (2015).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 20710.
81. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (establishing aesthetics as well as public health as valid bases for
exercise of the police power for neighborhood-wide urban renewal).
82. See Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423
(2010) (providing a detailed account of Berman and its background).
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in Southwest, Washington, D.C. The cost to existing residents, and
their wistfulness for their demolished neighborhood, was reported
by the Washington Post in 1999.83 A recent account in the New York
Times noted that redevelopment of the Southwest was once a sym-
bol of urban renewals high hopes and then of its crushing failure.84
Southwest was the nations first urban renewal project, ap-
proved in 1946 to replace what were then considered slums with
a modern community that would include federal buildings, town
homes and a variety of amenities. What it did, primarily, was
displace thousands of residents, mostly African-Americans. That
gave rise to the pejorative term Negro removal applied to
urban renewal and derived from this failed experiment, and
destroyed a viable commercial waterfront.85
A new $2 billion mixed-use project is being built in Southwest to
correct what is now regarded as an egregious error imposed on the
city by people then thought to be visionary planners.86 The citys se-
lected developer lauded it: Its a critical mass, the Big Bang theory.87
3. Lack of Knowledge Leads to Use of Heuristics
In attempting to make sense of the staggering array of inputs that
inform land use decisions, it is tempting to rely on the conclusions
of experts who employ heuristics. It is ironic that the problems with
which the present generation of planners must wrestle result largely
from the decisions of a previous generation of experts and that the
early errors of overreaching, from which planners slowly have with-
drawn, now come back in new forms.88 Yet experience dictates that
humility is imperative. As Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager observed,
yesterdays Everglades swamp to be drained as a mosquito haven
83. Linda Wheeler, Broken Ground, Broken Hearts; In the 50s, Many Lost SW Homes to
Urban Renewal, WASH. POST, June 21, 1999, at A1.
84. Eugene L. Meyer, Contrite over Failed Urban Renewal, Washington D.C. Refreshes a
Waterfront, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at B10.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Monty Hoffman, chief executive of PN Hoffman).
88. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Reflections on Private Property, Planning and State
Power, 61 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 5 (2009).
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is todays wetland to be preserved for wildlife and aquifer recharge;
who knows what tomorrows view of public policy will bring, or how
the market will respond to it.89
For this reason, there is a great deal to be said for the incremental
change that marked the common law90 for the taking into account
tacit knowledge91 and harnessing the combined insight of all who
might enter into transactions.92 Good development is dependent on
evaluating the myriad of interrelated details in a proposed project.93
When attempting to plan for positive benefits of agglomeration, that
problem is compounded.
C. From Idealism to Zoning for Dollars
Comprehensive plans also have become less idealistic. In mid-
century, local planning commissions helped to create wholly new
communities, the suburbs, which for many embodied the vision of
the future America.94 By the waning years of the century, however,
recurrent stresses resulted in American society put[ting] its faith
in economic pragmatism. A shorter view dominated planning pro-
cesses, replacing comprehensiveness with a focus on narrower and
more immediate strategic opportunities. Local plans no longer re-
flected a sense of community need; instead, they were bent to serve
entrepreneurial opportunity.95
As will be discussed later, the high transactions costs implicit in
bargaining for favorable development regulation on a parcel-by-parcel
89. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).
90. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 925 (1996) (noting that the common law can serve as a model for incremental change
in society as a whole, as it did for [Edmund] Burke).
91. See generally MICHAELPOLANYI,TACITDIMENSION (1966) (dealing with impressionistic
or tacit knowledge, gained from experience, that is difficult to convey to others).
92. See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988) (urging use of prices as a
mechanism by which millions of individuals can send signals as to what kinds of goods and
services they are willing to supply or demand under various circumstances, thus contributing
insights to the store of public knowledge).
93. See Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 57
(2014).
94. David J. Allor, Toward a Longer View and Higher Duty for Local Planning Commissions,
60 J. AM. PLAN. ASSN. 437, 438 (1994).
95. Id.
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basis96 is a principal reason asserted in support of comprehensive
urban replanning.97
However, land economist William Fischel supports such bargaining
as economically efficient.98 He notes that a developer seeking to ac-
quire land owned by a privately governed community might want to
build eight houses instead of the four the community permits. The
amount by which the value of eight building lots exceeds the value of
four larger lots is economic rent, which the developer and the home-
owners association with power to grant permission will share in a
bargaining process.99
Fischel then asserts that the exact same principles should apply
if the development permission must be sought from public land use
regulators. Restrains on the ability of the municipality to engage in
such bargaining are inefficient in that they retard exchanges that
would be mutually beneficial to the parties involved.100 However,
what is the source of a municipalitys claim to ownership of all devel-
opment rights beyond existing development? Perhaps it is a Geor-
gian notion that growing value of land is caused by actions of society
and of government.101 Perhaps it is based upon the United Kingdoms
Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, which nationalized devel-
opment rights with payment of only very limited compensation.102
The clash between idealisticshaping of communities and pragmatic
acceptance of strategic imperatives has an effect on judicial percep-
tions of the legitimacy of planning and zoning. To be sure, it has
been almost ninety years since Euclid was decided103 and thirty-five
years since Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.104
96. See infra Part III.B.1.
97. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 6.
98. William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exaction: A Property Rights Analysis, 50
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1987).
99. Id. at 1013.
100. Id. at 104.
101. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY THE REMEDY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE
OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH 406 (1940)
(asserting the efficiency of a single tax on the value of land, without improvements as a substi-
tute for all other taxes). This reasoning motivated much of the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), affd
on other grounds, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
102. See Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 163 (2007).
103. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
104. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Whatever the theoretical merits of carefully distinguishing between
planning and regulation, to demand that courts do so now, as the
Supreme Court observed in a different context, would be asking us
to disinvent the wheel.105 While the demand for zoning by homeown-
ers and its supply by officials and planners were interactive, William
Fischel suggests that an indication of which factor is more important
is the failure of planners to obtain the speedy elimination of all prior
nonconforming uses, without which planners regarded zoning dis-
tricts as seriously flawed.106
As noted earlier, comprehensive planning has changed its focus
from long-term to short-term107 and from the vision of the future
America to entrepreneurial opportunity.108 In his influential arti-
cle Zoning for Dollars, Jerold Kayden described incentive zoning
as the process by which cities grant private real estate developers
the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their vol-
untary agreement to provide urban design features.109
Kayden explored the implications of government approval of devel-
opment in excess of that normally permitted in exchange for receipt
of some benefit110 and concluded that government will manipulate
the base matter of right zoning FAR [floor-area ratio] to a lower level
than otherwise necessary in order to obtain amenities at no marginal
physical planning cost.111 Similarly, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,112 Justice Scalia noted that a restriction on develop-
ment could be a legitimate exercise of the police power but that the
restriction would fail if there were no nexus between the restriction
and an unrelated condition that would excuse adherence to it. In
105. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) (rejecting suggestion, despite evidence to
the contrary, that it would be erroneous to permit psychiatrists to predict dangerousness).
106. William A. Fischel, The Persistence of Localism, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER
RESOURCES 259, 277 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2012). Fischel argues that the sem-
inal Supreme Court decision in Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), which upheld
the uncompensated closure of a brickyard that was subsequently surrounded by residential
areas, both involved what was akin to a traditional nuisance and has not, as a practical matter,
resulted in the termination of most nonconforming uses. Id. at 27782.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 6063.
108. See supra text accompanying note 95.
109. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991) (de-
scribing bargaining for incentive zoning fees to fund various community needs and amenities).
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 46.
112. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion.113 Scalia
presciently added: One would expect that a regime in which this kind
of leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce stringent
land-use regulations which the State then waives to accomplish
other purposes. . . .114
By making it clear that aspirational planning for the ideal city
differs from regulation to ensure the safe and healthy city, spheres for
community protection and landowner autonomy could be fostered.115
If it is to possess integrity, planning must instantiate important police
power boundaries. As Kayden observed, the fact that it has become
the politys opening bid in a bargaining process intrinsically delegit-
imizes the entire regulatory system.116
In any event, planners simply do not have the ability to say how
much development should be allowed. As I have noted elsewhere,
planners cannot readily apply their tools in any linear sense, since
the question is not how much development will be permitted but,
rather, how to evaluate the myriad of interrelated details in the
application.117 Likewise, sheer density might be measured in a gross
sense by the number of dwelling units per acre, but that would not be
a useful measure of the housing stock, much less the subtle issues
involved in the interactions among residents and others that would
have a bearing on positive agglomeration.
III. THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE REPLANNING AND ITS INFIRMITIES
This Part of the Article discusses proposals for enhancing the
prosperity of vibrant cities through densification and the ensuing
113. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 1415 (1981)).
114. Id. at 837 n.5.
115. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983).
116. Kayden, supra note 109, at 7 (Zoning expresses conclusions about theoretically objective
physical planning criteria such as street, sidewalk, sewer, and water pipe capacity; light and air
availability at ground level; and compatibilityof new buildings with the existing neighborhood.
Thus, any overriding of that zoning, no matter what the proposed amenity, intrinsicallydelegit-
imizes the entire regulatory system. This critique gains particular currency when the amenity
is geographically or conceptually unrelated to the development project obtaining the incentive.).
117. Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLORL.REV. 1, 57 (2014).
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benefits of positive agglomeration. It notes that the benefits are
uncertain. Furthermore, long-term comprehensive planning proved
unworkable in a dynamic society and was replaced by short- to
intermediate-term flexible (i.e., improvisational) recipes for munici-
pal opportunistic bargaining with developers. Although proposals
for densification stress replanning, the actual mechanism by which
they would work is not planning at all but rather the creation and
lock-in of regulatory property. The political grand bargain needed to
achieve this requires the purchase of political support from powerful
landowners and others. As is the case of regulatory property gener-
ally, the benefits that they receive inure from government depriva-
tion of the property rights of others less well placed or less lucky.
A. Expertise Reduxthe New Comprehensive Planning
As noted earlier, planning and zoning were quintessential
Progressive ideas.118 Adherents of the somewhat disparate strands
of Progressivism were united in their belief that the talents of experts
drawn from the newly professionalized rankschiefly economists,
political scientists, social workers, lawyers, and teachersshould be
harnessed by government at all levels to help individual Americans
reach their full potential.119 Soon enough, urban planners joined
this elite.120 From this perspective, property is marked by land use
governance,121 and individuals autonomous ownership of land under-
lying Lockean property is described as depend[ent] upon social and
public values for conceptual coherence.122
The new comprehensive planning asserts that the proper basis for
urban land use planning is the city as a whole,123 that neighborhood
118. See WOLF, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 30.
120. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS
PROSPECTS 48485 (1961) (noting that the profession of planning dates to the Progressive Era).
121. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delin-
eating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
122. See Gregory S. Alexander, Propertys Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1287 (2014).
123. This term is employed here to echo parcel as a whole, an apparently simple exposition
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Alas, the term is rife
with subjectivity and complexity. See, e.g., Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel,
25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353 (2003); Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Owner-
ship and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549 (2012).
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autonomy (localism) is deleterious, and that economic productivity
is the desideratum. Once a proper citywide bargain is imposed, it
should be locked in place. The lock-in serves to solidify current plan-
ning views of the social nature of cities in property law and is remi-
niscent as well of the similar goal of locking in government licensure
and largess that Charles Reichs The New Property124 expounded a
half century ago. Plus ça change, plus cest la même chose.
According to City Replanning, the importance of common law
property is attenuated, and legislative and administrative actions
now determine most of the rules government how real property is
used and purchased.125 Furthermore, in a view akin to the United
Kingdoms Town and Country Planning Act, Hills and Schleicher sug-
gest the community is entitled to new value created by a change in
the land-use status quo.126
It is true that in 1926 the Supreme Court in Euclid gave localities
great deference in land use regulation.127 Furthermore, the Courts
1978 opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York128
introduced an ad hoc, multifactor analysis of regulatory takings that
incorporated elements of subjectivity and fairness that defies oper-
ationalization and essentially leaves local political decisions intact
except in cases of egregious abuse.129
One practical constraint on the abilityof localities to impose onerous
regulation is the need to compete with other localities for residents.
124. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that the key to
ensuring continued enjoyment of government licensure and largess is to accord them the same
rights as traditional property).
125. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 1.
126. Id. at 57 (noting that too low a charge for a development permit might be regarded
as distributively unjust under this presumption). This view is similar to that of the English
Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, which expropriated development
rights to all land and established a special fund to provide small and gratuitous payments to
aggrieved landowners. See also MALCOLM GRANT, URBAN PLANNING LAW 63 (1982).
127. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control.).
128. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
129. For explication, see Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, supra note 117
(emphasizing the nature of the Penn Central doctrine and its uneasy embrace of substantive
due process); Steven J. Eagle, The Four Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 601 (2014) (emphasizing the development and application of the conventional
economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and character of the regulation factors,
and advocating recognition of the equal status of a fourth spatial and temporal relevant
parcel factor).
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The sorting model developed by Charles Tiebout postulates that
localities will compete for residents through offering varying packages
of amenities and taxation.130 However, Hills and Schleicher assert
that Tiebouts sorting model does not solve the problem of excessive
land use regulations because there are notorious limits on the mo-
bility of existing residents.131 The immobility of land and the unique-
ness of cities give municipalities pricing power.132 Many large cities,
they add, have no adequate substitutes, because they create agglom-
eration economies that rivals cannot duplicate.133
Yet the very agglomeration that Hills and Schleicher seek to
nurture already fosters the differentiation of thriving regions.134 Also,
in New York, middle-class outer-borough homeowners remain a po-
tent force in the Citys politics.135 It remains true that property own-
ership and use conveys distinctions of status,136 and housing is a vital
source of self-identity and of presentation of the self to others.137
A reminder of consequences of experts riding roughshod over
communities is the saga of urban renewal underlying Berman v.
Parker.138 As detailed by Amy Lavine,139 in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury the federal government engaged in massive redevelopment in
Southwest,Washington, D.C., bulldozing neighborhoods, sound build-
ings included. Three decades later the Washington Post recounted
costs to existing residents and their wistfulness for their demolished
neighborhood.140 The New York Times recently described that
130. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
131. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 34.
132. Id. at 35.
133. Id.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 25759 for discussion.
135. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Seces-
sion of Staten Island As A Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 775, 847 (1992).
136. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757
(2009).
137. See, e.g., Edward K. Sadalla et al., Identity Symbolism in Housing, 19 ENVT & BEHAV.
569, 572 (1987) (The house, being a fixed and fairly permanent piece of sign equipment, may
be viewed as an especially significant tool employed in the performances of its users.).
138. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (establishing aesthetics as well as public health as valid bases for
exercise of the police power for neighborhood-wide urban renewal).
139. Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423
(2010).
140. Wheeler, supra note 83.
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redevelopment as once a symbol of urban renewals high hopes and
then of its crushing failure.141
Southwest was the nations first urban renewal project, ap-
proved in 1946 to replace what were then considered slums with
a modern community that would include federal buildings, town
homes and a variety of amenities. What it did, primarily, was dis-
place thousands of residents, mostly African-Americans. That
gave rise to the pejorative term Negro removal applied to urban
renewal and derived from this failed experiment, and destroyed
a viable commercial waterfront.142
A new $2 billion mixed-use project is being built in Southwest, to cor-
rect what is now regarded as an egregious error imposed on the city
by people then thought to be visionary planners.143 The citys se-
lected developer lauded it in perhaps an inadvertent paean to agglom-
eration: Its a critical mass, the Big Bang theory.144
B. Economic Concerns Driving Densification
Enrico Moretti asserted that for each new high-tech job in a
metropolitan area, five additional local jobs are created outside of
high tech in the long run[,] but that attracting one job in tradi-
tional manufacturing generates 1.6 [new] jobs.145 College-educated
young people, unlike others, continue to move at a high clip, and
[w]here they end up provides a map of the cities that have a chance
to be the economic powerhouses of the future.146 Booming high tech
industries, environmental amenities, and cultural cool are impor-
tant factors.147
141. Meyer, supra note 84.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Monty Hoffman, chief executive of PN Hoffman).
145. ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 6061 (2012) (incorporating research
based an analysis of 11 million American workers in 320 metropolitan areas).
146. Claire CainMiller, Hello, Buffalo: Urban Migration of College Graduates is Expanding,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, at A15.
147. Id. (noting that Denver has become one of the most powerful magnets, and that it has
many of the tangible things young people want . . . including mountains, sunshine, and jobs
in booming industries like tech). Contributing to cool are microbreweries and bike-sharing
and an acceptance of marijuana and same-sex marriage. Id.
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At the heart of current concerns driving densification is a problem
that affects the prosperity and productivity at all skill levels.
When housing supply is completely elastic, workers of all skill
types gradually move to the productive locale, generating con-
vergence. Low-skilled workers are more sensitive to changes in
housing prices, and as housing supply becomes constrained, low-
skill workers stop moving to the productive locale, leading to a
decline in convergence.148
Furthermore, a paper by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Moretti estimates
that the economic effects of high housing costs resulted in a poten-
tial reduction in output in the United States of 13 percent between
1964 and 2009.149
1. Unclear Development Rights Lead to High Transactions
Costs
While property rights have the effect of delegating to owners the
ascertaining of the best use of a resource,150 it is a vital predicate
that owners know what their property rights are.151 As Carol Rose
observed, crystalline rules discourage rent-seeking behavior by leg-
islative and other decision-makers, who otherwise might sell clari-
fications of muddy rules to the highest bidder. Hard-edged rules
define assets and their ownership in such a way that what is bought
stays bought and can be safely traded to others, instead of repeatedly
being put up for grabs.152
In the era of improvisational land use regulation that followed the
demise of long-term comprehensive planning, an important example
of poorly defined property rights involves the extent and intensity
of development that will be permitted a developer. Even when zoning
ordinances purport to allow nominally fixed development as of right,
ostensibly crystalline ordinance provisions are understood by all to
148. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 8, at 3.
149. Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 12.
150. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 175456 (2004).
151. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) ([I]f market
transactions were costless, all that matters (other than questions of equity) is that the rights
of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.).
152. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 591 (1988).
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be the citys opening bid. Indeed, as Kayden recognized, the ordinance
level of development might be considerably less than the locality
thinks appropriate so that it could sell rezoning to a reasonable
level.153
The argument is based upon Ronald Coases seminal insight into
the importance of transaction costs.154 Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith subsequently placed the conceptual development of property
rights within the Coasean tradition155 and explored the importance of
having standardized property rights that were easily understood and
tradable.156 Merrill argued more generally that property rights should
be delineated by mechanical rules instead of judgment-based stan-
dards in order to facilitate transactions.157 Along the same lines, Gary
Libecap and Dean Lueck asserted development and land transactions
were eased by urban land being platted in a rectangular grid.158
2. Soaring Housing Prices and Their Consequences
The argument that restrictive land use regulation is the culprit
for high housing costs was set forth a decade ago by Edward Glaeser
and associates:
In Manhattan, housing prices have soared since the 1990s. Al-
though rising incomes, lower interest rates, and other factors can
explain the demand side of this increase, some sluggishness in the
supply of apartment buildings is needed to account for high and
rising prices. In a market dominated by high-rises, the marginal
cost of supplying more housing is the cost of adding an extra floor
to any new building. Home building is a highly competitive indus-
try with almost no natural barriers to entry, and yet prices in
153. See Kayden, supra note 109, at 46 (observing that officials might set a base FAR
[floor-arearatio] at an artificially low twelve rather than a planning-supported fifteen, andthen
offer three FAR bonuses in exchange for desired amenities).
154. Coase, supra note 150.
155. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54
J.L. & ECON. S77, S79 (2011).
156. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000).
157. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
158. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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Manhattan currently appear to be more than twice their supply
costs. We argue that land use restrictions are the natural expla-
nation for this gap. We also present evidence that regulation is
constraining the supply of housing in a number of other housing
markets across the country. In these areas, increases in demand
have led not to more housing units but to higher prices.159
While one might think that supporters of lower housing prices
would focus on impediments to enhanced supply, which has not been
the case. Instead, affordable housing advocates have concentrated
on distributional issues related to inequality and on hostility to
market interests.160 As earlier observed, many planners believe
that market interests thwart the popular desire for denser housing
as well.161
In Levin v. City and County of San Francisco,162 a federal district
court noted the citys affordable housing crisis of remarkable propor-
tions.163 It explained that this was due to deep structural problems
in the housing market in a city that has not produced housing to meet
its expanding population.164 The citys response was not to permit
new housing but rather, among other things, to replace existing rules
requiring landlords to pay the relocation expenses of tenants evicted
without fault with draconian new conditions on erstwhile landlords
who withdrew apartments from the rental market.165
In evaluating housing affordability from the perspective of the
individual, instead of focusing on the ratio of housing costs to income
in various locales, we might focus on the ratio of income net of housing
costs in the same locations. That might suggest that housing costs
159. Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 16, at 331.
160. See, e.g., Marcia Rosen & Wendy Sullivan, From Urban Renewal and Displacement to
Economic Inclusion: San Francisco Affordable Housing Policy 19782014, 25 STAN. L. & POLY
REV. 121 (2014) (celebrating how San Francisco, which consistently has amongst the nations
highest housing costs, counteract[s] destructive redevelopment practices and market interests
to preserve and enhance housing opportunities for low-income families and create inclusive
communities). Id. at 12223.
161. See supra text accompanying note 67.
162. ___ F.3d ____, 2014 WL 5355088 (Oct. 21, 2014). Notice of Appeal filed Mar. 4, 2015.
163. Id. at *2.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *34 (noting payments to departing tenants were pegged to their rents, which
results in high-income tenants, who could afford high rents, sometimes being entitled to in
excess of a quarter-million dollars).
100 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:073
should rise in the high-cost locale, so that after-housing earnings
were equalized between it and the low-cost location.166 However, it
also suggests the gains that would inure to society through agglomer-
ation are stymied by actions of existing residents. One reason why
residents resist change might be excessive risk aversion.167
Other local government theorists, led by William Fischel, focus
instead on the political power of homeowners and their mercenary
concern with property values. In this view, policymakers cater
to homeowners demands for low property taxes (for homeowners,
anyway), high levels of public services, uncongested public ame-
nities, and protection from competition in the housing market
when it comes time to sell.168
While the empirical case for replanning is based on very high rents
in New York, San Francisco, and a few other highly desired cities, the
conceptual case is builtupon the urban agglomerative model that peo-
ple flock to the most desirable cities because those they desire to asso-
ciate with already live there.169 Thus, just as agglomeration attracts
people, its related congestion repels them, and the task is to try to
find a good balance.170
The location decisions of households are influenced less by work-
place accessibility than by availability of amenities, recreational
opportunities, and public safety. In addition, the locations of firms
are clearly becoming more footloose under the influence of the
information revolution, just at a time when core agglomeration
diseconomies (pollution, congestion, crime, fiscal instability, etc.)
appear to be outweighing the original agglomeration economies
166. Edward L. Glaeser & Abha Joshi-Ghani, The Urban Imperative: Toward Shared
Prosperity (World Bank Poly Research, Working Paper No. 6875, 2014), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2439697.
167. Been, et al., supra note 17, at 228. However, given their inability to protect against loss
in value to their major asset, homeowners aversion might not be so excessive. See infra text
accompanying notes 21921.
168. Been, et al., supra note 17, at 228 (quoting WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS:HOWHOMEVALUESINFLUENCELOCAL GOVERNMENT, TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE
AND LAND-USE POLITICS 18 (2001)).
169. See Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks, supra note 16.
170. See Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and the Structure of Cities (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 13-25, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2272049 (analyzing methods of optimizing relationship).
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that pulled people and economic activities together. In this view,
the central cities are not coming back any time soon.171
3. Positive Economics Does Not Mandate Densification
While agglomeration might be economically more productive, that
is not dispositive of whether it should be embraced.
From a utilitarian perspective, a practice is desirable if it maximizes
happiness.172 Where individuals freely transact in the marketplace, the
resulting bargain appears value maximizing for them, without the
need for external evaluative criteria.173 However, this principle does
not provide a solution where legislation takes into account the
interests of others. Some commentators, notably Judge Richard
Posner, have argued that the maximization of welfare, or utility,
best can be considered as maximization of pecuniary wealth.174 On
the other hand, scholars have argued that this approach slights sub-
jective values175 and that calculations of value might result from
trivializing anything that cannot be reduced to economic efficiency.176
Tellingly, James Buchanan warned that the value-maximization
perspective cannot be extended from the market to politics since the
latter does not directly embody the incentive compatible structure
of the former.177 More generally, all desirable things might not be
commensurable, i.e., measurable by the pecuniary metric of the
171. Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United
States, 5 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 137, 151 (1999).
172. The classic exposition is JEREMYBENTHAM, INTRODUCTIONTOTHEPRINCIPLESOFMORALS
AND LEGISLATION (1789).
173. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 243, 244
(1987).
174. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.LEGALSTUD. 103,
119 (1979). Posner referred, inter alia, to the fact that the wealth principle is more definite
than the happiness principle, that wealth generally is obtained through productive activities
that benefit others, and that obtaining wealth generally results from adhering to conventional
pieties such as honesty in dealings. Id. at 12223.
175. Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posners the Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1114 (1982).
176. Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALEL.J. 1083, 1119 (1983)
(asserting that [j]ust as some true believers simplify their Coasean statement of the facts by
refusing to take pervasive market failure seriously, so too they may simplify their statements
of value by trivializing anything that cannot be reduced to economic efficiency).
177. Buchanan, supra note 172; see also James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Market Efficiency,
2 RMM J. 1, 2 (2011) (For the market to generate fully efficient results, all valued goods must
be private, that is, both excludable and rivalrous.).
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marketplace.178 Some things, like love, or perhaps rootedness in place,
are not instrumental.179 That should be kept in mind in evaluating
statements like [m]obility and flexibility are key principles of the
modern economy. Home ownership limits both.180
C. The Virtues of Localism
1. A Sense of Place and Its Disregard
For many, density intuitively detracts from the well-being that
comes from being rooted in a place.
Americans are of two minds as to how we ought to live. Publicly
we say harsh things about urban sprawl and suburbia, and we en-
courage activity in the heart of town. In theory, but only in theory,
we want to duplicate the traditional compact European commu-
nity where everyone takes part in arich and diversified public life.
But at the same time most of us . . . feel a deep and persistent
need for privacy and independence in our domestic life. That is
why the freestanding dwelling on its own well-defined plot of
land . . . is so persistent a feature of our landscape. That is why
our downtown areas, however vital they may be economically, are
so lacking in what is called a sense of place.181
This view of place engenders scant sympathy from those in more
urbane precincts who view sprawl as the ogre of land use and urban
policy.182 That said, many residents of cities or older suburbs who dis-
like low-density growth in the hinterlands absolutely detest infill
growth if it takes place in the neighborhoods in which they are set-
tled and comfortable.183
178. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THEMORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986) (A and B are incommensu-
rate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value.).
179. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 (1995) (Love is its own end. My
contention is that, in this respect, private law is just like love.).
180. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET: HOW NEW WAYS OF LIVING AND WORKING DRIVE
POST-CRASH PROSPERITY 173 (2010).
181. JOHN BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, A SENSE OF PLACE, A SENSE OF TIME 157 (1994).
182. Paul J. Boudreaux, Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough Questions for the Antisprawl
Movement, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 172 (2000).
183. See, e.g., Sandra Fleishman, The Debate Over Infill Developments: There Goes the
Neighborhood?, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2000, at G1.
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Localism seems a manifestation of and a way to develop social
capital, which refers to the ways in which individuals and commu-
nities create trust, maintain social networks, and establish norms
that enable participants to act cooperatively toward the pursuit of
shared goals.184 Thus, annexation of small communities by larger
ones has been deemed a threat to liberty.185 In this sense, rent control
has been defended as an impetus for long-term social capital.186
Evidence of such assortative matching is the explosive growth of
homeowner association communities.187 Because of their more fine-
grained appeal, they can allocate resources and provide public goods
that satisfy minority preferences better than local governments.188
Indeed, homeowner association covenants are not only meant to
keep property values from declining; they are meant to preserve com-
munity character, even when threatened by actions that increase
property values.189
Economic analyses purporting to demonstrate the irrationality
of homeowner behavior may well miss these nonpecuniary motiva-
tions. While the existence of private property has long been the bête
noire of romantics,190 property involves more than market wealth,
184. Sheila R. Foster, The City As an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 529 (2006).
185. See Christopher J. Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the
Age of Mobile Capital, 73 U. PITT.L.REV. 505, 520 (2012) (Annexation is now widely perceived
as a threat to individual liberty and autonomous self-government, pitting metropolitan region
residents against metropolitan region central city governments.).
186. See Curtis J. Berger, Home is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1989) (Rent control, in New York City and elsewhere, makes it
possible for tenants to regard their apartment as a home, and to think of themselves as belong-
ing to a community.).
187. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB.POLY 479, 481 (2009) (noting that [i]n some regions during the housing boom of the early
2000s, more than half of all new housing construction was in communities in which residents
were bound by a panoply of covenants).
188. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375,
138893 (1994).
189. Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
759, 777 (2011) (emphasis added).
190. See, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality
Among Men (1755), in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 141 (Roger D. Masters ed., 1964)
([T]he fruits belong to all and the earth to no one!); Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, WHAT IS PROP-
ERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994)
(1840) ([P]roperty is theft.). Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 22 (1987) (So, for Proudhons property is theft, the economist is
likely to substitute government is theft. This insight provides the essential underpinning for
proposals to constitutionalize laissez-faire.).
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and a system of property rights cannot survive unless property
ownership is infused with moral significance.191 The genius of indi-
vidual ownership of land is commended both from its morality in incul-
cating individual responsibility and in its productivity as giving the
owner the fruits of his or her labor.192
Those fruits represent more than pecuniary gain. For many,
individual autonomy is the key so that property and contract are val-
ued not because they are economically efficient but rather because
they best serve[ ] our preference for private ordering.193 One aspect
of the quest for autonomy is the instantiation of personality through
things, or, put another way, our ownership and use of real property
both reflects and help shape individuals sense of personhood.194
With community itself being a transmogrified and sometimes
abused term,195 it is easy to overlook that the relevant community has
more to do with the normative values of the discerner than with objec-
tive principles. Those values certainly have much to do with our reac-
tion to stringent and arguably appropriative regulation.
On a national scale, people outside leading cities bristle at being
labeled provinciaux by Parisians or inhabitants of flyover country
in bicoastal America. In the New York metropolitan area, people re-
siding in the outer boroughs or, to include those in New Jersey,
bridge and tunnel people, feel similarly not amused by the per-
ceived arrogance of Manhattanites, which most memorably is encap-
sulated in Saul Steinbergs iconic New Yorker cover.196 While it might
191. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2007) (noting the genius of making the owner account for all events per-
taining to his property, large and small).
192. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE.L.J. 1315, 132728 (1993) (citing Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (Pap. & Proc. 1967)).
193. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Scholarship, 82 CORNELLL.REV. 856, 896 n.199 (1997); see also
Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55, 90 (1987) (noting
the consistencybetween the division of landed property into discrete parcels separated by rigid
boundary lines, and a society whose members highly value individualism and autonomy).
194. See Radin, supra note 37.
195. The term community has its origins in the Latin noun communitas, referring to the
unstructured commonality of people marked by social equality. In contemporary usage, it typ-
ically refers instead to a distinct subset of the general population (e.g., arts community, gay
community) or as a euphemism for what the American founders referred to as a faction (e.g.,
underwriting messages on a Washington, D.C. public radio station are sponsored by the
aerospace community).
196. The New Yorker cover, View of the World from 9th Avenue, appeared on March 29,
1976. It has spawned many parodies and also a well-known copyright case, Steinberg v.
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be economically justifiable, the notion that government should cut
back on assistance to ailing communities and refocus its efforts on
assisting individuals to resettle among the more educated and pro-
ductive also leads to a sense of estrangement.197
These perceptions of existing city residents are fueled in large
part by the rise of income inequality, which is particularly acute in
vibrant cities,198 and its attendant justification of meritocracy. That
term originated as a sardonic commentary on a system where those
who succeed believe that they deserve their fate.199 When we con-
sider sweeping land use change to effectuate massive economic goals,
it is easy to overlook those with whose plight we do not associate.
Carol Rose noted that past expropriations of property from those for
whom we feel distaste gave rise to no demoralization among us. . . .
They were not members of our moral and political community. . . .200
Mary Ann Glendon, observing the destruction of the entire close-
knit and blue-collar Poletown neighborhood in Detroit for the creation
of a General Motors auto assembly plant, declared that no amount of
compensation . . . could repair the destruction of roots, relationships,
solidarity, sense of place, and shared memory that was at stake.201
Economists have suggested that propinquity for social interaction
and the presence of numerous restaurants and cultural amenities
Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (claiming that the movie Moscow on the
Hudson infringed).
197. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies,
39 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 155, 15556 (2008) (asserting that the mere exis-
tence of agglomeration externalities does not indicate which places should be subsidized, that
there appear to be human capital spillovers, whereby concentrations of educated people in-
crease both the level and the growth rate of productivity, and that the case for national policy
that favors specific places must depend more on efficiencyinternalizing externalitiesthan
on equity). On the other hand, there is evidence that judicial mandates leading to improved
schools in central cities facilitate the return of suburbanites, and, presumably, agglomeration.
See Zachary D. Liscow, Are Court Orders Responsible for the Return to the Central City?
The Consequence of School Finance Litigation 6970 (Jan. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551082.
198. Douglas Rae, Two Cheers for Very Unequal Incomes, in JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN
METROPOLIS 105, 105 (Clarissa Rile Hayward & Todd Swanstrom eds., 2011) (observing that
healthiest central city economies . . . turn out to have very unequal income structures).
199. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 6972, 12223 (1958) (introducing
term).
200. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 29 (adding that the disruption of the property of British loyalists or South-
ern slave-holders seemed to carry very little threat to the property of insiders).
201. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
2930 (1991).
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might mean that urban life is conducive to the production of social
capital.202 However, [d]enser places appear to have less, rather than
more, social capital.203 This, too, might reinforce voters taste for
localism.
From the perspective of a citys economic prosperity, however,
substantial income inequality may well be a good thing. It largely re-
flects that affluent individuals have stopped moving out to the sub-
urbs and started moving back to the central city.204 Also, in New York,
[h]ouseholds earning more than $100,000 a year . . . pay two-thirds
of the personal income taxes collected by the city, even though they
account for a mere 11 percent of all those who file.205
2. Housing Choices Reflect Personal Values
While cities are centers of human creativity, generating most of
our art, culture, commerce and technology, they also represent the
excesses of human activity, which encroach upon and alter our way
of life in profound and often indelible ways.206 Modern land use reg-
ulation grows directly out of efforts to control particular excesses and
impacts from city life and urban growth.207
According to a recent Pew Research Center report on Political
Polarization in the American Public,208 individuals residential land
use preferences very much reflect their cultural and political values.
To be sure, [m]ost Americans, regardless of their ideological prefer-
ences, value communities in which they would live close to extended
family and high-quality schools.209 However, there are differences
between right and left that go beyond disagreements over politics,
friends, and neighbors. Most germane here, if they could choose any-
where to live, three-quarters of consistent conservatives prefer a com-
munity where the houses are larger and farther apart, but schools,
stores, and restaurants are several miles away.210 The preferences
202. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 56.
203. Garnett, supra note 201, at 56 (quoting EdwardL. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban
Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1295 (2006)).
204. See generally Rae, supra note 197.
205. Steven Malanga, Bloomberg to City: Drop Dead, 13 CITY J. 2735 (Winter 2003).
206. Foster, supra note 183, at 527.
207. Foster, supra note 183, at 52728.
208. Pew Research Ctr., supra note 68.
209. Id. at 12.
210. Id.
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of consistent liberals are almost the exact inverse, with 77 percent
saying theyd chose to live where the houses are smaller and closer
to each other, but schools, stores, and restaurants are within walk-
ing distance.211
The notion that adoption of a comprehensive plan will signal
closure on a values debate and change the arena to technical issues
of conformity are unrealistic. Dan Tarlock observed that Charles
Haar made the unwarranted assumptions that the planning process
will generate consensus over time, as people accept its allocations,
and that the plan can embody reasoned choices that command wide
acceptance.212 Tarlock asserted instead [p]rocedures that rest on
expertise and attempt to gain acceptance for general principles . . .
will do little to resolve fundamental value conflicts.213
One way of recognizing andharmonizing the importance of localism,
as Jane Jacobs argued, is that cities should be divided into diverse
districts of intermediate size: The chief function of a successful dis-
trict is to mediate between the indispensable, but inherently politi-
cally powerless, street neighborhoods, and the inherently powerful
city as a whole.214
In Balancing the Zoning Budget,215 Hills and Schleicher noted
that, at least in theory, developers could simply bribe the neighbors
into accepting greater housing density in their neighborhood when-
ever they actually wanted to build.216 Yet when Edward Glaeser and
Bryce Ward studied land use controls in Greater Boston and enu-
merated regulatory barriers to new construction,217 their primary
puzzle was that communities were not choosing density levels to
maximize their land values.218 Glaeser and Ward conjectured that
this was related to zoning being based on historical considerations,
211. Id.
212. A. Dan Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted Land Use Plans As a Standard of Judicial
Review: The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 86 (1975) (discussing Charles M. Haar, The
Master Plan: An Inquiry in Dialogue Form, in LAND-USE PLANNING 745 (Charles M. Haar, ed.,
3d ed. 1971)).
213. Tarlock, supra note 211, at 8687.
214. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 12140; see generally Steven J. Eagle, Urban Revitalization and
Eminent Domain: Misinterpreting Jane Jacobs, 4 ALB. GOVT L. REV. 106 (2011).
215. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the Zoning Budget, 62 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 81, 94 (2011).
216. Hills & Schleicher, Zoning Budget, supra note 214, at 9495.
217. Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use
Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009).
218. Glaeser & Ward, supra note 216, at 277.
108 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:073
the difficulty of transfers of wealth between developers and current
owners, and the possibility of (unspecified) global externalities.219
William Fischel also adopted the hypothesis that the local elector-
ate exercises its land use authority in ways that look economically
rational.220 He found a more coherent explanation for homeowners
reluctance to trade in risk aversion. The concentration of their wealth
in their homes and the inability ofmost homeowners to insure against
neighborhood decline seem to offer a better explanation of why sub-
urbanites are wary of value-enhancing transactions that would pro-
mote the higher-density development desired by both profit-minded
developers and public-spirited promoters of smart growth.221
Indeed, the value of homes is fragile and affected by many things.
Even the designation of a neighborhood school under the No Child
Left Behind Act as in need of improvement has been shown to result
in a substantial decrease in neighborhood property values.222
D. Are Local Officials Over Solicitous of Homeowner Concerns?
There are some land uses that are useful to society, like airports
or trash transfer stations, that are not nuisances per se but to which
people say not in my back yard (NIMBY). This gives rise to the
chronic complaint that local officials are indulgent of homeowners
NIMBYism.
The notion that local officials should be responsive to the desires of
their electorate regarding the character of the community hardly is
novel. Generally speaking, courts defer to local decisions, unless the
result is to place unfair burdens on individuals,223 arbitrarily deprives
219. Id. at 278.
220. Fischel, supra note 106, at 260.
221. Id. at 271.
222. Alexander Bogin & Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Property Left Behind: An Unintended
Consequence of a No Child Left Behind Failing School Designation, 54 J. REGL SCI. 788, 789
(2014). The authors add: Additional analyses suggest that this home price effect is largely due
to strong perceptions of poor school quality or social stigma surrounding a failing designation.
Id. at 788.
223. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (The Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is designed to bar Government from forcing some people along to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.). The
Supreme Court has continually reaffirmed this principle, most recently in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
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them of due process of law224 or cuts too deeply against the broader
public interest.225
In smaller, more homogeneous, residential communities, the atten-
tiveness of public officials to homeowners concerns and desires was
accepted as a given.226 Employing public choice analysis,227 William
Fischel suggested that this results from homeowners mercenary
concern with property values.228 On the other hand, in large cities,
where voters were thought too heterogeneous to fight for exclusionary
policies, the growth machine of elites was thought to prevail.229
Vicki Been and associates recently revisited these views in light of
a large dataset of New York City rezoning proposals.230 They reiter-
ated that the growth machine is typically thought to describe urban
land-use politics, while the homeowner theory explains suburban
land use.231
Recently, however, cities have begun to engage in land use
practices long associated with suburbsdownzoning land to more
restrictive regulations, imposing substantial fees for develop-
ment approval, and taking significant quantities of land off the
market through programs to preserve historic landmarks and
open space. That shift should lead to a reexamination of received
wisdom about urban land use politics.232
224. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding zoning as
residential of sliver of land in manufacturing area to be arbitrary).
225. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court cautioned that it
did not mean to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand
in the way. Id. at 38990.
226. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (analyzing officials deference to the desire of suburban ma-
jorities for exclusionary zoning).
227. Public choice economics describes government activity through the lens of a marketplace
where favorable legislation and regulation are exchanged for votes and campaign contributions.
Foundational works include KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3rd
ed. 2012) (1951); ANTHONY DOWNS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); and JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
228. FISCHEL, supra note 167, at 18.
229. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987).
230. Been, et al., supra note 17, at 22829. The data set was based on 200,000 lots considered
by the New York City Planning Commission for rezoning between 2002 and 2009. Id. at 227.
231. Id. at 229.
232. Id.
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For its advocates, densification is a collective action problem,233
in which numerous small interest groups are able to take advantage
of the checks and balances of a pluralist system to block change
that would be salutary for society as a whole. Its political manifesta-
tions are popularized using terms such as demosclerosis234 and
vetocracy.235 Of course, when change is salutary is a matter of
opinion.
IV. THE GRAND BARGAIN OF REPLANNING
The heart of the Hills and Schleicher argument for comprehensive
replanning is that it is a mechanism for enforcing citywide deals.236
They define a plan, in this context, as (1) a citywide or multi-neigh-
borhood determination of permissible land uses (2) made simul-
taneously that is (3) sticky, as a practical matter, against future
piecemeal alteration.237 In important result would be to counteract
the anti-agglomerative bias that Schleicher previously asserted was
present in local government law.238
A. Expertise Coupled with a Strong Mayor
David Schleicher has argued that political parties provide legisla-
tures with their basic organizing principles, that in legislatures with
strong political parties, members have an incentive to vote with their
leaders so as to burnish the partys brand and ultimately ensure
their reelection.239 Similarly, as Roderick Hills and Schleicher add,
in cities where strong parties vie for control, the leadership of the
prevailing party can impose a citywide plan and thus supervene
233. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
234. JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1994).
235. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Down with Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at
SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/friedman-down-with
-everything.html.
236. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 28.
237. Id.
238. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, U. ILL. L. REV. 1507,
156162 (2010).
239. See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 73, at 1700 (citing, inter alia, GARY W.
COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE
8497 (2d ed. 2007)).
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the power that district legislators otherwise would exercise through
aldermanic privilege.240
However, in most cities the local legislature is formally nonpartisan
or totally dominated by one political party.241 Without strong partisan
leadership, there is a collective action problem, in which individual
members opt to protect the special interests of their constituents, as
opposed to what generally is understood as the common good.242 The
result is the ironclad principle of Aldermanic privilege, where every
legislator must approve land use regulatory changes in his or her own
fiefdom.243 This creates a prisoners dilemma problem, in which mem-
bers collectively prefer lower spending but individually steer pork
to their districts and veto locally undesirable land uses.244
Hills and Schleicher propose to counter the problem of piecemeal
land use votes on individual zoning changes, with its Aldermanic
privilege and NIMBYism, with comprehensive replanning.245
Ordinarily, the Mayors city planning department, or a newly
created independent body appointed by politicians elected city-
wide, proposing a new plan or map to the city council after exten-
sive hearings. The Mayor faces the broadest electorate and thus
has the greatest incentive to be responsive to citywide concerns.
Putting the agenda-setting power in the Mayors hands further
promotes citywide interests. Particularly if the remapping is con-
sidered under a closed rule (i.e. no amendments are allowed), the
Mayor is in a position to propose a map that goes as far to pro-
tect citywide interests as the legislature will bear.246
While professional planners and perhaps an independent body
devise a system that addresses the entire citys concerns,247 imple-
mentation requires the kind of political skills and backroom deals
honed by aldermen through the ages.248
240. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 3031.
241. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?:
The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419 (2007).
242. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 3132.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 30 (citing, inter alia, Barry Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congres-
sional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 24953 (1979)).
245. Id. at 32.
246. Id. at 3233.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 11822. Disinterested expertise as a mark of original
Progressive Era comprehensive planning.
248. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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B. Selling Density Increases Through a Standard Price Sheet
Hills and Schleicher suggest that standardization of densification,
in the form of uniform development rights in individual neighbor-
hoods, accompanied by an upzoning price sheet, will facilitate en-
hanced land use by reducing transaction costs.249 In effect, this would
revive development as of right. City Replanning posits that trans-
parency in the allocation of development rights best can be achieved
through municipal pricing and sale of development rights. A com-
prehensive map that sets out what can be built as of right will pro-
duce higher property values than a system in which government
would allow the same amount of development through an ad hoc
amendment process.250
In what might be an inadvertently potent aside, Hills and
Schleicher state that if the uniform price sheet sets prices for new
development that are too low, the money left on the table might be
regarded as [ ] distributively unjust (at least if one presumes that the
community is entitled to new value created by the change in the land-
use status quo).251 This telling parenthetical reveals an important
aspect of the mechanism that City Replanning work. After utilizing
adroit procedure to present the local legislature with only one non-
amendable choice, the mayor will appropriate development rights
in private land, and sell those rights to present owners or interested
developers. How the city comes to own future development rights is
left unclear.252
As Hills and Schleicher indicate, a price sheet regime would
mean the loss of the potentially useful information that city offi-
cials might glean from developers custom-tailored proposals.253
Officials are not experts at the creative ferreting out subtle opportu-
nities; imaginative developers are. But developers will not disclose
such information only to have it incorporated into uniform price
sheets or respecting condemnation where bidding for redevelopment
is open to all. They will share such information only when they can
249. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 54 (noting that [s]uch uniform def-
initions of use rights would allow buyers to have a clearer idea of the uses accompanying title).
250. Id. at 36.
251. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
252. See supra notes 1012 and accompanying text.
253. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 57.
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capitalize on it.254 While uniformity reduces costs, valuable private
information is expensive. In that sense, urban revitalization through
stealth coordinationoften associated with crony capitalismcan
be worth the price.255
A top-down plan imposed on local legislatures might encourage the
kind of homogeneous development that Jane Jacobs explained was
badfor the development of a heterogeneous and organic vibrant neigh-
borhood.256 Jacobs also rejected government-sponsored spontaneity257
However, there are many paths to development. Silicon Valley and
Houston both have become economic powerhouses, although their
cultures have led to different growth models. The former is based on
technology and the latter on energy, which reflects our growing eco-
nomic pluralism and diversity.258 The Bay Area is the hands-down
winner when it comes to creativity and charm. But its a luxury re-
gion, unaffordable and wildly unequal. Houston wins when it comes
to livability, especially for people who want to have children.259 While
densification is prescribed as a corrective, the differences in cities
reflect not only economics but, more fundamentally, social and polit-
ical polarization. Each economic sector attracts different kinds of
people and nurtures different kinds of values.260
Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts recently analyzed one-size-fits-all
regulations for development permit applications.261 They conceded
its easier for bureaucrats to monitor compliance if all licenses convey
the same privileges and obligations.262 However, they argued that
there are circumstances in which such uniformity requirements are af-
firmatively harmful and must be met by countervailing anti-herding
rules. One reason is that anti-herding regulation can reduce the
kinds of systemic risk that occur when there is excessive behavioral
254. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public
Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1079 (2011).
255. Id. at 107880.
256. JACOBS, supra note 2.
257. Id. at 441 (arguing against a deductive approach to planning methodology by stating
that [c]ity processes in real life are too complex to be routine, too particularized for applica-
tion as abstractions).
258. See David Brooks, The Sorting Election, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13 2014, at A25.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399240.
262. Id. at 3.
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uniformity.263 The other reason is that anti-herding regulation can
produce socially beneficial information. Inducing separating equilibria
among the regulated can, for example, avoid the inefficiency of infor-
mational cascades and help steer both private and public actors to-
ward better evidence-based outcomes.264
Even if it is correct that building in a specified city is more expen-
sive because engaging in a bargaining process is daunting to out-of-
town developers, and a coterie of local developers have monetized
the advantages of familiarity and trust, developers with specialized
knowledge of the planning and approval process also are apt to have
specialized knowledge of local markets. Their incentive to come up
with innovative plans depends upon the possibility of executing them.
Even as officials and developers have an eye towards exactions, cam-
paign contributions, and profits, all will benefit if projects are com-
pleted and successful.265
C. Devices to Make Replanning Sticky
In order for replanning to work, Hills and Schleicher require that
plans must be sticky in the sense that they must resist the individ-
ual legislators constant temptations to defect from the commitment
under pressure from community groups and when asked to fine-tune
by developers and neighbors.266 Their goal of is to prevent backsliding
to parcel-by-parcel bargaining, although that had been the history
of earlier comprehensive planning.267
1. Replanning and the Collective Action Problem
City Replanning outlines how comprehensive plans might success-
fully address the NIMBY problem. Generally, the mayor or planning
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight Thats Right for California Redevelopment
Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 995 (2001) (quoting BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN,
DOWNTOWN, INC.:HOWAMERICAREBUILDSCITIES 23 (1990)) (describing how, in proposing urban
renewal projects for subsidies, officials and developers seek out the blight thats rightplaces
just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract developers).
266. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 45.
267. See infra Part II.B.1.
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commission or independent commission would propose a new plan
to the city council after extensive hearings.268
The Mayor faces the broadest electorate and thus has the great-
est incentive to be responsive to citywide concerns. Putting the
agenda-setting power in the Mayors hands further promotes city-
wide interests. Particularly if the remapping is considered under
a closed rule (i.e. no amendments are allowed), the Mayor is in a
position to propose a map that goes as far to protect citywide
interests as the legislature will bear.269
The fact that the mayor, elected citywide, puts comprehensive
rezoning to the local legislature on a take-it-or-leave-it basis gives it
substantial advantage. However, the mayor might have other con-
siderations, such as seeking reelection or another office, and networks
of friends, business associates, and campaign contributors. Some
other sweetener might be needed. Also, the plan must be sticky
(i.e., have staying power).270
One answer supplied by City Replanning is that the new plan would
distribute in equitable fashion denser housing and other locally
desirable and undesirable land uses (LULUs) across neighborhoods
using a zoning budget.271
Such a budget would specify an overall goal of locally undesir-
able land uses, or simply quantity goals for different types of hous-
ing, for the entire jurisdiction. It would also allocate those land
usesacross neighborhoods, seeking to allay concerns from council
members about being dumping grounds for new construction and
to capture the benefits of cross-neighborhood trades. Finally, the
budget would include an enforcement mechanism, creating some
sort of presumptive entitlement for developers to build the bud-
geted use until the citywide goal is met.272
They add: [T]he entire scheme relieves individual legislators of polit-
ical pressure to unbundle the package and force a vote on the site-
specific decision.273
268. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 32.
269. Id. at 3233.
270. Id. at 45.
271. Id. at 46; see also Hills & Schleicher, Zoning Budget, supra note 214.
272. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 46.
273. Id. at 47.
116 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:073
However, the granularity of cities is such that aldermanic districts
often are much larger than locales that are generally regarded as
neighborhoods or that might identify and organize themselves as
neighborhoods if sufficiently threatened. It is of little recompense to
homeowners in a residential subdivision faced with an adjacent
looming condominium tower if a trash transfer station is to be built
across town.
Many landowners who would benefit from denser development
would seek a presumptive entitlement. One might assume that such
entitlements would be distributed only until the city-wide goal is
met. However, municipal officials sometimes make promises beyond
budgetary constraints. Even within the budget, there still is the issue
ofdetermining recipients. The likely outcome is that a frenzy of wheel-
ing, dealing, and cashing of political IOUs from political leaders and
others would ensue.
Hills and Schleicher attempt to avoid that result by stating that
planners might constitute an extra-legislative body that could bundle
together many site-specific zoning decisions as to dissuade legislators
from trying to unravel it.274 This is possible but requires political as
well as planning acumen. It also requires a working knowledge of
pressures and lures, political, financial, and otherwise, to which leg-
islators are subject.
In hot button situations where legislators might feel too much
political heat, such as inclusionary zoning requiring the construction
of low- or moderate-income housing together with market-rate hous-
ing, they propose that the local legislature could delegate the task to
an expert planning staff led by the mayor. . . . [T]he staff would
provide additional political cover for legislators in sensitive districts,
allowing them to endorse the general idea of inclusionary zoning
while feeling free to rail against the formula that the planning staff
ultimately presents.275
While here and elsewhere City Replanning cites the Congressional
Base Closure and Realignment Act (BRAC) as an example of the
success of such expert bundling schemes, its post-2005 history not
inspire confidence.276
274. Id. at 4748.
275. Id. at 52.
276. See infra notes 35255 and accompanying text.
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2. The Retrenchment Problem and Regulatory Property
When one engineers an important legislative advance, the obvious
next move is to lock it in place so that legislators (or their successors)
cannot retreat. A literal example of this principle was recounted by
Thomas Schelling: In World War I, German soldiers were sometimes
chained to their machine guns so that they could not act on an im-
pulse to flee.277
While soldiers during war are not permitted to flee, the rules for
legislators are somewhat different. Efforts to ensure sticky legisla-
tion must confront the doctrine of entrenchment, which the Supreme
Court has described as the principle of constitutional law holding
that one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its
successors.278 This principle prevents legislative bodies from mak-
ing their ordinary legislation unrepealable.279
The entrenchment doctrine does not prevent governments from
entering into contracts, and government breach or arrogation of coun-
terparties contract rights gives rise to claims under the Contracts
Clause,280 or Takings Clause,281 respectively. Takings law, for exam-
ple, interferes (or should interfere) with the ability of interest groups
to lobby for property transfers that come at the expense of particular
members of the public.282 Therefore, local governments have become
increasingly adept at using private law mechanisms like contracts
and property conveyances to make binding precommitments into the
future.283 Christopher Serkin notes that [t]he first and perhaps most
obvious form of entrenchment comes from the creation of property
rights. The vested rights doctrine is the best example.284
277. Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local
Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (2001).
278. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *90).
279. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002).
280. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .).
281. Id. amend. V (No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.).
282. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 278, at 1690 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS
(1985)).
283. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011).
284. Id. at 898.
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A fortunate developer who obtains an entitlement for a high-
density, high-rise residential tower is apt to commence work quickly
or take whatever other action is required under state law for vesting
of that development right as a protected property interest.285 The de-
veloper may express gratitude to officials making the award, in one
form or another. That might offset the animosity engendered among
adjoining single-family home residents and developers whose applica-
tions are denied. But that raises the issue of how the fortunate parcel
and its owner were selected.
3. The Creation of Regulatory Property and Cronyism
Regulatory property is a property right that is created and
allocated by government and derives its value from the fact that hold-
ers are permitted to engage in activities forbidden to others.286 A land
use example is the transferable development right (TDR), which
gives the holder a government entitlement to develop a parcel in the
area in which it could be used (receiving area) more intensely than
other parcels located there.287 The Supreme Court has adjudicated
the rights of TDR recipients288 but never ruled on the rights of owners
in the receiving areas. Assuming that denser development of parcels
in the receiving area is not inimical to the public health, safety, or
welfare, owners may claim that their land has been downzoned so
that now-valuable TDRs could be sold or given to owners of other par-
cels to mitigate what otherwise would be takings.
285. See generally John J. Delaney & EmilyJ. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights
as Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U.J. URB.
& CONTEMP.L. 27, 31 (1996) (Generally, the black-letter rule for acquisition of vested rights pro-
vides that a landowner will be protected when: (1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or
omissionof the government, (3) he has made substantial changes or otherwise committed himself
to his substantial disadvantage prior to a zoning change.).
286. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2001)
(originating term).
287. See generally Matthew C. Garvey, Note, When Political Muscle is Enough: The Case for
Limited Judicial Review of Long-Distance Transfers of Development Rights, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 798 (2003).
288. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (holding that TDRs
mitigate financial burdens imposed on landowners by stringent land use regulation rather than
constituting (inadequate) just compensation).
2015] ON ENGINEERING URBAN DENSIFICATION 119
It might be, however, that density-mixing TDRs . . . constitute a
valid and rational exercise of the police power in most instances.289
But that view conflates density mixing with government sale of devel-
opment rights. Assume, for instance, that 50 lots in a district of 1,000
lots might be developed as six-unit buildings and the other 950 lots
restricted to single-family homes. Should government have a right
to sell TDRs, permitting 50 buyers to construct the multifamily struc-
tures? How might that differ from selling any other zoning?
That problem involves what Lee Anne Fennell termed lumpy
property,290 where the size or other attributes of parcels in the area
under consideration for a certain purpose do not comport with the
functional need. In the case of TDRs, for instance, the receiving area
where mixed density would be appropriate is not congruent with indi-
vidual parcels. A single owner of the entire receiving area presumably
could apply for a development permit for 950 single-family residences
and 50 six-unit buildings. There would be no mismatch serving as a
justification for TDRs.
If the right to limited multifamily development thus is intrinsic
to the receiving area, every landowner should own an aliquot share.
As Professor Fennell stated: When market transactions prove un-
equal to the task of shifting from one scale of use or form of ownership
to another, the government may turn to coercive reconfiguration, as
through eminent domain or partition.291
This is the same principle as has been applied in other land-based
common pool situations, such as regulatory unitization of petroleum
reserves located beneath the lands of multiple owners.292 Likewise, in
Barancik v. County of Marin,293 the county revised its countywide and
local plans to provide for TDRs. The amendments were [d]irected spe-
cifically to the homogeneous community of Nicasio Valley and treated
it as one complete land forum.294 Interestingly, TDRs had been given
to landowners deprived of development rights in a case decided by
289. Garvey, supra note 286, at 799800.
290. Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012).
291. Id. at 1971.
292. See, e.g., Richard A. Forster, Oil and Gas: The Corporation Commissions Role in
Evaluating the Prudence of Operations in Statutory Unitization, 24 WASHBURNL.J. 191, 19395
(1985) (noting and describing how numerous states have enacted compulsory unitization stat-
utes responding to the physical and economic waste that often result from the drilling of unnec-
essary wells and promotion of oil and gas conservation).
293. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988).
294. Id. at 835.
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the U.S. Supreme Court on a narrow standing issue, Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Agency.295
This analysis of TDRs directly implicates the zoning budget
recommended as an element of comprehensive replanning by Hills
and Schleicher.296 The budget would allocate . . . land uses across
neighborhoods, and it would include an enforcement mechanism,
creating some sort of presumptive entitlement for developers to build
the budged use until the city-wide goal is met.297
In large cities with high housing prices, presumptive entitlements
that are in short supply would be most desirable. Those who obtain
development rights within the quota will have land worth much more
than those who do not. Should developers (or, more likely, indigents
hired for the purpose) camp out on the street at the entitlement office
days in advance of the acceptance of applications? Should applicants
procure testimonials to their (often expensive) good works from civic
and religious leaders, as applicants for new TV channel licenses were
wont to do, thus dissipating associated economic rents?298
Might a point system be devised so that development applications
are graded based on established criteria?299 Would that even be per-
missible in light of Hills and Schleichers desire for a presumptive en-
titlement for developers and their strong proclivity in favor of lower
information costs and less custom-tailoring?300 The standard price
sheet for density increases they propose301 might help in getting
away from parcel-by-parcel development negotiation, but it is hard to
295. 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (holding that the landowners claims were ripe for judicial review,
since disbursement of the TDRs was the agencys final determination).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 27071.
297. Id.
298. See J. Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 81, 98
(noting that FCC interpretations of a Supreme Court ruling gave it the right to force all com-
peting applicants for a particular radio or television frequency into a self-destructive process of
mutual rent dissipation); see also James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TO-
WARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 4 (James M. Buchanan, Robert Tollison &
Gordon Tullock eds. 1980) (Rent seeking is designed to describe behavior in institutional
settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social
surplus.); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (asserting that politicians and bureaucrats create
rents through legislation and regulation and extract them from applicants through campaign
contributions, votes, and political favors).
299. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972) (upholding
comprehensive plan providing for point system for development applicants).
300. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 43.
301. Id. at 5354.
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envision this being done with sufficient granularity to take into ac-
count relevant circumstances in particular neighborhoods or blocks.
Finally, the frantic activity likely at the time when replanning
budget entitlements are distributed is a magic moment when great
profits are to be made or lost and in which those whose expertise or
favor are necessary to deals are apt to prosper.302 In the area of land
use, this is exactly when the Supreme Courts recent decision in
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District303 is most rel-
evant. Koontz states: Extortionate demands for property in the land-
use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because
they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right
not to have property taken without just compensation.304
Explicit or even implicit municipal exactions of development appli-
cants for cash or in-kind benefits, such as paving off-site streets or
paying for nearby parks, might be treated as extortionate demands.
While there is yet little case law indicating how far Koontz will be
extended, the myriad of ways for localities to engage in low-visibility
extortionate practices makes that course of action tempting.305
One unintended consequence of Koontz might be an increase in the
conditioning of development on developer accession to arguably ex-
tortionate demands. As local officials become more cautious about the
possibility of unconstitutional claims, they well may concentrate their
receptivity to proposals from developers who are local repeat players
and who play the game with discretion.306 This, in turn, would exac-
erbate problems with cronyism and corruption. Favored developers
might supply tips about opportunities for tax-favored or otherwise
subsidized projects on lands they control or that might be acquired
302. See KURT VONNEGUT, GOD BLESS YOU, MR. ROSEWATER 4 (1998) (1965) (In every big
transaction, there is a magic moment during which a man has surrendered a treasure, and dur-
ing which the man who is due to receive it has not yet done so. An alert lawyer will make the mo-
ment his own, possessing the treasure for a magic microsecond, taking a little of it, passing it
on.); see also Shark Attack: Why American Firms Cannot Do Deals Without Being Sued, ECONO-
MIST, June 2, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21556248 (Like so many nov-
elists, [Vonnegut] was talking bosh. No alert lawyer takes only a little.).
303. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
304. Id. at 2596. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses
to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a gov-
ernmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury. Id.
305. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW.
1 (2014).
306. Id. at 1416.
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for their subsequent redevelopment on targeted sites that might be
acquired through municipal condemnation.307
While Hills and Schleicher do not spell out the nature of advisory
commissions, enforcement mechanisms, presumptive entitlements,
zoning budgets,and interactions between private and publically subsi-
dized projects that they have in mind, the integrity of the development
process rests on this myriad of details and not on the formulation of
a citywide deal, as such.308
D. Densification and Agglomeration are Different Concepts
Charles Tiebout postulated that business people and professionals
in a metropolitan area would sort themselves into one of its rings of
suburbs based on the mixes of amenities andtaxes that they offered.309
Similarly, one might assume that cities might compete for achieving
a critical mass of firms and workers specialized in one industry or
another.310 However, to the extent that lifestyle provides the ultimate
agglomeration, it is plausible to think that, like London or Paris in
their respective countries, a handful ofAmerican cities might predom-
inate in all fields.
Furthermore, increased densification in the name of promoting the
wealth effects of agglomeration tend to be resented by those who feel
disrespected and displaced. While plans for engineering densification
implicitly aim at overcoming their resistance, the estranged major-
ity votes in large numbers and otherwise has influence.311
1. Congestion in Its Broader Aspect
David Schleicher noted that agglomeration economists generally
conflate the detriments of density under the heading of congestion
costs.312 True congestion costs are the increased expenses caused
307. See Eagle, supra note 27, at 107881.
308. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 4553.
309. Tiebout, supra note 130.
310. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 4.
311. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Seces-
sion of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 775, 847 (1992); see also supra notes 13437, 195, and accompanying text.
312. Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 73, at 1737.
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by many people crowding into a small area. Higher land costs are the
primary congestion cost, but traffic and things like noise or other
forms of pollution also fall into this camp.313
A few cities, such as London, impose congestion fees on automo-
biles entering the center during business hours, which presumably
is less of a burden on the finally well off, who presumptively are more
productive.314 But might we impose a Pigovian congestion tax on res-
idents in areas such as Greenwich Village who do not make positive
agglomerative contributions, perhaps those who declare their occu-
pations as lawyers or bankers rather than artists? Aside from this
suggestions political impracticality, [v]irtually every author points
out that we do not know how to calculate the ideal Pigouvian tax or
subsidy levels in practice, but because the point is rather obvious
rarely is much made of it.315
Likewise, since the end of World War II, highways in the United
States have been thought of as a way of dispersing the talented and
prosperous fromthe center city. However, mass transit might have the
opposite effect in making it easier for workers who add lesser value
to commute into the center city.316 Might Pigovian taxes on center city
space eating slugs subsidize such congestion-relieving measures?317
The Article next focuses on problems of increased density resulting
frompopulation growth parasitic on agglomeration and from displace-
ment of community.
2. Agglomeration Benefits are Difficult to Achieve
In her article Agglomerama, Lee Anne Fennell characterizes
urban spaces a type of commons which could be overcrowded or,
313. Id.
314. See generally Michael H. Schuitema, Comment, Road Pricing as a Solution to the Harms
of Traffic Congestion, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 81 (2007).
315. Stephen W. Salant & Nathan Seegert, Private Access Fees and Congestion: Is there a
Role for Government After All?, at 29 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 14-26, 2014),
available at ssrn.com/abstract=2537848 (quoting William J. Baumol&Wallace E.Oates, TheUse
of Standards and Prices for Protecting the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42, 42 (1971)).
316. Badger, supra note 13 (quoting Enrico Moretti) (California high-speed rail has always
been thought of as a fast way to move people from Los Angeles to San Francisco, as competing
with the plane. . . . But it might be that actually its most meaningful economic impact would be
as a way to allow people in Central Valley low-wage cities to commute to the Bay Area.).
317. See infra text accompanying note 320.
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alternatively, fail[ ] to attract parties who are well suited to generate
agglomeration benefits.318 The challenge, she added, is to assemble
participants together whose joint consumption and production activ-
ities will maximize social value.319
In discussing urban spaces as commons, Fennell noted that every
firm or household is eager to incorporate positive externalities of oth-
ers into its own private income but is largely indifferent to the mag-
nitude or sign of its own contributions to the collective.320
Furthermore, market mechanisms and self-sorting cannot be
depended upon to generate optimal agglomerations. If cash prices
were the sole basis for allocating urban locations, a buzz builder who
would add a large premium in kind to the community could be outbid
by a space-eating slug.321 This problem occurs in many contexts, no-
tably the downtown shopping district, where the most desirable mer-
chants cannot capture the positive spillovers of the traffic they draw
to the area. The privately owned regional shopping center facilitates
internalization of positive externalities so that anchor stores pay
much lower rents per square foot than merchants parasitic on the
traffic anchors generate.322
This problem is difficult to overcome using traditional public land
use controls. Some general designations might help, such as those dis-
couraging formula stores and restaurants in favor of those that are
more novel and would attract business to the neighborhood323 or pre-
serving urban manufacturing loft buildings by forbidding conversion
to residential use.324 However, zoning is not sufficiently fine-grained
to capture synergies that swirl among entrepreneurs and artisans
at a given time, much less keep current with dynamic changes over
short periods of time.
318. Fennell, supra note 30, at 1023.
319. Id. at 103.
320. Id. at 113.
321. Id. at 120.
322. See, e.g., Marcus Gerbich, Shopping Center Rentals: An Empirical Analysis of the Retail
Tenant Mix, 15 J. REAL EST. RES. 283, 28486 (1998).
323. See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, Economic Regulation and the Power to Zone, 38 REAL EST. L.J.
421, 422 (2010) (noting some polities are not receptive to Wal-Mart and other large formula
stores locating within their community, and they rely on their zoning codes or in some cases state
environmental laws to limit or block [them] entirely).
324. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative
Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2010).
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Another possible solution is what Fennell calls differential pric-
ing,325 where the government strikes individualized bargains in the
context of permit applications, such as incentives for legitimate the-
aters in the most propitious locations. This is similar to performance
zoning designed to generate positive externalities, such as guaran-
tees of foot traffic to stores by requiring firms to eliminate employee
lunchrooms or limit telecommuting.326 However, such custom solu-
tions arrived at through bargaining regarding uses of individual par-
cels goes directly against the goal of comprehensive replanning to
limit transactions costs.327
Higher housing costs that result from increased density might well
result in demands for more affordable housing, and developers, who
typically agitate for higher density, might be allowed to build more
luxuryunits if the construct affordable housing units.328 In her current
capacity as Commissioner of New York Citys Department of Housing
Preservation and Development, Professor Vicki Been has announced
that her department is being reorganized to implement Mayor Bill de
Blasios plan to create and preserve 200,000 units of low-cost hous-
ing during the next decade.329 Beens department will oversee the
cornerstone of the effort: Mandatory inclusionary housing, and in
every neighborhood the city will target for development through re-
zonings. . . . every single housing project will be required to include
affordable housing.330 Regardless of the social benefit thereby cre-
ated, increased density without positive agglomerative effects creates
congestion that discourages agglomeration.
Here, however, it is useful to focus on the demand for residences in
agglomerative neighborhoods by what might be deemed as high-in-
come but parasitical new residents. The principal difference between
325. Fennell, supra note 30, at 133.
326. Id. at 137.
327. See infra Part III.B.1.
328. See David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42/43 URB.
LAW. 307, 322 (2010) (noting that California Density Bonus Law requires local governments
to reward developers that agree to build a certain percentage of low-income housing with
increased density bonuses above those permitted by applicable local regulations).
329. Ryan Hutchins, H.P.D. Plans Major Changes to Jump-Start Affordable Housing
Development, CAPITAL PLAYBOOK, Oct. 1, 2014, available at http://www.capitalnewyork.com
/article/city-hall/2014/10/8553747/hpd-plans-major-changes-jump-start-affordable-housing
-development.
330. Id.
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the apartment house for lower-income persons, gratuitously described
in Euclid as a mere parasite,331 and new luxury buildings to be oc-
cupied by their ostensible betters is that the affluent pay higher taxes
but might have more potential for diluting the agglomerative aspects
of the neighborhood that foster economic productivity.
Individuals seeking to move to areas possessing strong positive
agglomerations of cultural amenities and where productive businesses
prevail must bid against each other for that privilege. Housing prices,
taxes, and regulatory burdens tend to be high, and the level of govern-
ment services tends to be low.332 Those whose efforts and presence
collectively provide the value of agglomeration are trapped into pay-
ing more and more to enjoy the value that they themselves created
and that is enjoyed by residents who do not add agglomerative value.
This is the opposite of mutualization, whereby members of private
clubs collectively internalize the joint value of their relationships.333
Recent books by Richard Florida334 have trumpeted the notion that
attracting the creative classwell-educated young people with an
entrepreneurial bentis the key to urban prosperity.335 Richard
Schragger notes that amenities attracting such young people include
waterfront parks, arts districts, the creation of edgy urban street-
scapes, and the repurposing of downtown turn-of-the-century indus-
trial warehouses.336 He added that these would augment amenities,
331. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (noting that, in sections of
detached homes, very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character
of the district).
332. Schleicher, supra note 237, at 151112 (noting that [a]gglomeration gains at the local
level give otherwise mobile residents a reason not to move, even when governmental policies
affect them in a negative way).
333. James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965) (explaining
strong preference of elite individuals to join social clubs with mutual ownership, as opposed
to proprietary clubs whose owners could charge high dues for the benefits of mutual association).
334. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW ITS TRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002); FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET, supra
note 179; RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS (2005). Floridas creative class
has been the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, Biscotti and Circuses: Richard
Florida Concedes the Limits of the Creative Class, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 20, 2013, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/20/richard-florida-concedes-the-limits-of-the
-creative-class.html.
335. FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET, supra note 179, at 173.
336. Richard C. Schragger, Is a Progressive City Possible? Reviving Urban Liberalism for the
Twenty-First Century, 7 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 231, 234 (2013).
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such as art museums, symphony orchestras, theaters, and parks,
that James Buchanan earlier had recommended as a way for cities to
attract and retain the wealthy.337 The city, on this account, is a con-
sumer good that needs to create a brand that will appeal to a particu-
larly desirable demographic.
However, what if a citys brand becomes so important that it
swamps the traditional measure of agglomerationthe propinquity
of many firms and workers specializing in a particular trade? One
current example is the move of General Motors Cadillac division from
Detroit to New York. For generations, Cadillac was located in Detroit
and was GMs prestige division.338 Alas, Cadillacit last was Amer-
icas top-selling luxury car in 1997. Since then, its executives have
tried seemingly everythingfrom new models to new management
to new marketingto revive its flagging fortunes, with little to show
for it.339
On September 23, 2014, General Motors announced that Cadillac
headquarters would move from Detroit to New Yorks trendy SoHo
neighborhood.340 The New York Times reported that Cadillacs new
head, Johan de Nysschen, was convinced that to reinvent the strug-
gling brand, it needed more autonomy, more focus and more of a con-
nection to what is cool and fashionable.341 As the Wall Street Journal
added, GMs brass feels being in Manhattan will help Cadillac bet-
ter reach luxury buyers.342 There was no indication that New York
had an agglomeration of automotive engineering excellence. Instead,
as Mr. de Nysschen added, [t]here is no city in the world where the
inhabitants are more immersed in a premium lifestyle.343
However, the wealthy in general prefer a premium lifestyle, as do
well-remunerated physicians, lawyers, and bond traders. A New York
Times Magazine account of life in Greenwich Village questioned how
337. Id. at 234 (quoting James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB.
CHOICE 1, 14 (1971)).
338. See generally Generations of GMCadillac, GMHERITAGE CENTER, https://history.gm
heritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Cadillac (last visited May 15, 2015).
339. Aaron M. Kessler, Cadillac Tries to Make a Fresh Start in New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2014, at B1.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Jeff Bennett & John D. Stoll, Cadillac Seeks Brighter Future in New York, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2014, at B7.
343. Id. (quoting Johan de Nysschen).
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its local shops could survive extreme gentrification.344 It said that
the impact of the tremendous growth of the financial industry since
the 1970s may be most evident in the Village. The artists, weirdos
and blue-collar families . . . are long gone. Theyve been replaced, in
large part, by guys in suits.345
The saga of Greenwich Village indicates how easy it is for those
attracted to neighborhoods made vibrant by the creative class to
raise density and rents and thus dissipate the agglomerative crea-
tive energies of the artists and entrepreneurs whose presence they
sought. The transition from creators to parasites, so to speak, is has-
tened by increasingly effective means of signaling by their home ad-
dress that the arrivistes are both wealthy and cultivated.346
Also, in the most vibrant American cities, many wealthy people,
including a substantial number from abroad, acquire residences in
prime neighborhoods as pieds-à-terre, investment apartments, and as
hedges against unrest or currency devaluations at home.347 A recent
series of New York Times articles on towers of secrecy asserts that
shell corporations own a substantial number of the most expensive
new condominiums, with beneficial ownership traced to oligarchs who
derived their fortunes through questionable means.348 In New York
City, [t]wenty-four percent of co-op and condo apartments citywide
are not the primary residence of their owners.349 Substantial num-
bers of vacant units also drain agglomerative interactions from
a neighborhood.
E. Would a Grand Bargain Last?
Just as the Progressives envisioned comprehensive land use
planning as a one-time exercise, so contemporary reformers, such
as Hills and Schleicher,350 see comprehensive city replanning as a
344. Adam Davidson, Jane Jacobs vs. Marc Jacobs, N.Y. TIMES SUN. MAG., June 5, 2012,
at MM16.
345. Davidson, supra note 343.
346. See generally Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure
of Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434 (2002) (illustrating the basic signaling model in which expen-
sive credentials proxy desirable characteristics not directly ascertainable).
347. Julie Satow, Why the Doorman is Lonely, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2015, at RE1 (quoting
George V. Sweeting, deputy director of the New York City budget office).
348. See, e.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Hidden Wealth Flows to Elite New York Condos,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A1.
349. Satow, supra note 346.
350. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 4559.
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way to cut the Gordian knot and establish the framework for long-
term progress.
However, despite efforts to thwart them through procedural obsta-
cles and vested rights,351 grand bargains have a way of eroding. It is
instructive to consider Milton Friedmans critique of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986,352 which reduced rates and abolished special preferences
wholesale. [A]s of 1986 . . . the tax system had gotten so complicated,
you had filled up the blackboard essentially so that Congressmen had
nothing more to sell, and they were therefore willing to wipe the slate
clean and start over again. . . .353
An example of a highly lauded grand bargain was the military base
closure process devised by Congress to shelter individual members
from constituent demands that obsolete local bases be kept open. It
resulted in the Base Closure and Realignment Act (BRAC), which re-
sulted in more than 350 installations being closed in five rounds end-
ing in 2005.354 Hills and Schleicher discuss BRAC as an example of
a successful bundle.355 However, the process was seen nevertheless
as putting political careers in jeopardy,356 and Congress barred the
Pentagon from even planning future rounds.357
To the extent that a land use regime put in place by comprehensive
replanning perseveres, its primary cause would be lock-in through
regulatory property. However, I assert that the creation of regula-
tory property entails the same sort of deal making that Hills and
Schleicher reject358 and that losers in the scramble for regulatory
property might obtain judicial vindication that would vitiate its
achievements.359
351. See infra Part IV.C.
352. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
353. Lawrence Zelenak, The Theory and Practice of Tax Reform, 105 MICH.L.REV. 1133, 1148
(2007) (quoting remarks of Milton Friedman, Sixth Meeting of the Presidents Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform 11718 (2005)).
354. See Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified and amended as 10 U.S.C. § 2687
(2006)) (providing authorization to facilitate the closure and realignment of military bases); Hills
& Schleicher, Zoning Budget, supra note 214, at 1078 and n.68 (outlining legislative process).
355. Hills & Schleicher, City Replanning, supra note 21, at 47.
356. See Carl Hulse, Freshman Senator Can Finally Breathe Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005,
at A10 (discussing removal from closing list of Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, a de-
cision that would decide [the] political fortunes of Senator John Thune).
357. Walter Pincus, Hagel Turns Up the Heat on Closing Surplus Military Bases, WASH.POST,
Mar. 18, 2014, at A15.
358. See infra Part IV.C.2.
359. See supra notes 3014 and accompanying text.
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V. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Comprehensive replanning, of course, is not the only possible an-
swer to reforming land use so as to enhance density, agglomeration,
and urban prosperity.
A. Privatization of Land Use Regulation
One possible alternative to comprehensive replanning is Robert
Nelsons suggestion that zoning regulation is best regarded as a
neighborhood property right.360 Nelson railed against zoning abuse,
concluding that it ultimately served the political interests of the
most powerful elements of the municipality, rather than any public
interest.361
Nelson proposed instead that state law be changed so that super-
majorities of landowners should have the right to organize a new
type of neighborhood association. It would have sweeping powers to
regulate land use, including the ability to sell rights of entry to con-
venience stores, or even sell all the neighborhood property in one
package for comprehensive redevelopment.362 However,as Iobserved
at the time, [t]here is a certain irony in Nelsons privatization pro-
posal: at the behest of interested parties, state law would impose a
contractarian regime upon those who prefer a regulatory one.363
Another purported solution to the inefficient use of land, developed
by Abraham Bell, would permit private takings in order to eliminate
the monopoly on land use generally belonging to the incumbent
owner.364 Switching from individual parcels to neighborhoods, he and
Gideon Parchomovsky seek to harness the insights of auction theory
to devise an improved governance model for common-interest com-
munities, perhaps the most important real-property form today.365
360. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 2251 (1977); Robert H. Nelson,
Comment: A Private Property Right Theory of Zoning, 11 URB. LAW. 713 (1979).
361. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 847
(1999) (citing BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 231 (1972)).
362. Nelson, supra note 359, at 835.
363. Steven J. Eagle, Devolutionary Proposals and Contractarian Principles, in THEFALL AND
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184, 187 (F. H. Buckley, ed., 1999).
364. Bell, supra note 20.
365. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Governing Communities by Auction, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2014).
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Likewise, Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman suggest that govern-
ment condemn large blocks of land and auction off the consolidated
parcels.366
CONCLUSION
Many existing residents of vibrant cities object to densification,
both because of the disamenities it imposes upon them and also be-
cause theyperceive gentrification as embodyingclass-based arrogance.
Others, perhaps the majority, are tepid at best. Yet agglomeration
leads to enhanced material prosperity for the broader community and
enriched lives for many.
Approaches advocating top-down agglomeration, such as that in
City Replanning, are conducive to circumventing democratic values,
insofar as they move from individual autonomy and subsidiarity to-
wards decision-making by technocratic experts.367 Rather, bargains
are made and consolidated through transient alliances cemented, in
part, by the liberal employment of regulatory property both as sweet-
eners and as constitutional roadblocks to further change. In fair-
ness, Rick Hills and David Schleicher propose only general methods
to ameliorate contemporary political paralysis and assume that equi-
table institutions, procedures, and results will follow.
History, however, suggests that salutary results should not be
expected. Garrett Hardin insisted that overpopulation was a funda-
mental environmental problem,368 justifying the necessity of aban-
doning the freedom to breed369 through mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon.370 James Krier replied that a society capable of achiev-
ing consensus on coercing its members into cooperation is a society
that can cooperate without coercion.371 Likewise, a society where
top-down urban planning might obtain good results in the long term
is a society where more subsidiarity should work better.
366. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 25152.
367. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2125, 212527
(1990) (citing and discussing authorities).
368. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) (introducing the
term).
369. Id. at 1248.
370. Id. at 1247.
371. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 325,
337 (1992).
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Alternatives to Progressive Era reliance on top-down mandates
might be premised on the Burkean perspective that we build upon fal-
lible human nature and make only incremental changes to customs
and rules that have generally worked successfully, absent urgent
reason for radical change.372 Likewise, a Hayekian view that focuses
on the importance of tacit or local knowledge, and the impossibility of
central decision makers to gather all of the information needed for
good planning, leads to the same results.373
Thus, the need for humility in land use planning suggests the
importance of incremental steps and decentralized decision making.
The predictions of individual landowners are not always going to cor-
rectly anticipate the future and might sometimes lead to pernicious
consequences. However, individual owners are most apt to be knowl-
edgeable about local conditions. With their own property on the line,
they have a strong incentive to achieve satisfactory results.
It might be that grand bargains, such as that suggested in Com-
prehensive Replanning, will prove salutary. But they are leaps of faith,
and the foibles of imperfect people will infiltrate the details.
372. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1139, 1208 (2002) (Burke used the incremental and organic model of the common law as
his metaphor for how social change should proceed generally.).
373. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 193204 (1960) (noting legislation
that is generalized, predictable, and impersonally applied to all as indicative of the rule of law).
THE BUNDLING PROBLEM IN TAKINGS LAW: WHERE
THE EXACTION PROCESS GOES OFF THE RAILS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
Thank you very much for having me speak at this conference, and
congratulations to you, Michael, for having done so much work in this
area for the past forty years. My job on this occasion is to explain why
it is necessary to examine the exaction question from the ground up in
order to reach a principled solution to what has become a confused
body of legal doctrine about an ever-more common legal practice.
I take this view because what is striking about virtually all of the
Supreme Court decisions in this area is that they assume a legal uni-
verse in which the status quo ante is unquestioned. Thus the cases
proceed as though it were perfectly legitimate to make claims that the
state possesses some kind of omnibus environmental easement that
in turn requires all private owners to engage in actions of environmen-
tal mitigation before being allowed to develop their private land. The
rule in question surely applies to wetlands in light of the record in the
recent Supreme Court decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District.1 But it is not limited to wetlands, for in Koontz
it applied to uplands as well. Indeed, I will go further to note that the
same logic applies to all sorts of urban and rural land. The govern-
ment thinks that it is within its right to insist that it need issue per-
mits for development only to private parties who toe the line on the
conditions that it imposes. The common view of most lawyers, more-
over, is that this process escapes any serious challenge under the
Takings Clause, which provides, as we all know, nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. On this
issue, Koontz gave a modest victory to the landowner, which resulted
* The Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, The Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distin-
guished Service Professor of Law, Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago.
This Article is an expanded version of the remarks that I made at the Brigham-Kanner Confer-
ence on Property Rights held at William & Mary Law School on October 30, 2014.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). For my earlier views, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme
Courts Mischievous Environmental Easement, POINTOFLAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:46 PM),
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/02/richard-epstein-the-supreme-courts-mischievous
-environmental-easement.php.
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in a remand. But even that action has led at least one commentator
to ask whether Koontz is The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever.2
It is equally clear that one reason for the reticence is that neither
the Supreme Court nor most commentators want to attack head on
the basic question, which is, whether it is possible to optimize social
welfare by the consistent application of the Takings Clause, and if so,
how. Instead there is a tendency to follow the unfortunate trend set
out by Justice William J. Brennan in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,3 who insisted that general principles cannot
be developed under the Takings Clause, which in the end is best ex-
plicated by a series of ad hoc decisions that cannot be reduced to first
principles.4 It is all too apparent that no such approach will succeed
if the Supreme Court is not prepared to undertake the effort. So let
us go back first to the theory of the Eminent Domain Clause, then
see how it applies to the Nollan case, which I think is paradigmatic,
and then see how it applies to the situations in Koontz.
I. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The basic problem in organizing a system of rights over real
property is that land, and the improvements made to it, are not mov-
able, so conflicts necessarily arise in which neither party has within
it the power to move out of harms way. In addition, developers need
at times to assemble land, which cannot be done through voluntary
transactions, in order to make spaces suitable for productive devel-
opment, whether for a new city hall or for a railroad track.
Now, at this point there is a choice. The assembly in question could
be done by fiat: the government just announces that it will take land
to devote to these public uses without having to pay compensation for
what it has taken. But it is just that option that is foreclosed by the
Takings Clause, which at the very least is meant to be a bulwark
2. See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014).
3. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. Id. at 124 (noting the use of essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, because his Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any set formula for determining when justice and
fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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against the all too foreseeable instances of arbitrary exercises of
government power. There is an enormous danger in allowing the gov-
ernment to take property for public use, without just compensation,
even after the most solemn deliberation. Those deliberations can
stress public benefits without offering the disinterested observer any
indication as to whether the transaction that the government pro-
poses will on net advance the public welfare. Yet that desired social
outcome will not be the case if the value of the property in public
hands, when used for public use, is lower than its value in private
hands, when used for the private use that the government action dis-
places. The Takings Clause is meant not only to compensate people
whose property has been taken; it is also needed to stop that stream
of unwise government actions from taking place.
Yet what is the alternative? One possibility is to use a model of
voluntary transaction so that all the parcels intended for a particular
development can only be taken with the unanimous consent of every
individual whose property is going to be taken. That insistence on
consent follows from a strong libertarian model that holds that the
only proper uses of government power are to prevent the use of force
and fraud. The recalcitrant landowner has done neither, so his power
to hold out for the price that he desires must be protected. The result
is not simply that it will cost more money to build the public project.
It is that in many cases the project will not get built at all, as the mul-
tiple, strategic demands of individual landowners will block the pub-
lic project even when its completion does serve the common good by
the metric mentioned above: the property is more valuable in public
hands than in private ones.
The constitutional solution that gets us between the horns of this
dilemma is that the government may take for public use so long as it
pays just compensation. In the case of the town hall or the railroad,
it becomes a political judgment as to whether that public use is wise
or not. That judgment in turn is exercised more sensibly when the
taxing power of the state is so constrained that government can nei-
ther force the cost of the taking onto one select group when the ben-
efit is widely dispersed, nor conversely require payments to come
from general revenues when the benefit is limited to a select group of
the public at large.
Bracketing that public use problem in this case, it is clear that the
takings power gets rid of the holdout power that could otherwise be
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exercised by determined individuals, while the just compensation
requirement constrains greedy government officials from taking
something for nothing. As Jim Burling said in his earlier remarks,
there is no question that if the government can take property at a
zero price, it will take a lot of property. But if government has to pay
market value for the property taken, it will take a lot less. In most
cases we do not allow private parties to take individual pieces of
property from others without just compensation, because a competi-
tive market helps determine correct prices. But even if they had the
power to take, it would never be for zero price. Government may have
the power to force transactions that are denied to private parties,
but if they are endowed with the special power to take without
consent, then just compensation limitation is critical to making sure
that this power is exercised only for proper purposesnamely, at
fair value when the holdout problem cannot be avoided through
voluntary transactions.
The just compensation formula is thus the key to good government.
It helps shape the way in which the government takes land and the
way in which the government collects its taxes. In each case the
proper application of government power is restricted, to the extent
that human institutions can make it so, to cases in which the value
of particular pieces of private property are greater in public hands
than in private hands. If it is not, then it is unlikely that the govern-
ment would make the purchase in the first place.
Social welfare is at the core of the takings power. Knocking out the
takings power undermines social welfare by inducing the govern-
mentor more accurately, some dominant political coalitionto over-
consume. The upshot is the same type of resource distortions that
arise whenever private parties are allowed to take each others prop-
erty for zero price. Our laws are intended to block private theft. They
should do the same thing with government theft.
II. EXACTIONS
It is ironic that it took so long for the exactions question to receive
explicit treatment under the Takings Clause in the famous decision
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.5 That delayed response
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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is particularly surprising since the law of exactions has long been a
part of the general law of unconstitutional conditions. Stated in its ca-
nonical form, this doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute dis-
cretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit, it cannot
grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly coerce,
pressure, or induce the waiver of that persons constitutional rights.6
Sometimes it is said that the greater power to exclude necessarily
entails the lesser power to allow exercise of right, subject to con-
ditions. Originally that position was accepted as a constitutional
tautology,7 but with time it became clear that the power to select the
target of regulation was a far more dangerous power. Thus the doc-
trine ofunconstitutional conditions was applied as early as the 1920s
in Frost v. Railroad Commission8 to strike down a California law that
required all private haulers to act as common carriersi.e., take all
comers at reasonable ratesif they wanted to gain access to the
public highways. Justice Sutherland made it clear, at least for the
moment,9 that the state could not use its monopoly power over the
public roads to destroy competition among various types of carriers
using those roads. The point is worthy of generalization. The correct
use of exclusive government powers is the advancement of competi-
tion in all relevant dimensions.
This problem is an enormous one, for the government exerts
monopoly power not only when it operates the only public highway
system in town, but also when it issues or withholds building permits.
It was just that power that set up the Supreme Courts decision in
Nollan. In that case the Coastal Commission wished to condition the
6. For an extensive discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
5 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993).
7. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When
no proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to
enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses.
So it may take the less step of limiting the public use to certain purposes.
Id. The decision was rightly overruled in Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
For my discussion of this evolution, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CON-
STITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 42532 (2014).
8. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
9. Frost was largely gutted by Sutherland himself in Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S.
251 (1932).
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issuance of a building permit to the Nollans on their willingness to
convey to the public a lateral easement that cut across the front of
their land above the high-water mark. There was in fact no substan-
tive difficulty with the application, for the Nollans only wished to re-
place their small beachfront bungalow with a larger house that was
similar in all respects to those along its stretch of the beach, so there
were no traditional police power issues of either health or safety. For
these purposes, it is also safe to assume that an easement open to all
counts is one that is dedicated to public use. But the real challenge is
to decide whether the public gain from the creation of this lateral
easement exceeds the private loss. Accordingly, the correct intellec-
tual inquiry runs as follows: let the government figure out exactly
what that lateral easement is worth to its citizenry. Once it has col-
lectively made that determination, it then can raise funds through
taxes or fees to compensate the landowner for the loss of value to his
property after it condemns the easement. If the public body does its
calculations correctly, and it concludes that the value of the easement
is indeed greater than the reduction in value of the servient land to
its owner, it takes the easement and pays the compensation.
That simple process yields a social improvement because the public
is better off, and the individual landowner is not worse off. Equally
important, if it turns out that the price is not worth paying, then the
government does not condemn the easement, which again leads to the
correct social outcome. The purpose of prices in markets is to prevent
some ill-advised transfers. The same happens in the government con-
text. Clearly, the effectiveness of this argument depends on the accu-
rate valuation, but that point is true in all takings cases whenever
there is no ready market to measure the value of any divided interest
in property, which is commonly the case.
Now, most government agencies are convinced of the worth of their
public mission, so they would like to find a way to move forward with
their regulatory programs without having to pay anything at all. It is
there where the permit power intervenes by allowing the state reg-
ulator to bundle the permission to build with the willingness of the
owner to sacrifice that lateral easement or other interest. Allowing
this tactic to work should be regarded as an abject form of judicial
capitulation to the destructive forces of special interest politics.
To see why, consider two cases. First, assume that the building
permit is worth $100,000 to the property owner who wants to build or
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expand a beachfront house. Assume further that the lateral easement
across the front of the property imposes on the landowner a cost of
only $25,000. Faced with this inevitable choice, the rational land-
owner will compare the gains from receiving the building permit
against the losses from surrendering the easement. He will then
choose the more valuable item and accept the condition, ending up
$75,000 to the good. At one level, this looks like a bargain for mutual
gain, which it is against the status quo ante in which no permit is
granted and no easement created.
Unfortunately, the analysis above asks the wrong question, because
the choice made by the landowner does not address the social choice
of whether or not the lateral easement is worth more to the public at
large than the cost the encumbrance imposes on the original owner.
What is needed here is the head-to-head comparison of the rival uses.
So in each and every case in which the government bundles the per-
mit with the easement, it is avoiding the fundamental question behind
the Takings Clause: is the easement worth more in public or private
hands? If it is worth more in public hands, there is an increase in so-
cial welfare. But if not, then the taking should not take place, given
the decline in social welfare. Bundling always obscures that choice,
and so it should never ever be allowed. Once it is prohibited, then the
government body has to make the normal social calculation by ask-
ing whether the easement costs the government in taxes and fees
more than it is worth. Thus if the value of the easement to the pub-
lic is only $15,000 in the above case, the government should not re-
ceive it, because overall social value dips from $100,000 to $90,000
($100,000 $25,000 + $15,000). In the other case it increases from
$100,000 to $110,000 ($100,000 $25,000 + $35,000). But under the
bundling technique, it is impossible to tell whether that easement
is worth $35,000 or $15,000, so there is a built-in certainty that error
will manifest itself in some cases. That wont happen if the permit is
separated from the easement, in which case the payment of compen-
sation supplies a strong sorting mechanism. The condemnation goes
forward only when the easement produces gains, but not otherwise.
Now, this bundling problem is compounded in Koontz by the incor-
rect way in which the law now defines the relevant set of property
rights. Generally speaking, the orthodox theory of the Takings Clause
holds that private property is defined under state law, after which
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the government then decides whether or not to exercise its powers
of condemnation. In order to figure out what the phrase private
property means, however, it is not possible to work with two incon-
sistent definitions simultaneously. It is not correct to say that that
private property means one thing in disputes between private parties
and quite another when the dispute is between the government.
Unfortunately, this intellectual confusion now dominates the
Supreme Courts tortured view on the enormous breadth of the fed-
eral governments navigation servitude, which is said to dominate all
private interests in any navigable body of water. Textually, it is a
huge stretch to say that the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the several states gives it the power to sweep aside all private
property interests in water. Yet just that thoroughly mischievous and
confused proposition was roundly endorsed by Justice Robert Jackson
in United States v. Willow River Co.10 That position was later en-
dorsed by Justice William O. Douglas in a narrow five-to-four vote in
United States v. Twin City Power Co11:
It is no answer to say that these private owners had interests in
the water that were recognized by state law. We deal here with
the federal domain, an area which Congress can completely pre-
empt, leaving no vested private claims that constitute private
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.12
This creation of government property by fiat wipes out all traditional
private rights, and it does so when there is nothing about the navi-
gation system that precludes the standard application of the eminent
domain power to protect the complex array of usufructuary water
interests: riparian access, the ability to maintain a wharf of a mill,
and so on. The mindset behind the navigation easement also leads
to a similar assertion of powers outside the navigation easement, for
it is no accident that Justice Brennan in Penn Central placed ex-
plicit reliance on Willow River in a decision that, when all was said
and done, refused to recognize that air rights were fully vested prop-
erty interests under New York law.13
10. 324 U.S. 499 (1945). For my extensive criticism of the navigation servitude, see Richard
A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, in PROPERTY IN LAND
AND OTHER RESOURCES 317, 34251 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds. 2012).
11. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
12. Id. at 227.
13. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
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Note the political dynamic that follows. If there is a set of neighbors
who wish to restrict certain use by a private party, they will typically
have to purchase a restrictive covenant to achieve their ends. But if
the government has rights that transcend those of the citizens it rep-
resents, acquisitive neighbors may not seek to obtain that same re-
striction at no cost to them by the enactment of some kind of a zoning
law or other restrictive program. The Takings Clause was intended
to rein in these grand factional ambitions. The ability to redefine
property rights undercuts that function and opens up endless oppor-
tunities to public abuse and confusion, which thus undercuts the
central mission of that clause.
It is now easy to predict what will happen in a wide variety of
political circumstances. Let us suppose a majority gets together and
thinks that it is appropriate to restrict what the neighbor can do with
his property. So the local majority, in the form of the local water man-
agement district, informs someone like Mr. Koontz, who wishes to
build on his property, that he must comply with an environmental
easement over his property. That decision in effect requires him to
buy back the right to use his property from government in order to
go forward with his building plans.
Not surprisingly, this supposed environmental easement has been
recognized nowhere in the history of Western civilization until the
rise of the modern environmental movement. Generally speaking,
easements have to be created by agreement or by prescription. In a
few limited cases they are created by implication14 or necessity.15 But
the environmental easement has no known contours but is so defi-
nite that the government can pump up its contours by assertion in
order to increase the size of its exaction. The grand assertion of this
easement should be treated as a massive taking. Since no compen-
sation is ever forthcoming for its creation, the condition should be
struck down forthwith under a per se rule. That decision does not
blockany water district decision to take private lands for environmen-
tal purposes. It only ensures that the desirable set of incentives with
it are created through the standard eminent domain process in which
the government, acting as the agent for the public, pays full value for
what it takes.
14. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 296 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (sewage easement by implica-
tion on the subdivision of a single parcel of land).
15. Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1950) (denying the doctrine when the lock in is
not created by a single conveyance).
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What is so appalling about the Koontz case is that both sides agree
on the one point that should be emphatically rejectednamely, that
the government has the environmental easement that allows it to in-
sist as of right on a program of environmental mitigation as a pre-
condition for issuing a building permit. At this point, Koontz starts
to resemble the current situation under rent control laws, where at
the end of a lease the landlord has to repurchase the right to reoccupy
the premises from his newly empowered tenant, even though he is
entitled to regain possession as of right under the terms of the lease.
The definition of what the landlord owns is the exclusive right to buy
back from the government, at a price satisfactory to the government,
that which he already owned under the common law of property. I
commend Justice Samuel Alito for writing an opinion that imposed
some modest limits on government power. But the incurable defect
of his opinion is to address, and to reject, the claim that the govern-
ment easement allows it to impose, as of right, a duty of environmen-
tal mitigation on a private landowner.
Once the environmental easement is rejected, the case takes on
a radically different posture, for it is now necessary to first establish
the relationships between private parties in order to understand the
scope and limits on government power. In Koontz, this inquiry raises
some serious issues. To recap, Koontz owned about fourteen acres of
land on which he wanted to build on a little less than four acres. As
an aside, it is not clear whether or not he reduced his demands solely
because he knew that he would have to respond to the demand for
environmental mitigation. Anyhow, for him to accomplish his pro-
gram he agreed in his permit application to build up the land in one
place and regrade it in another. He also agreed to build a dry-bed
pond that would allow him to control the flow of storm water that
could run off from his building and its nearby parking lot. This last
request is surely appropriate, for there is no doubt in my mind that
if in fact he had so constructed the land to increase the run off into
public waters or into his neighbors land, his conduct would amount
to a tort under the standard rule of Rylands v. Fletcher that renders
it wrongful to bring, keep, or collect water on his land responsible for
its escape.16 Indeed that last position was rightly affirmed by the
16. See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), affg, L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866). The case
involves further complications in that the water was not fully collected but was only run off.
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Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard,17 in which Chief Justice
William Rehnquist made it clear that the City had a legitimate inter-
est to make sure that paving over open ground did not increase the
flow of water into public waters.18 That position is consistent with the
view that landowners can be held liable in tort for redirecting rain-
water over the land of their neighbors.19
As a general principle, whenever a private landowner or the
government,as trustee of public waters, can hold private landowners
responsible for harms after the fact, it is permissible to enjoin that
wrongful conduct to prevent the harm from occurring in the first place.
It was for just this reason that Koontz included the grading require-
ment and the water-pond system. Once those devices are sufficient
to meet the peril, the rest of the development is Koontzs concern, not
anyone elses. If his precautions fail, he of course is still liable for the
harm that his new development has caused. The carryover of the com-
mon law rules against the government yields some cases in which it
can enjoin as of right and yields others in which it must pay in order
to acquire a benefit that it needs.
Putting the point in this fashion gives rise to the common objection
that it is often difficult to tell the difference between two situations:
withholding a benefit on the one hand and inflicting a harm on the
other. That distinction is critical to the above analysis because the
pollution case is inflicting harm, and the refusal to dedicate ones
property as a wetland is withholding a benefit. If the distinction col-
lapses, there is nothing left doctrinally to limit legislative discretion.
Anything that the state does not like can be reclassified as either a
public or a private nuisance so that its power to restrict without com-
pensation is secured.
This all too fashionable line of argument received a qualified
endorsement in some Supreme Court decisions, including by Justice
Scalia in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.20 There, Justice
Scalia wrote:
The transition from our early focus on control of noxious uses to
our contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which
17. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
18. Id. at 387.
19. Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966).
20. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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governmentmay regulate without compensation was an easy one,
since the distinction between harm-preventing and benefit-
conferring regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite
possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the ecological,
economic, and esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina
Legislature in the present case. One could say that imposing a
servitude on Lucass land is necessary in order to prevent his use
of it from harming South Carolinas ecological resources; or, in-
stead, in order to achieve the benefits of an ecological preserve.21
Unfortunately, this passage is wrong in all its particulars. This con-
tested distinction is not just in the eye of the beholder just because
someone chooses to object to it. The easiest way to see why is to start
outside the law of nuisance with ordinary interactions between peo-
ple. Outside some supercharged legal dispute, is it proper to say that
everyone in the world has benefited me because no one in the world
has hit me? Similarly, is it possible to say that everyone in the world
has simultaneously hurt me because they have not given me some
money to improve my lot? Note that in either of these two worlds, the
number of wrongs that cry out for redress is infinite and undefined,
for everyone both benefits and harms everyone else simultaneously.
But no one ever thinks or says that everyone is entitled to restitution
for not hitting or is subject to tort liability for not giving, which is
what the Scalia position entails.
In order to avoid that bizarre result in the takings contexts, we
understand both phrases so that actions between strangers, whether
for restitution or for tort, now become the rare exception and not the
universal rule. I am responsible for hitting other people, which is
prima facie tortious. That is not a universal condition but an event
that happens only infrequently. Similarly I am responsible in resti-
tution when I confer some tangible property or labor on another per-
son, and then only in cases of necessity or mistake in which the other
person is incapable of caring for himself. That too is a rare occasion.
The number of claims shrinks from infinite to close to zero.
The choice of baselines would not matter in a zero transaction-
costs world in which an infinite number of disputes could be resolved
at zero cost in an infinitesimal period of time.22 But once these
21. Id. at 1024.
22. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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transaction costs become positive, the choice of baseline can no longer
be random, for it is now responsive to the concern that the legal sys-
tem not drown the world in high transactions costs needed to remedy
an endless stream of nonexistent wrongs. Even if by some miracle
Scalias alternative baseline were initially adoptedwhich has never
been the case in the private lawthe shift to the common law rules
on tort and restitution would constitute a massive across-the-board
Pareto improvement, with huge gains shared by all. The traditional
harm/benefit distinction thus makes perfectly good sense. And that
distinction connects without a hitch to the law of nuisance once it is
understood to involve nontrespassory physical invasions, at least if
that term is construed broadly enough to cover, as it should, the cases
of the diversion of water. In essence, the proposals that Koontz offered
did more than meet the requirements of the common law rules.
But once the distinction between conferring benefits and imposing
harms disappears, it now becomes permissible for the Water District
to say to Koontz that if he wants to exercise his development rights,
he has to buy them back because of the public benefits from an ample
supply of increasingly scarce wetlands. As an eminent domain prop-
osition, the Water District compares the value of this plot as a wet-
land with its value for private use, and condemns only when the
former is greater than the latter. That conclusion is most unlikely for
this particular parcel. If the District wants to acquire other parcels,
it can levy general taxes to raise the revenues, without distorting the
acquisition process.
When the use of the eminent process is rejected, Koontz has to
buy back his development rights, at which point a destructive bar-
gaining cycle starts through the political process. There is no upper
bound on what the water district can demand, so it will demand a
great deal. But it is all cheap talk, because the District would never
pay the landowner the sums needed to complete the deal. Just that
happened in Lucas, for once the Coastal Counsel was ordered to pay
$500,000 to prevent Lucas from building on either of its two plots,
they abandoned the entire enterprise and sold both plots off for that
sum with the development rights intact.23 It turns out that there are
23.  After paying Lucas $850,000 in compensation for the two lots, South Carolina
proceeded to sell the lots to private parties for development. Large homes now sit on both lots.
WIKIPEDIA, LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucas
_v._South_Carolina_Coastal_Council#Result (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
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a lot better ways for the Coastal Council to spend that money on
beach maintenance.
The aftermath of the Lucas decision should be one of relief, not
distress, for that is exactly the way in which the system of eminent
domain should workforce some degree of monetization of the envi-
ronmental interest in order to guide public policy on whether or not
to take. At this point we now can state the secret of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions: to the extent that the individual engages
in something that would be a traditional tort against his neighbor, or
against the public at large, the public can condition the permiton need
to stop that behavior. With the legitimate end, the only question is
whether the means chosen are overbroad or underinclusive. But,
alternatively, to the extent that the government wishes to go beyond
tort preventionand remember this is now an intelligible concept
it must pay under the formula that the more it takes, the more it pays.
By this test Mr. Koontz had got it right, and Justice Alito got it wrong
by trying to figure out which conditions were permissible and which
were not.
Now the important intellectual point is this: once the first step in
the analysis is wrong, everything that follows is wrong as well. Hence
much of the discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
in Koontz is a distraction from the main event. It makes no difference
for the analysis whether the conditions involved have to do with the
restrictive covenant that is imposed on the same parcel of land that
is to be developed or whether it requires a cash or kind contribution
to fix up some culvert or ditch located elsewhere in the district. Nei-
ther are nuisance prevention.
Similarly, Justice Elena Kagan is way off base when she argues
that this exaction should be treated as just another real estate tax
even though it is levied on a particular transaction. The basic point
about real estate taxes is they are based upon the market value of
the property taxed. The revenues collected are to be spent on general
public purposes so that the distribution of the tax is roughly propor-
tionate to the distribution of the public goods that the tax supplies.
The hope is that following this regime produces a Pareto improve-
ment in that all persons benefit by an amount greater than the tax
imposed, which means that public deliberations will seek common
solutions rather than partisan gains, because nobody will vote for
a tax that leaves them worse off than before, even after the benefits
supplied are taken into account.
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What the Water District program did was impose a set of special
assessments to fund the creation of general public benefits. If this is
allowed, then the entire structure of the tax system becomes indefi-
nite; factions will seek programs that preserve benefits for their mem-
bers while imposing costs on outsiders. Two or more factions can
play that game, so the downward cycle continues as people squabble
over liabilities that each group will happily impose on all the others.
So the basic normative rule is that selective impositions can never
be used to fund general benefits. At this point, there is no reason ever
to use any system of exaction in Koontz-like situations, because gen-
eral real property taxes will always dominate exactions in funding
the creation of public goods. It is for just this reason that the costs of
making general repairs to beach installations should appear on the
public budget to which Koontz has to contribute his pro rata share
based on the increased value of his property. But it is a mistake to use
exactions as a form of off-budget financing to pay for general benefits
from a single landowner or group of landowners
So if this analysis is correct, it is not necessary for Justice Alito to
send this case back to the Florida courts with complex instructions
to decide whether, and if so why, this exaction does, or does not, pass
muster. The rule remains as before: nuisance prevention by appro-
priate means is fine, but cost shifting for generalized public benefits
is not. There is no holdout problem to overcome so long as public
funds raised by general taxes are used to secure public benefits.
On this model all the second-tier issues raised in Koontz turn out
to be irrelevant. It is no longer relevant to ask whether the exaction
attaches to the same parcel of land over which development rights
are claimed. The Supreme Court constantly refers to an essential
nexus between the exaction imposed and the benefit supplied, but
the term is a major intellectual distraction because it is not meant
to echo the principle of proportionality just mentioned.24 Nor does it
matter whether the exaction is in cash or in kind. It is, of course, pos-
sible that any onsite restriction may be a nuisance control device. But
it is surely impossible for the remote improvements to squeeze in
under that rubric, so the same nuisance prevention formula is easier
24.  In [Nollan and Dolan] we held that a unit of government may not condition the
approval of a land-use permit on the owners relinquishment of a portion of his property unless
there is a nexus and rough proportionality between the governments demand and the effects
of the proposed land use. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586.
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to apply in the case of onsite requirements than in the case of offsite
requirements. Indeed if the nuisance problems are insuperable, it is
a good thing for this development not to take place.
Oddly enough, under the current law it takes some analysis to
figure out how bargaining takes place under the two rules. Start with
the artificial rule that states that the exaction must be tied to the land
on which the development takes place. That rule limits the demands
the water district can make. But it need not kill the deal because the
district might rather have the development even if it cannot get all
the financial assistance it desires for other projects. After all, the in-
kind exaction releases funds for other purposes. But of course, it can
always bluff and insist that unless more is coming, the permit will
not be granted, at which point the landowner has to decide whether
to hold firm or to pay additional consideration to get the job done.
Overall, my guess is that the broader rule would give the water
district more scope to insist on offsite improvements at the initial
stage and would probably result in a distribution of benefits that is
more favorable to the water district than the landowner. But again
the distribution of surplus is not the key question here. Rather, that
question is whether or not the restrictions should be imposed in the
first place, at which point the simple eminent domain approach dom-
inates both these alternatives.
The first point is that there is no longer a bargaining game, only
the usual disputes over just compensation for a partial restrictions.
The second point is that the price requirement on the government
will weed out ill-advised acquisitions. Why move for complexity when
simplicity will work better? The fundamental point is that no sound
system of governance gives any political party the unbounded level
of discretion that is created under the current law, which combines an
imperfect understanding of the exaction game with a flawed defini-
tion of private rights.
The state should not be able to avoid its own budget constraints by
declaring a new set of rights for itself that it then conveniently sells
back to private parties in unprincipled and costly negotiations. Just
that happens when permits are bundled with improper conditions,
which is why, as a matter of first principle, the process has to stop.
In closing, it is worth noting yet again that virtually all of the
intellectual confusion derives from the usual progressive mindset that
assumes that social welfare is improved by weakening property rights
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and entrusting an ever larger set of issues to government agencies
whose disinterested experts are said to reason their way to the cor-
rect social end. That model has failed everywhere else it is tried, most
conspicuously in general administrative law. Yet usually those fail-
ures lead to efforts to double down on the administrative state with
more restrictions and penalties. This is the path of destruction, and
the only path that will succeed is one towards market liberalization
in which the Takings Clause is returned to its original function. Seen
from a broad perspective, the exaction problem is yet another itera-
tion of a failed intellectual model that has always outperformed the
traditional classical liberal model of governance that is encapsulated
in the standard account of Takings Clausetake and pay.

BEYOND BLACKSTONE: THE MODERN EMERGENCE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW
DAVID L. CALLIES* & IAN WESLEY-SMITH**
INTRODUCTION
Modern laws are normally enacted by a legislature or developed
by a judiciary. However, there has been another traditional source of
social order throughout historycustoms, which are popular, nor-
mative pattern[s] that reflect the common understandings of valid,
compulsory rights and obligations.1 Although such customs and cus-
tomary rights have long been part of the law applicable to land,water,
and resources connected thereto, the Supreme Court of the United
States decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 has ele-
vated the importance of custom by naming it as a potential defense to
categorical takings claims.
A customaryor customary lawmost broadly defined, is a practice
or right of use exercised by a discrete and identifiable group of people
(a tribe or native peoples, for example) over a particular area of land
for a very long time and is recognized for certain purposes in a local
court or tribunal. In most countries, the customary law may be modi-
fied orabolishedbystatute, ordinance, or rule enacted by government,
generally through a legislative act. Thereafter, the precise definition
and scope of custom as law usually depends upon the nature and his-
tory of the nation in which customary rights are claimed or exercised.
This Article summarizes the modern emergence of customary law
in the United States and internationally. It discusses two distinct
forms of customary law, the first being custom, as recognized in En-
glish common law and discussed by Blackstone and the second being
native customs that are exercised by indigenous peoples. Section II
discusses Blackstones definition of custom and the importance of
* FAICP Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law. BA, Depauw University; JD, University of
Michigan; LL.M., Nottingham University, Life Member, Clare Hall, Cambridge University.
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ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43, 60 (Cambridge Univ.
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2. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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custom in real property as a source of law in derogation of so-called
common law. Section III explores native custom, with emphasis on
the State of Hawaii, which constitutionally protects the traditional
and customary rights of Native Hawaiians, and on select foreign
jurisdictions in which custom, often exercised by or in favor of indig-
enous peoples, plays a strong role in the law relating to land, water,
natural resources, and self-government. Section IV analyzes the
significance of custom within the United States as a background prin-
ciple of a states law of property, which gives state and local gov-
ernment a safe haven from liability under the categorical or total
regulatory taking rules set out by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Lucas. As this Article will demonstrate, poorly defined cus-
tomary law runs the risk of intruding onto fundamental property
rights such as the right to exclude. Judicial adherence to some form
of the Blackstonian criteria for good customs would significantly
ameliorate such dangers.
I. ENGLISH CUSTOM
A. Background
The most common and universal definition of custom finds its roots
in the writings of the English legal scholar William Blackstone. It is
described in his legendary Commentaries on Laws of England, many
editions of which were published shortly after the middle of the
eighteenth century.3
Blackstone wrote his commentaries, at least in part, as a polemic
in favor of the common law and to buttress it against anything that
might serve to weaken it. It is in this context that his commentaries
on custom must be read. Indeed, Blackstone recognized three forms
of customary law: common law (general custom) by which he pre-
sumably meant common law as we view it today, court (procedural)
custom of particular tribunals or courts, and particular customs
practiced by and affecting the inhabitants of a defined geographical
area. It is this third, or particular, custom that Blackstone took care
to carefully define and delimit, arguably because he viewed it as a
threat to the common-law tradition that he espoused and for which
he argues in the Commentaries.
3. Although not to the extent of another similar doctrine, the public trust doctrine.
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Blackstone set out seven criteria that a customary right or practice
must meet if it is to be a good customthat is, one which is enforce-
able against a common-law principle or tradition, say, of exclusive
possession of private land (a situation in which many of the disputes
over custom arose). But Blackstone did not draw these seven princi-
ples from the air. Although he cited comparatively few cases, he was
declaring the law pretty much as it had developed by the middle of
the eighteenth century and, indeed, as it continued to develop well
into the nineteenth century. To be valid, to be enforceable, to result in
a right of an individual despite common-law principles to the contrary,
a custom had to be immemorial, continuous, peaceable, reasonable,
certain, compulsory, and consistent. Even today, the law of custom is
hedged around by requirements, most of which derive directly from
Blackstones seven criteria.
Thus, for example, a recent volume of Halsburys Laws of England4
describes the essential attributes of custom as follows:
To be valid, a custom must have four essential attributes: (1) it
must be immemorial, (2) it must be reasonable, (3) it must be cer-
tain in its terms and in respect both of the locality where it is al-
leged to obtain and of the persons whom it is alleged to effect,
(4) it must have continued as a right and without interruption
since its immemorial origin. These characteristics serve as a prac-
tical purpose as rules of evidence when the existence of a custom
is to be established or refuted.5
Even so practical a source as a standard reference book of law for
local government councilors has the following entry:
Custom
If a right is given to or an obligation imposed upon all the
Queens subjects, it must be established by authority of the general
law. A local custom can therefore never be general and a custom-
ary claim in the name of the general public will fail. Similarly a
custom must be capable of definition, and so the courts will not
4. 12(1) HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998).
5. Id. ¶ 606, at 160. This entire section on custom is a superb explanation of custom today,
prepared by one of the preeminent scholars in legal history, Professor J.H. Baker, Fellow of
St. Catharines College, Cambridge.
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uphold a claim on behalf of a class whose membership cannot
be ascertained.6
It is the seven rules or criteria applicable to particular custom
(not common law, not special court rules, but land rights in deroga-
tion of common law particular to a particular and limited jurisdic-
tion and exercised by a small and definite population) which courts
have dealt with, and which still form the basis for English discussion
and categorization of customary law.7 These are:
1. Immemoriality
That is have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary. So that if any one can shew the beginning of
it, it is no good custom. For which reason no custom can prevail
against an express act of parliament, since the statute itself is a
proof of a time when such a custom did not exist.8
For centuries, time out of memory had a fixed, well-defined, and
accepted meaning. The phrase is a common one in setting up a cus-
tom as a defense against what would otherwise be an unlawful act.
2. Continuity
It must have been continued. Any implementation would cause a
temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which
will be within time of memory, and thereupon the custom will be
void. But this must be understood with regard to an interruption
of the possession only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the
custom. As if I have a right of way by custom over anothers field,
the custom is not destroyed, though I do not pass over it for ten
years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the right be
any how discontinued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.9
3. Peacefulness
It must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject to
contention and dispute. For as customs owe their original to
6. CHARLES ARNOLD-BAKER, LOCAL COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION 35 (Butterworths, 4th
ed.1994).
7. See HALSBURYS, supra note 4.
8. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7677.
9. Id. at *77.
2015] BEYOND BLACKSTONE 155
common consent, their being immemorially disputed either at
law or otherwise is a proof that such consent was wanting.10
4. Reasonableness
Customs must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, they
must not be unreasonable. Which is always, as Sir Edward Coke
says, to be understood of every unlearned mans reason. but of ar-
tificial and legal reason, warranted by authority of a law. Upon
which account a custom may be good, though the particular rea-
son of it cannot be assigned; for it sufficeth, if no good legal rea-
son can be assigned against it. Thus, a custom in a parish, that no
man shall put his beasts into the common till the third of October,
would be good; and yet it would be hard to shew the reason why
that day in particular is fixed upon, rather than the day before or
after. But a custom that no cattle shall be put in till the lord of the
manor first put in his, is unreasonable, and therefore bad: for per-
adventure the lord will never put in his; and then the tenants will
lose all their profits.11
The early twentieth-century cases of Mercer v. Denne,12 upholding
custom of the inhabitants of a parish (fishermen) to use a piece of
land covered with shingle to spread and dry their nets as in favor of
navigation, permitted the exercise of the custom to change with the
times so long as the burden on the landowner was not unreasonable:
The tanning, clutching or oiling of nets [new] belonging to fisher-
men tend to preserve the nets and make them useful for a longer
period, and the subsequent drying of nets seems to me to fall
within the reasons thus assigned for the custom. It is laid down by
Holt, J. in City of London v. Vanacore13 [a late seventeenth-cen-
tury case] that general customs may be extended to new things
which are within the reason of those customs. There is not, in
my opinion, evidence from which it ought to be inferred that the
practice of tanning or cutching has arisen within the time of
legal memory. But it was said that, so far as related to the drying
after oiling, the use has extended over a period of from twenty-
five to thirty-five years only, and, moreover, that this user was
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 2 Ch. 534 (1904); 2 Ch. 538 (C.A.) (1905).
13. 12 Mod 270, 271 (1699).
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more burdensome than the old user for drying after tanning or
cutching. I think, however, that the law as laid down by Lord St.
Leonards in Dyce v. Hay cited by Farwell J., applies, and that
those who are entitled to the benefit of a custom ought not to be
deprived of that benefit simply because they take advantage of
modern inventions or new operations so long as they do not
thereby throw an unreasonable burden on the landowner.14
Again, [i]t must not be forgotten that the persons claiming under
the custom are bound to exercise their rights reasonably and with due
regard to the interest of the owner of the soil.15
5. Certainty
Customs ought to be certain. A custom, that lands shall descend
to the most worthy of the owners blood, is void; for how shall this
worth be determined? But a custom to descend to the next male
of the blood, exclusive of females, is certain, and therefore good.
A custom, to pay two pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to
pay sometimes two pence and sometimes three pence, as the oc-
cupier of the land pleases, is bad for its uncertainty. Yet a custom,
to pay a years improved value for a fine on a copyhold estate, is
good: though the value is a thing uncertain. For the value may at
any time be ascertained; and the maxim of the law is, id certum
est, quod certum reddi potest.16
(a) Certainty of Practice
(b) Certainty of Locale
(c) Certainty of Persons
6. Compulsory
Customs, though established by consent, must be (when estab-
lished) compulsory; and not left to the option of every man,
whether he will use them or not. Therefore a custom, that all the
inhabitants shall be rated toward the maintenance of abridge,will
be good; but a custom, that every many is to contribute thereto
14. 2 Ch. 538, 581 (1905) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 584 (1905).
16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78.
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at his own pleasure, is idle and absurd; and, indeed, no custom
at all.17
The concept that a custom must be compulsory in order for it to be
good is for the most part self-evident; a law is not a law if it is not
obligatory to the parties. This issue is rarely addressed separately
because most of the cases on custom assume that a custom is com-
pulsory.
7. Consistency
Lastly, customs must be consistent with each other: one custom
cannot be set up in opposition to another. For, if both are really
customs, then both are of equal antiquity, and both established by
mutual consent: which to say of contradictory customs is absurd.
Therefore, if one man prescribes that by custom he has a right to
have windows looking into anothers garden; the other cannot
claim a right by custom to stop up or obstruct those windows: for
these two contradictory customs cannot both be good, nor both
stand together. He ought rather to deny the existence of the
former custom.18
As with the compulsory requirement, the criterion of consistency is
largely self-evident and does not appear often in the cases on cus-
tomary law.
These, then, are Blackstones seven criteria for good customs, as
interpreted by both contemporaries and later courts in England.
Since customary rights in land are in derogation of common-law
rights in landparticularly the fundamental right to exclude others
it makes sense for such customary rights to be limited in their ex-
ercise. Blackstones criteria present such reasonable limitations.
Moreover, most courts cite Blackstone asauthority for theircustomary
law. It is not altogether apparent that they understand it, however.
B. The Current State of Customary Law in the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland
It is clear that courts within the United Kingdomas well as
within other countries directly influenced by English common law,
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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such as the Republic of Irelandcontinue to give customary practices
the force of law when applicable.
In Spread Trustee Company Ltd. v Sarah Ann Hutcheson &
Others,19 the Court of Appeals of Guernsey considered the issue of
whether managers of a trustee were permitted to include a clause in
the trust instrument that excluded liability for gross negligence.20
In 1989, Guernsey had passed a trusts law (The Trust Statute),
amended in 1990, which had prohibited the exclusion of liability for
gross negligence in trust instruments.21 However, the gross negli-
gence at issue had occurred in transactions prior to 1989, before the
Trust Statute and amendment were passed.22 Therefore, the court
undertook to discover the law regarding the exclusion of liability for
gross negligence in trust instruments in Guernsey prior to 1989. The
court noted that there were no prior Guernsey statutes regarding
trusts and no court cases on point.23 It therefore looked to Guernsey
customary law.24
Both parties attempted to introduce favorable evidence about
Guernsey customary law.25 The court, after reviewing the common
law of Guernsey, found that there was no reliable evidence on the
customary law. It considered a letter that the Guernsey Finance Com-
mittee sent to the Guernsey President, which noted uncertainty re-
garding the law of trusts in Guernsey and stated that the Trust
Statute was intended to replace Guernsey customary law on the
subject.26 The court concluded that the best evidence of Guernsey
customary law on trusts prior to 1989 was the text of the Statute
that replaced the customary law.27 Accordingly, the court held that
prior to the enactment of the Trust Statute, Guernsey customary
law contained the same prohibition against including a term in the
trust instrument that excluded liability for gross negligence.28
19. Spread Tr. Co. Ltd v. Hutcheson, [2011] UKPC 13 (Guernsey). Official Press Summary
available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2011/13.(image1).pdf.
20. Id. at [4].
21. Id. at [2].
22. Id. at [4].
23. Id. at [12].
24. Id. at [13][16].
25. Id.
26. Id. at [15].
27. Id. at [37].
28. Id.
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Crown Estate Commissioners v. Roberts & Anor29 provides another
example of the contemporary use of customary law by courts within
the United Kingdom. In 2002, the Pembrokeshire County Council
applied to the Crown Estates Commissioners in order to register lease-
hold titles to a large part of the foreshore of the Pembrokeshire coast-
line, operating under the assumption that the foreshore and sea in
the area belonged to the Crown.30 Mr. Roberts, as successor in title to
the Bishop of St. Davids, alleged that he had estate over the area as
a result of a charter of 1115 AD.31 In addition, Mr. Roberts argued
that he had rights to the area as a result of ancient usage.32 Mr.
Roberts claimed the rights to the following: sea wrecks, wharfage,
sporting, a private fishery, treasure trove, profits, estrays, and other
rights.33 The England and Wales High Court, Chancery Division,
decided the case.
In assessing most of the rights, the court looked to the charter and
other subsequent treaties and legislative acts.34 However, the court
considered Welsh customary law antedating the Norman conquest
in evaluating Mr. Roberts asserted fishing, treasure trove, and es-
tray rights. The court noted that Welsh customary laws survived in
a collection of manuscripts known as the Hywel Dda.35 The charter
granting the land to the Bishop of St. Davids in 1115 AD had granted
any existing customary rights to the Bishops. Mr. Roberts argued
that existing customary rights granted by the charter included exclu-
sive fishing rights to the sea.36 After considering evidence of Welsh
customary law, the court determined that ancient Welsh princes did
not assert a right to a private ocean fishery, which meant that the
Bishop of St. Davids, and by extension Mr. Roberts, possessed no such
right.37 In considering a customary right to treasure trove, the court
found that customary law, in keeping with modern law, granted the
right to treasure to the Crown.38 However, the court did mention in
29. Crown Estate Commners v. Roberts & Anor, [2008] EWHC 1302 (Ch), available at http://
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/1302.html.
30. Id. at [3].
31. Id. at [4].
32. Id.
33. Id. at [5].
34. Id. at [39].
35. Id. at [85].
36. Id. at [84].
37. Id. at [90], [115].
38. Id. at [129].
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dicta that it was willing to accept that Mr. Roberts had a customary
right to estrays.39
Similarly, the Republic of Ireland continues to adhere to the com-
mon law tradition of recognizing customs as law. In Walsh & Anor
v. Sligo County Council,40 the High Court of Ireland considered a case
in which the plaintiff bought an enormous property that included pop-
ular access paths. The plaintiff installed a gate across the paths, thus
blocking out the general public, and filed suit seeking a declaration
that no public right of way existed over his property.41 In its counter-
claim, the County Council argued that the plaintiffs predecessor in
interest dedicated the paths to the public. However, in the alterna-
tive, the Council argued that the public had customary rights through
long usage to pass over the property.42 Although the court noted that
the onus was on the defendants to prove the existence of any custom-
ary right,43 it did not reach the issue of custom because it held that
the path had been acquired by prescription.44
However, as noted in the introduction, the United Kingdoms
legislature retains the power to alter or abolish a custom. For exam-
ple, the United Kingdom has enacted statutes to regulate town and
village greens (TVGs), an area traditionally governed by custom.
According to the common law, TVGs were theoretically established
by customary recreational usage since time immemorial.45
In 1965, the legislature enacted the Commons Registration Act,
which brought TVGs under statutory protection.46 Section 22(1) of
the Commons Registration Act of 1965 contained a definition of a
TVG as land on which the inhabitants of any locality have a custom-
ary right to indulge in lawful sports or pastimes.47 Despite this recog-
nition, the Commons Registration Act explicitly ended the traditional
39. Id. at [92].
40. Walsh & Anor v. Sligo Cnty. Council [2010] IEHC 437 (Ire.), available at http://www
.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2010/H437.html.
41. Id. at [6].
42. Id. at [7].
43. Id. at [31].
44. Id. at [299].
45. Oxfordshire CC v. Oxford City Council [2006] 2 WLR 1235 (Eng.) (describing the
traditional legal status of a village green as an area that by immemorial custom the inhabitants
of the town, village, or parish should have acquired the right of playing lawful games thereon
and enjoying it for purposes of recreation).
46. R v. Oxfordshire Cnty. Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council, [2000] 1 AC 335
(H.L.).
47. Id.
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role of custom in the establishment of TVGs. Instead, the Commons
Registration Act brought the creation of TVGs into a state regulatory
framework by mandating that TVGs would not be legally recognized
unless registered by a certain deadline.48
The Commons Act of 2006, which replaced the Commons Regis-
tration Act, was enacted by the legislature to modernize the law on
commons and town and village greens.49 The Commons Act made,
among other things, procedural changes to the process of registering
TVGs established by prescription.50 The Act did nothing to reintro-
duce the role of customary law in the establishment of TVGs and thus
solidified the fact that statutory law exclusively governs TVGs.51
II. NATIVE CUSTOM
Fred Bosselman and Peter Orebech have argued that [c]ustomary
law exists whenever people act as if they were legally bound to accept
customary rules . . . [and that no] endorsement by any legislative, ju-
dicial, or administrative body is needed to create customary law if peo-
ple accept rules as the law.52 In this sense, native customary law
can be loosely defined as the complex networks of customs that or-
dered behavior, defined social norms, structured economics and poli-
tics, and regulated natural resources in many indigenous societies. In
much of the world, colonization by Europeans replaced indigenous sys-
tems of customary law with Western-style positivistic law. However,
many native groups continue to structure their lives and identities
around traditional customary law, and some have begun to strive for
formal legal recognition of that fact. The following selected case stud-
ies, from within the United States and abroad, explore the complexi-
ties that result when native customary law is resurrected in nations
that are governed by modern common law and statutory frameworks.
48. Id. (explaining that the under the section 2(2) of the Act, no land capable of being reg-
istered under the Act was to be deemed to be common land or a town or village green unless
so registered . . . mean[ing] that unless they were registered within the prescribed time-limit,
they could not be registered as such thereafter).
49. Alec Samuels, The Commons Act 2006, J. PLANNING & ENVTL L. 1652, 1652 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Fred Bosselman & PeterOrebech, Conclusion:Customary Law ina Globalizing Culture,
in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 445, 445 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005).
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A. Hawaii
Customary law in Hawaii represents a harder and certainly more
sweeping situation than is the case with the English custom discussed
above. Hawaii presents more difficulty because there is no question
that some tradition of customary rights exists from the days of the
various kingdoms, rights that include gathering, access, and reli-
gious customary practices. This tradition predates not only statehood
but also territorial days and annexation towards the end of the nine-
teenth century. The size of applicable territory is usually broader
and the class far larger than Blackstonian custom would tolerate, al-
though, again, long-standingif not ancientpractice is usually a
prerequisite, and formal governmental action to the contrary gener-
ally takes precedence.
As explained in ATreatise on NativeHawaiian Law, [a]n important
foundation of law in Hawaii is the doctrine of custom.53 Until the es-
tablishment of the Western-style kingdom of Hawaii in 1839, Native
Hawaiians lived in a traditionally organized society governed entirely
by ancient Hawaiian custom and usage.54 Access rights from the
mountains to the sea and along the coastline,55 as well as religious,
cultural, and subsistence-gathering practices, were important cus-
toms that sustained native tenants.56 Even as Western influence
radically transformed Native Hawaiian society, many traditional cus-
tomary rights were codified in the first constitution and statutory
compilations of the Kingdom of Hawaii from 1839 to 1842.57 Moreover,
between 1845 and 1855, laws recognizing the customary rights of
native tenants were an integral part of the transformation of Hawaiis
ancient communal land tenure system to a modern property regime
incorporating Western concepts of private property rights. . . .58
Accordingly, although modern property law in Hawaii is primarily
based on Western common law, it also incorporates Hawaiian custom
and usage.59
53. Susan K. Serrano & David M. Forman, Traditional andCustomary Access and Gathering
Rights, in ATREATISE ONNATIVEHAWAIIANLAW *17 (MacKenzie, Serrano & Sproat, eds., Univ.
of Hawaii Press & Kamehameha Publishing, 2014).
54. Id. at *2.
55. See id. at *3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *711.
58. Id. at *11.
59. Id. at *15.
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Over the last thirty years, the Hawaii Supreme Court has inter-
preted the state constitution and several state statutes to confer
distinct legal status on Native Hawaiian customary practices, often
to the detriment of Western-style absolute property rights. The
court has recognized a specific right for Hawaiians to practice cus-
tomary subsistence gathering of certain items,60 as well as a broader
right to exercise traditional and customary rights on undeveloped
private property.61
1. Modern Legal Bases of Native Hawaiian Customary Rights
a. Section 7-1
In 1850, the Kingdom of Hawaii enacted the Kuleana Act, which
provided that Native Hawaiian tenants could acquire fee simple
ownership over lands that they traditionally cultivated.62 In order
to ensure that native tenants could use their new lands sustainably,
section 7 of the Kuleana Act granted such tenants the right to gather
enumerated items such as firewood and house-building supplies from
elsewhere within the ahupuaa63 of his or her residence.64 Section 7 is
the sole provision of the Kuleana Act that remains in force in the mod-
ern statutory scheme, now codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1.65
In the 1982 case of Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,66 the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that gathering rightscouldbe exercisedpursuant
to section 7-1 if three conditions were satisfied. As explained by A
Treatise on Native Hawaiian Law, the three conditions are as follows:
(1) the tenant must physically reside within the ahupuaa from which
the item is being gathered, (2) the right to gather can only be exercised
on undeveloped lands within the ahupuaa, and (3) the right must be
exercised for the purpose of practicing Native Hawaiian traditions
and customs.67 Section 7-1 is limited in scope; it only authorizes
60. See infra notes 6164 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 6685 and accompanying text.
62. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *17 n.72.
63. An ahupuaa is a traditional designation of land in Hawaii, which usually runs from a
mountain valley to the adjacent ocean.
64. Id. at *19.
65. Id. at *1819.
66. 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
67. See id. at 74950; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *24.
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Native Hawaiian practitioners to gatherthe items enumerated within
the statute and only within the ahupuaa of their residence.68 Accord-
ingly, it could be better characterized as a statutory provision protect-
ing a few narrowly defined customary rights than as one establishing
custom as an independent source of law.
b. Section 1-1
Section 1-1 of Hawaii Revised Statutes offers a broader legal
foundation for Native Hawaiian customary rights. Enacted in 1892,
it adopts English common law as the law of Hawaii, except as other-
wise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial prece-
dent, or established by Hawaiian Usage.69 Although section 1-1 does
not directly relate to traditional or customary gathering rights[,]70
it does explicitly codify customary Hawaiian usage asa source of law.71
Accordingly, in recent years the Hawaii Supreme Court has cited to
it as the basis for extending formal legal status to customary gather-
ing rights.72
In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,73 the court interpreted Haw. Rev.
Stat. section 1-1 broadly, holding that it may be used as a vehicle for
the continued existence of those customary rights which continue to
be practiced and which worked no actual harm upon the recognized
interests of others.74 Whether a Hawaiian tradition would be legally
recognized as a Hawaiian usage under section 1-1 depended on a case-
by-case analysis into the practice of the custom in the particular
area and a balancing of the respective interests and harm. . . .75 If
a Hawaiian usage had, without harm to anyone, been continued . . .
[section] 1-1 insure[d] [its] continuance for as long as no actual harm
[was] done thereby.76 However, the court found that the plaintiff,
68. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *34.
69. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (2013) (emphasis added).
70. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *17.
71. Id. at *18.
72. Id. at *17.
73. 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
74. See id. at 75152; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *18.
75. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 75152 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano
& Forman, supra note 53, at *18.
76. See Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 751; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *26.
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Kalipi, could not take advantage of the section 1-1 because there was
insufficient evidence to find that the traditional gathering rights that
he asserted extended beyond the ahupuaa in which he lived.
In Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,77 the court expanded the scope of
Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 by finding that customary and tradi-
tional gathering rights may extend beyond the ahupuaa in which
the Native Hawaiian practitioner resides. . . .78 The court held that
gathering rights could be exercised for subsistence, cultural, or reli-
gious purposes outside of the practitioners ahupuaa as long as such
rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised in [that]
manner.79 Pele Defense Fund was expressly reaffirmed in Public
Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Commission
(PASH),80 in which the court held that customary rights exercised
pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 went beyond the tenants
gathering rights enumerated in Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7-1 and were
dependent on the particular circumstances of the case.81 The court
clarified that section 1-1 represents the codification of custom as it
applies [in Hawaii] and concluded that such custom renders the
western concept of exclusivity . . . not universally applicable
within the state.82
c. Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution
Finally, traditional and customary rights are protected under
Article XII, section 7 of the state constitution of 1978.83 Article XII,
section 7 was intended as a provision encompassing and reaffirming
all rights of native Hawaiians such as access and gathering but
was not intended to remove or eliminate any statutorily recognized
rights . . . of native Hawaiians. . . .84 Importantly, the Hawaii
Supreme Court has held that section 7 imposes a constitutional
77. 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 (1993).
78. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *26.
79. Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918
(1993); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *27.
80. 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995).
81. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *29 (citing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v.
Hawaii Cnty. Planning Commn, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995)).
82. Id. at *29 (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268).
83. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *16.
84. Id.
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obligation on the state judiciary to preserve and enforce Hawaiian
traditional rights.85 The effect of this constitutional mandate is that
any argument for extinguishment of traditional rights based simply 
upon possible inconsistency . . . with our modern system of land
tenure must fail.86
Courts have often invoked Article XII section 7 in conjunction with
Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1. Thus, the court in Pele Defense Fund held
that traditional and customary rights practiced for subsistence, cul-
tural, and religious purposes on undeveloped lands were not only au-
thorized by section 1-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes but also
protected by the constitution.87 Similarly, in PASH, the court clarified
that this constitutional obligation extended to protecting customary
rights generally, beyond those normally associated with tenancy in
an ahupuaa.88
2. The Substance of Hawaiian Customary Gathering
Rightsa Defense to Trespass
In sum, Native Hawaiian customary gathering practices have
formal legal status in Hawaii. Section 7-1 provides statutory au-
thority for the continuance of certain customary gathering practices,
although its scope is limited. Section 1-1 provides that Native Ha-
waiian customs and usage are a legitimate source of law in Hawaii.
Courts have interpreted section 1-1 to offer broader protection for the
exercise of traditional rights beyond those enumerated in section 7-1.
Finally, Article XII, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution obligates the
state to protect legitimate customary and traditional practices . . .
to the extent feasible. . . .89
The most striking effect of the Hawaii Supreme Courts recognition
of customary rights is on the property rights of landowners within
the state. Because Hawaii property law protects the exercise of tra-
ditional and customary rights and the concomitant limitation of the
85. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano &
Forman, supra note 53, at *26.
86. See Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 748; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *34.
87. See Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918
(1993); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *27.
88. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Commn, 903 P.2d 1246,
1269 (Haw. 1995); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *29.
89. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra
note 53, at *34.
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owners right of exclusion[,] . . . the owner of land in Hawaii acquires
title that is uniquely subject to the rights of native tenants.90 The
custom-imposed limitation on the owners right of exclusion is best
exemplified by the fact that the Hawaii Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Native Hawaiian gathering rights can be asserted as a
defense to trespass.
In the 1998 criminal case of State v. Hanapi,91 the state charged
Hanapi, a Native Hawaiian, with trespass after he repeatedly entered
a neighbors private property.92 Hanapi, appearing pro se, asserted
Native Hawaiian customary rights as a defense, arguing that he en-
tered the property in order to perform religious and traditional cere-
monies to heal the land following the neighbors grading and filling
of an area near two traditional fishponds.93 Although the Hawaii Su-
preme Court convicted Hanapi of trespass, it nonetheless recognized
the viability of the customary rights defense. The court identified
three elements that a defendant must meet to render a trespass con-
stitutionally protected as a Native Hawaiian right.94
First, the defendant must qualify as a Native Hawaiian.95 In PASH,
the Supreme Court defined a Native Hawaiian as a descendant of
Native Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778, rejecting
a definition based on blood quantum.96 The PASH opinion did not
reach the issue of whether non-Hawaiian family members of Native
Hawaiians would qualify.97
Second, the defendant must establish that his or her claimed right
is constitutionally protected as a customary or traditional native Ha-
waiian practice. . . .98 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has determined
that a custom must have been established in practice by November 25,
1892.99 In Hanapi, the court held that the custom or usage could be
proven by Kamaaina witness testimony.100
90. See id. at *15.
91. 970 P.2d 485 (Haw 1998).
92. See id. at 492; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *36.
93. See State v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485, 486, 48889 (Haw. 1998); see also Serrano & Forman,
supra note 53, at *36.
94. See Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 49394; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37.
95. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37.
96. Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Commn, 903 P.2d 1246, 1270
(Haw. 1995).
97. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37.
98. Id. at *3738 (quoting Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 49495).
99. Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272.
100. Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 49495.
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Finally, the defendant must prove that the right was exercised
on undeveloped land. . . .101 In PASH, the court explained that
customary rights may be exercised on land that is undeveloped or
less than fully developed.102 However, courts have not yet pinpointed
the precise point in the development process at which land becomes
fully developed.103
More recently, in State v. Pratt,104 the Hawaii Intermediate Court
of Appeals held that the three Hanapi elements are merely the min-
imum a defendant has to show in support of a claim that his or her
conduct was constitutionally protected [against trespass] as a native
Hawaiian right.105 The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed and held
that once the Hanapi elements are met, the court must apply a
totality of the circumstances test to balance the competing interests
of the practitioner and the state.106
3. Consistency with Blackstonian Custom
Custom has been incorporated into Hawaiis statutory framework
for over a century.107 The Kalipi court, in holding that Haw. Rev. Stat.
section 1-1 codified the Hawaiian usage exception to the common law,
analogized to the English doctrine of custom, although it recognized
that [not] all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom were
necessarily incorporated. . . .108 More recently, A Treatise on Native
Hawaiian Law has further explored the relationship between classic
Blackstonian custom and customary law in Hawaii.109 The authors
of that Treatise analyzed the Supreme Court of Hawaiis opinion in
PASH and discerned seven elements of Hawaiian customary law to
101. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *38 (citing Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 49495).
102. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra
note 53, at *18.
103. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra
note 53, at *18.
104. 124 Haw. 329 (Ct. App. 2010).
105. Id. at 355.
106. State v. Pratt, 277 P.3d 300 (Haw. 2012).
107. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *18.
108. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 75051 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano
& Forman, supra note 53, at *25.
109. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *3031.
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be contrasted with the seven elements of Blackstonian custom. The
seven elements of Native Hawaiian usage are as follows:
(1)The date by which Hawaiian usage must have been estab-
lished is fixed at November 25, 1892, rather than . . . time
immemorial.110
(2)The right of each ahupuaa tenant to exercise traditional
and customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding
arguable abandonment of a particular site . . . continuous
exercise [of the right] is not required: the custom is not de-
stroyed . . . it only becomes more difficult to prove.111
(3)The PASH court found that, at least in the context of Haw.
Rev. Stat. section 7-1, there is no requirement that the prac-
tice be peaceable and free from dispute.112
(4)[R]easonableness concerns the manner in which an other-
wise valid customary right is exercisedin other words, even
if an acceptable rationale cannot be assigned, the custom is
still recognized as long as there is no good legal reason
against it.113
(5)[A] particular custom is certain if it is objectively defined
and applied. . . .114
(6)In Hawaii a usage need not necessarily be compulsory, because
[t]he state has the authority under article XII, section 7 of the
Hawaii Constitution to reconcile competing interests . . .
once land has reached the point of full development it may
be inconsistent to allow or enforce the practice of traditional
Hawaiian gathering rights . . . [however,] the State does not
have unfettered discretion to regulate these rights . . . out of
existence.115
(7)Consistency is properly measured against other customs,
not the spirit of present laws. . . .116
110. Id. at *30 (discussing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Commn,
903 P.2d 1246, 1272 (Haw. 1995)).
111. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26, 1272).
112. Id. at 31 (discussing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1267).
113. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39).
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26, 1272).
116. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39).
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Notwithstanding the unquestionable legal and historical basis for
some Native Hawaiian customary rights, these seven elements of
Hawaiian usage clearly exceed the traditional bounds of Blackstonian
custom. For example, the defined class and applicable territory of
Native Hawaiian rights are both much broader than would be the
case with customary rights as defined by Blackstone. However, there
is some overlap as well; Native Hawaiian practices must be long
standing and are subject to some reasonable government regulation.
Hawaii is far from the only area experiencing a resurgence of
native customary law. The following case studies demonstrate that
the re-emergence of customary law is truly a worldwide phenomenon.
Customary law in Norway and Greenland were thoroughly analyzed
in the Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, which
traces the history of customary law, assesses the continued viability
of custom as a source of law in contemporary societies, and argues
that customary law may play a valuable role in sustainable develop-
ment. The following sections build off of that book by providing up-
dates on the status of customary law in both Norway and Greenland
and also introduce studies into the role of native customary law in
South Africa and New Zealand.
B. Norway
1. Customary Law in NorwayGenerally
Norwegian courts generally recognize local customs as law if the
usage meets the general prerequisites of (1) longevity, (2) non-inter-
ruption, (3) freedom from dispute, and (4) reasonableness.117 The Res-
urrection of Customary Laws, by Peter Orebech, provides a current
and comprehensive analysis of recent applications of general custom-
ary law in Norway.118 Additionally, the customary laws of the indige-
nous population of northern Norway, the Saami, have also received
some recognition in recent years.
For example, in 2005, the Norwegian government enacted the
Finnmark Act, which transferred ownership of 95% of the land of the
117. Peter Orebech, How Custom Becomes Law in Norway, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY
DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 224, 240 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
118. Peter Orebech, Western Scandinavia: The Resurrection of Customary Laws, 48 TEX.
INTL L.J. 405 (2013).
2015] BEYOND BLACKSTONE 171
northern district of Finnmark from the state to a new legal entity
called the Finnmark Estate.119 Section Five of the Finnmark Act rec-
ognizes the customary basis for this transfer by stating through
prolonged use of land and water areas, the Sámi have collectively and
individually acquired rights to land in Finnmark.120 Similarly, Saami
reindeer pastoral rights were affirmed by a 2001 court case on the
basis of immemorial usage.121 Despite these and other successes,
indigenous groups seeking to have their traditions recognized as law
generally face an uphill battle, as the following case study of Saami
fishing rights demonstrates.
2. Saami Fishing Rights as Customary Law
The indigenous coastal Saami of the northern district of Finnmark
have traditionally practiced open access to the fisheries of that
area.122 In modern times, many Saami fishermen would like to have
their tradition of open access to fisheries recognized as customary
law123 in order to overturn conservation quotas imposed in 1992.124
Peter Orebech argues that the Saami practice of open access fishing
can achieve the status of customary law based on the uniformity
of fishing practices within the geographic region.125 Moreover, he
argues that the local fishing practices in Finnmark meet the formal
Norwegian prerequisites for recognition as customary law.126
119. See Øyvind Ravna, Sami Rights and Sami Law in Norway, in THEPOLAR LAW TEXTBOOK
II 26989, 288 (Natalia Loukacheva ed. 2013).
120. Id. at 276.
121. Id. at 280 (discussing the Selbu case).
122. David Callies, Peter Orebech & Hanne Petersen, Case Studies: Hawaii, Norway and
Greenland, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43, 60
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). Under the open access doctrine, all local fishermen were afforded
equal access to ocean resources. Id.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Id. The Saami feel that the fishing quotas exclude local small-scale fishermen in favor
of large-scale commercial fishing, while the national government favors fishing quotas in order
to protect dwindling fish populations. Id. at 58.
125. See Callies et al., supra note 122, at 60.
126. (1) The longevity requirement is met because the open access approach to fisheries can
be proven to be at least over one hundred years old, (2) the non-interruption requirement is met
because the fishermenof Finnmark repeatedly confirm steadfast joint usage and have engaged
in open access practice annually without interruption, (3) the peaceable and free from dispute
requirement is met because local fishermen who were interviewed universally regarded the
ocean as open access, and (4) the reasonableness requirement is met because the practice would
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However, Norwegian courts have yet to recognize the Saami tradi-
tion of open access to fisheries as customary lawin fact, there has
been no notable jurisprudence on the subject.127 Moreover, the Nor-
wegian government has legislatively rejected the idea of special
Saami rights to the fisheries of Finnmark.128 In 2006, the Norwegian
government appointed a joint Saami-Norwegian Coastal Fishing
Commission (The Commission) to investigate the marine fisheries
rights of the Saami and other residents of Finnmark.129 In 2008, the
Commission unanimously drafted and proposed the Finnmark Fish-
ery Act, which stated that all inhabitants of the geographic area of
Finnmark, regardless of ethnicity, had equal rights to utilize the fish-
eries as well as priority over non-residents.130 Interestingly, section
thirteen of the Finnmark Fishery Act contained a reservation stating
that it did not infringe upon existing individual or collective prop-
erty rights to the sea established by custom or usage.131
However, the Norwegian government declined to enact the Finn-
mark Fishery Act.132 In 2009, the Fisheries Minister spurned the cen-
tral conclusion of the Commission by denying the existence of special
fishing rights for the people of Finnmark.133 In 2012, the Norwegian
Parliament officially struck down the proposed Act by a vote of 106 to
34.134 The government agreed to implement modest measures pro-
tecting Saami access to maritime resources but, unlike the Commis-
sion, rejected the idea of general customary rights to the fisheries.135
give fishinga stable and predictable framework. David Callies, Peter Orebech& Hanne Petersen,
The Case Studies Revisited, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT 411, 41720 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
127. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on Indige-
nous Fishing Rights in the Seas with Case Studies from Australia and Norway 18 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E.C.19.2010.2EN.pdf.
128. See supra, note 127 and infra notes 12930 and accompanying text.
129. Svein Jentoft, Governing Tenure in Norwegian and Sami Small-Scale Fisheries: From
Common Pool to Common Property?, 1 LAND TENURE JOURNAL 91, 100 (2013), available at http://
www.fao.org/nr/tenure/land-tenure-journal/index.php/LTJ/article/viewArticle/75.
130. Id. at 1012. The right of the people of Finnmark to use such fisheries was based on
historical use and the rules of international law on indigenous peoples as well as on a constitu-
tional duty to protect Saami culture. See Report on Indigenous Fishing Rights, supra note 127.
131. Camilla Brattland, Mapping Rights in Coastal Sami Seascapes, 1 ARCTIC REV. ON LAW
AND POL. 28, 35 (2010).
132. See Report on Indigenous Fishing Rights, supra note 127.
133. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 104.
134. See id. at 113.
135. See id. at 10304.
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The fate of customary law as a means of regulating Norwegian
fisheries is uncertain. The Norwegian government, like most govern-
ments, would clearly rather approach Finnmark fisheries law from
within the framework of state legislation and management than cre-
ate room forcustomary law.136 Even the Commission, which advocated
for recognition of the traditional rights of local Finnmark fishermen,
only discussed custom as a source of legal rights in one paragraph of
the sixteen-part proposed Act.137 Similarly, under the proposed Act,
those claiming private or collective rights to fishing grounds were to
direct claims to the Finnmark Commission138 rather than to a court.139
In sum, the Saami tradition of open access does not appear likely to
achieve political recognition as customary law as long as the govern-
ment continues to approach the issue through a state regulatory
framework. Meanwhile, the role of Saami customary law in Norwe-
gian courts remains undeveloped.140
Some Saami continue to work towards securing recognition of
traditional fishing rights through the political process.141 Others feel
that the Norwegian courts should recognize fishing rights as custom-
ary law,142 as advocated for by Peter Orebech.143 Alternatively, the UN
International Labour Organization and Tribal Peoples Convention
No. 169 and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
may provide an international law basis for recognition of customary
fishing rights.144
136. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 110.
137. The Commission was pushing towards a regionalized, co-management model of fish-
eries governance. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 108.
138. The Finnmark Commission is a government entity established in 1995 to resolve Saami
land rights issues. See Camilla Brattland, supra note 131, at 35.
139. Id.
140. To date, the use of Sámi customary law as a source of law in the courts is still in its
initial phase. It therefore remains difficult to draw robust conclusions on its ultimate legal sig-
nificance. Thus far, case law points to the fact that Sámi law has faced significant problems in
working harmoniously with Norwegian law. See Øyvind Ravna, supra note 119, at 288.
141. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 105.
142. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 106.
143. See supra, notes 12627 and accompanying text.
144. Norway is a party to ILO Convention No. 169. See Report on Indigenous Fishing Rights,
supra note 127. According to ILO Convention No. 169, Saami customs should have greater
weight than Norwegian law in Saami rights questions. See Camilla Brattland, supra note 131,
at 48. Despite international pressure to finalize the process of clarifying Sami land and re-
source rights[,] the Norwegian government regards its commitments as sufficiently fulfilled
by the measures agreed to in 2011. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 110.
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C. New Zealand
1. Background
On the other side of the worldin a situation somewhat similar
to that of the Saamithe indigenous Maori of New Zealand are also
fighting for recognition of their customary laws. Tikanga Maori, or the
Maori system of customary laws,145 is comprised of oral traditions,
rituals, and practices rather than codified statutes.146 Tikanga Maori
is rooted in core values that define right from wrong and underlay the
formal rules of traditional Maori society.147 The Maori relied on
tikanga Maori to inform decisions regarding leadership, social roles,
access to resources, and to define various other rights, relationships,
and practices.148
The Maori cite to a number of historic authorities in arguing that
tikanga Maori is recognized as law by New Zealand.149 First, the
common law doctrine of Aboriginal Rights theoretically allows Maori
customary law to be incorporated into the common law legal
system.150 Second, section II of the Treaty of Waitangi recognized
the protected status of Maori customary law through the promise of
tino rangatiratanga.151 By 1896, the Waitangi Tribunal interpreted
this clause to require preservation of all Maori valued customs
and possessions, a mandate which arguably extends protection to
tikanga Maori.152 Third, tikanga Maori has been acknowledged, at
145. Tikanga Maori and Maori customary law are terms (not necessarily interchangeable)
that embody the values, standards, principles, or norms that indigenous Maori had developed
to govern themselves. Linda Te Aho, Tikanga Maori, Historical Context, and the Interface with
Pakeha Law in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 10 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 10, 10 (2007).
146. Robert Joseph, Recreating Legal Space for the First Law of Aotearoa-New Zealand, 17
WAIKATO L. REV. 74, 83 (2009).
147. Id. Although the values differ from tribe to tribe, the core values include (1) the
importance of genealogy, (2) authority over who might exercise certain rights, (3) reciprocity,
(4) sacredness and secularity, and (5) stewardship. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 11.
148. Caren Fox, Access to Customary Law: New Zealand Issues, 1314 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 224,
228 (2011).
149. See Robert Joseph, supra note 146, at 7578.
150. The common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights recognizes the continuation of local native
law following British annexation. Elements of Aboriginal rights maintained were those not
repugnant to common law and which did not interfere with or challenge the new sovereign.
Id. at 75.
151. Tino rangatiratanga is translated into English as the full exclusive and undisturbed
possession of their . . . other properties. Id. at 76.
152. Id. at 75.
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least peripherally, by various statutes.153 Whether New Zealand will
actually interpret these authorities in a manner that awards sweep-
ing and formal legal status to tikanga Maori remains uncertain.154
Meanwhile, the common law of New Zealand has gradually con-
ferred limited legal status on Maori customs and usage. As early as
1847, New Zealand courts recognized the validity of native title to
land,155 although the seminal 1877 case of Wi Parata v. Bishop of
Wellington initially denied the existence of Maori customary law.156
The legal status of Maori custom was revived in 1901 when the Privy
Council recognized that Maori customary law could be used to prove
land tenure.157 Soon after, in 1908, Public Trustee v. Loasby held that
Maori customs could be raised at common law if a three-element test
was met.158 Realistically, because New Zealand operates under a com-
prehensive system of codified laws, the second element of the Loasby
test severely limits the application of tikanga Maori.159 Despite these
and other recognitionsofMaori rights in the common law, mainstream
courts generally disfavor recognition of these customs as law.160
Additionally, the New Zealand parliament has struggled with the
notion of customary law and has consistently legislated to nullify
the impact of any court decisions that it believes threatens its sov-
ereignty as the penultimate source of all law concerning Maori.161
The enactment of the 2004 Seabed Act provides an example of the
parliament proactively legislating to supersede Maori customary
rights recognized by courts.162 In Ngati Apa v. Attorney General, Maori
153. Id. at 64 (discussing the historic and contemporary statutes that recognize Maori
customary law).
154. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 229.
155. The case of R v. Symonds recognized native title to land. See Linda Te Aho, supra note
145, at 12.
156. Prendergast CJ found that the Maori had no settled system of law and that an Act
referring to the ancient custom of the Maori cannot call what is non-existent into being. See id.;
see also Robert Joseph, supra note 146 (discussing in detail judicial denial of Maori custom).
157. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 12.
158. (1) Whether the custom could be factually proven by experts, (2) whether the custom
was contrary to statute, and (3) whether the custom was reasonable from the judges per-
spective. Id.
159. Id. at 13.
160. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 228.
161. Id. at 237.
162. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 14 (summarizing the court decision in Ngati Apa
v. Attorney General and the subsequent Seabed Act 2004); see also R. P. Boast, Foreshore and
Seabed, Again, 9 NZJPIL 271 (2011) (discussing in detail the Seabed Act and the 2011 Marine
and Coastal Area Act that replaced it).
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customary rights to the foreshore and seabed were found to exist, to
have survived British sovereignty, and to have not been explicitly ex-
tinguishedby legislation.163 The parliament responded with the 2004
Seabed Act, which unambiguously extinguished the asserted Maori
customary rights.164
The Waitangi Tribunal and the Maori Land Court are two legal
institutions that currently attempt to integrate tikanga Maori into
their operations.165 The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to
hear claims asserted by Maori regarding violations of the principles
of the Treaty of Waitangi.166 The Waitangi Tribunal actively consid-
ers evidence of tikanga Maori when evaluating claims.167 It also allows
testimony in the Maori language, considers evidence of custom by
traditional witnesses,168 and brings together a mix of historical, legal,
and tikanga Maori experts who analyze early settler and official ac-
counts with oral history.169 Similarly, the Maori Land Court consid-
ers tikanga Maori when determining rights and interests in land170
and is experimenting with new procedures and policies to further
accommodate Maori values and practices.171
2. Customary Law in Sustainable Development
The role of tikanga Maori in the management of New Zealands
fisheries provides a perfect example of the importance that custom-
ary law can play in achieving goals of sustainable development, as ex-
plored by Valmaine Toki.172 The Maori world-view inseparably links
163. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 14.
164. Id.
165. These are the two legal systems most closely aligned to the revitalization of tikanga
Maori. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 231.
166. Id. at 231.
167. Id. at 233.
168. This policy appears similar to the concept of the kamaaina witnesses in Hawaii. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
169. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 232.
170. Maori Tikanga has been applied in relation to ascertaining rights and interests in land,
including hearing evidence ofMaori customary adoptions, Maori customary title, Maori succes-
sion practices, customary marriages, Maori genealogy, sacred sites, fishing grounds, and other
places of importance. Id. at 234.
171. These measures include involving traditional experts in the court, appointing judges
versed in tikanga Maori, and requiring judges to attend annual Maori language and educational
seminars. Id. at 235.
172. Valmaine Toki, Adopting a Maori Property Rights Approach to Fisheries, 14 N.Z. J.
ENVTL. L. 197 (2010).
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humans and the natural environment in a unified cosmic order.173
Therefore, many aspects of tikanga Maori emphasize the sustainable
management of resources.174 Under tikanga Maori, fisheries were
collectively utilized, but access and use was regulated in order to
protect the resource itself and to ensure its availability for future
generations.175
In 1986, New Zealand enacted the Fisheries Amendment Act,
which introduced a fishing quota in order to protect dwindling fish
populations.176 The Maori appealed the Fisheries Amendment Act
to the Waitangi Tribunal and the courts, arguing that it violated their
customary fishing rights.177 The Waitangi Tribunal issued two re-
ports that recognized that customary Maori fishing rights had a com-
mercial component and that such rights were capable of evolving as
recognized commercial rights in fishing.178 The Waitangi Tribunal
further stated that the fishing quota had violated Maori customary
rights and interfered with the Maori right to develop the fishery
resource.179 New Zealand courts adopted the findings of the Waitangi
Tribunal.180 In 1992, the Crown and the Maori entered into a settle-
ment agreement that established both Maori commercial fishing
rights and customary gathering rights.181
The Maori Fisheries Act was passed in 2004 to allocate commercial
fishery assets to the Maori.182 Each Maori tribe received shares in a
Maori-owned fisheries company, cash, and fishing quotas.183 Essen-
tially, Maori customary rights to fisheries were converted into private
property rights under Maori control.184 Maori tribes and organiza-
tions, now endowed with commercial interests, are attempting to de-
velop organizational models that can balance financial objectives with
173. Id. at 200.
174. Id.; see also Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 11.
175. See Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 200.
176. This quota created a transferable private property right in commercial fish species.
Id. at 206.
177. Id. at 207.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 208 (discussing the settlement terms).
182. Id. at 207.
183. The Maori company, Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, in turn, was granted partial or full
ownership in a number of other large fishing and processing companies. Id. at 209.
184. Id.
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customary values and sustainable outcomes.185 The Maori Fisheries
Act mandated that Maori organizations receiving assets have paral-
lel commercial and traditional structures and prohibited transfer of
assets away from the tribe.186 The Maori Fisheries Act also codified
the protected status of Maori customary fishing and gathering.187
New Zealands recognition of Maori customary rights to fisheries
and the subsequent transfer of commercial assets to Maori organiza-
tions represent an interesting blend of traditional and modern con-
siderations. This synthesis of customary and corporate values and
organizations may provide a new framework for the sustainable
development of resources.188
D. South Africa
Large segments of the South African population continue to live
under customary law,189 which is derived from oral tradition and
emphasizes familial and communal values over individualism.190 The
goal of customary law is reconciliation between parties in conflict, and
to that end, the law is non-specialized, often blending criminal and
civil type cases.191 Customary law was comprehensive before coloni-
zation but increasingly concerns only tort offense and family law.192
Customary practices become customary laws in one of two ways
in South Africa. First, some traditional courts look to living custom-
ary law.193 Living customary law is derived from actual practices and
usage in the community.194 In this framework, customs and values are
dynamic and are given the force of law because they are the true
185. See Linda Te Aho, Corporate Governance: Balancing Tikanga Maori with Commercial
Objectives, 8 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 300 (2005) (discussing the role of tikanga Maori in Maori corpo-
rations); see also Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 210.
186. See Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 212.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africas Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the
Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 63, 70 (2003).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Craig Bosch & Chuma Himonga, The Application of African Customary Law Under the
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?, 117 S. AFRICAN L.J. 306,
338 (2000).
194. Id. at 319.
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source of authority and organization in a community.195 Scholars and
activists often advocate for living customary law because it adapts
to changing conditions, thus eliminating outdated practices and stay-
ing relevant.196 This conception of custom as law is criticized because
it is inherently flexible and inconsistent, as there is no requirement
that the practice be ancient.197 Accordingly, common law courts in the
country, which favor customs that are certain and readily ascertain-
able, will not usually apply living customary law.198
Rather, South African common law courts apply what regional
academics refer to as official customary law.199 Official customary
law is determined by reference to customary practices that have been
codified in court cases, secondary sources, anthropological reports,
and government studies.200 Critics feel that official customary law is
Westernized, stagnant, and undemocratic.201 However, official custom-
ary law is clearly favored by government authorities, as it is readily
ascertainable and more in line with legal positivism.202
1. Treatment of Customary Law in Colonial South Africa
Colonial governments in the geographic area that is now South
Africa often had difficulties with traditional customary law.203 Colo-
nial authorities sometimes recognized the right of traditional lead-
ers to apply customary law yet at other times forced European legal
systems onto indigenous populations.204 When the British and Dutch
settlers of the region did recognize local customs as law, it was for
pragmatic reasons, as the settlers believed both that recognition was
necessary to keep native populations complacent and that European
law was too sophisticated to be applied to indigenous cultures.205
South Africa was unified into a single nation in 1910. In 1927, South
Africa solidified and defined the position of traditional customary
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 325.
198. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 73.
199. Id. at 72.
200. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 329.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 307.
204. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 66.
205. Id.
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law with the passage of the Black Administration Act.206 The Black
Administration Act applied only to native Africans, and was designed
to be comprehensive in reach, regulating administrative, judicial, and
substantive matters such as the appointment of chiefs, establish-
ment of courts and jurisdiction, legal status, land tenure, marriages,
and succession.207 It created a parallel system of traditional courts
that were authorized to apply customary law,208 which was comprised
of Chiefs and Headsmans Courts, with appeals heard by Native
Commissioner Courts.209 The traditional courts only had jurisdiction
in cases in which both parties were black and in civil and minor crim-
inal cases.210 The application of customary law was severely limited
by the requirement that customary law could not be repugnant to
principles of public policy or natural justice.211
In 1988 South Africa passed the Evidence Amendment Act,212 which
obligated all courts in South Africa to recognize customary laws
when applicable[,] even if a party was not black.213 The application
of customary law was made subject to two conditions: (1) it had to be
proven with reasonable certainty, and (2) it could not be repugnant to
principles of public policy or natural justice.214 The Evidence Amend-
ment Act reinforced the legal basis for indigenous custom as law.215
However, the inclusion of the repugnancy clause ensured that custom-
ary law was relegated to a subordinate position.216
206. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307.
207. Sanele Sibanda, When is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law Under
South Africas Constitutional Dispensation, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 17 (2010).
208. Chuma Himonga & Rashid Manjoo, The Challenges of Formalisation, Regulation, and
Reform of Traditional Courts in South Africa, 3 MALAWI L.J. 157, 161 (2009).
209. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307.
210. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71.
211. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 308. The Public Policy to which the courts would refer
was an embodiment of the sentiments of the small, dominant, white population of South
Africa. Id.
212. The Evidence Amendment Act states in relevant part:
(1) Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indig-
enous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient
certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of
public policy or natural justice: Provided further that it shall not be lawful for
any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar custom
is repugnant to such principles.
See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 308.
215. Id. at 307.
216. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 67.
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In sum, during colonial and apartheid South Africa, customary
law enjoyed official status. However, the jurisdiction of traditional
courts applying customary laws was limited to cases in which cus-
tomary law was applicable.217 In practice, customary law was usu-
ally applied in family- and tort-type cases and was restricted from
regulating important areas of law such as land title or succession.218
Additionally, the repugnancy requirements of the Black Administra-
tion Act and the Evidence Amendment Act prevented the application
of customary law in areas where it conflicted with common law. For
example, in the 1983 case of Ismail v. Ismail, a South African court
struck down a traditional polygamous marriage performed under
customary law as being against public policy.219 Customary law and
the traditional court system were arguably used as instrument[s]
for entrenching a uniform system of indirect rule in South Africa,
whereby traditional leaders became state agents in administering
the affairs over whom they were appointed to rule.220
2. Legal Bases in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa
With the fall of apartheid in South Africa, the crafters of the new
government agreed to strengthen the statusof customary law in South
Africa.221 The Interim Constitution of 1993 gave relatively wide rec-
ognition to customary law and its institutions, thus ensuring a dis-
tinct elevation in its status in the national legal system.222
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
(Constitution) further formalized the position of customary law.223
The Constitutions Chapter Twelve on Traditional Leaders implicitly
and explicitly provides a legal basis for customary law in numerous
sections.224 First, sections fifteen, thirty, thirty-one, and thirty-two
collectively provide for a right to culture.225 The right to culture
217. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307.
218. T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell, Restoring Land: The Claims of Aboriginal Title, Customary
Law, and the Right to Culture, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 431, 440 (2005).
219. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 308.
220. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 32.
221. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68.
222. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 309 (discussing the provisions of the Interim Constitution
in great detail).
223. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68.
224. Id.
225. Section 31, for example, provides that [e]very person shall have the right to use the
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arguably includes the right to live by culturally based customary
laws, because culture is often defined to include legal systems.226
Second, sections 211(1) and (2) recognize the institution, status, and
role of traditional leadership, according to customary law[,]227 and
allow traditional leadership to govern locally, subject to custom and
legislation.228 Third, section 212 calls for future legislation to em-
power traditional leaders to deal with customary law and the cus-
toms of communities observing a system of customary law.229 Fourth,
customary law and common law are mentioned as equals in Section
39(2) and (3).230 In particular, section 39(3) allows for people to raise
claims of rights conferred by customary law, although it does not
grant an affirmative right to customary law.231 Fifth, and most signif-
icantly, section 211(3) explicitly mandates that the courts must apply
customary law when that law isapplicable, subject to the Constitution
and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.232 This
mandatory duty imposed by section 211(3) distinguishes it from sim-
ilar language in the Black Administration Act, which left the appli-
cation of customary law to the courts discretion.233
However, the potential application of customary law under the
Constitution is limited by several clauses. For example, section 211(3)
provides for the mandatory application of customary law only when
applicable.234 In many situations it is not clear whether customary
or common law should apply, and there are few existing authoritative
language and to participate in the culture of his or her choice. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 310;
see also Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68.
226. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 310.
227. Id. at 313.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
In terms of s 39(2): When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Whereas in terms of s 39(3): The
Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent
that they are consistent with the Bill.
Id. at 313 n.4. (emphasis in original).
231. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68.
232. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 313.
233. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68 n.28.
234. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 314.
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guidelines.235 Likewise, section 211(3) provides that customary law is
applied subject to the Constitution, which includes the Bill of Rights.
Proponents of customary law fear that aspects of customary law that
run counter to principles of equality in the Bill of Rights may be
struck entirely.236 Such proponents advocate instead for the courts
to develop customary laws until they are in line with the spirit of
the Bill of Rights.237 Similarly, Schedule 6, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion holds that all legislation adopted prior to the Constitution re-
mains in force until repealed.238 Thus, the repugnancy clause of the
Evidence Amendment Act of 1988 may survive and further limit the
application of customary law.239 Finally, there is no explicitly stated af-
firmative right to be governed bycustomary law in the Constitution.240
3. Substantive Developments Since 1996
Despite its ambiguities, the Constitution has reinvigorated the
standing of customary law in South Africa by forming the legal basis
for contemporary developments and reforms of customary law.241
However, the status of customary law, and the form that it should
take, are still the subject of debate.242
South African Courts have struggled to apply customary law in a
manner that is consistent with the Bill of Rights. The three cases
discussed below demonstrate the complex legal landscape that courts
must navigate when applying customary laws while at the same time
attempting to upholdconstitutionally protectedgenderequality rights.
The 1997 case of Mthembu v. Letsela considered the viability of
the practice of primogeniture243 as customary law.244 The plaintiff was
a widow with one daughter, while the defendant was the father of the
235. Id.
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id.
238. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 32.
242. Id. at 34.
243. The customarypractice male primogeniture mandates that the eldest male descendant
inherits property to the exclusion of female relatives and younger male relatives in exchange
for the obligation to provide for dependents. Id. at 33.
244. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 332.
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plaintiffs deceased husband. The plaintiff had married her husband
under customary law and did not dispute that customary rules of suc-
cession applied. However, the plaintiff argued that under the new
Constitution the rule of primogeniture was gender discriminatory.245
Accordingly, the plaintiff asked the Court to modify the customary
law in order to allow her daughter, as the deceaseds sole heir, to in-
herit the property.246 The High Court, after considering evidence of
customary practices in the form of archives and testimony from expert
witnesses, determined that primogeniture was not gender discrimina-
tory, because it required the male inheritor to provide for any widows
and female descendants of the deceased.247 The Court thus upheld
primogeniture as customary law and applied the law accordingly.This
decision was superseded by the decision of the Constitutional Court
in Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha and the RCSA of 2009.248
In 1997, a South African court considered the case of Mabena v.
Letsoalo.249 Mabena involved a dispute between a widows family
and the deceased husbands family over the validity of the customary
law marriage between the couple.250 The husbands family argued
that the customary marriage was invalid because the mother of the
bride had negotiated it, while traditionally the father performed such
marriage negotiations.251 The court noted that males traditionally
arranged customary marriages, according to official records on cus-
tomary law.252 However, the court also considered evidence that in
contemporary culture the custom had shifted to allow women to per-
form marriages.253 The court upheld the validity of the marriage, thus
modifying the customary law of marriage to comport with the Con-
stitution and shifting community practices.254
The Constitutional Court recentlymodified the customary marriage
practice of polygamy in the 2013 case of Mayelane v. Ngwenyama
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 179; see also infra notes 26769 and accompanying text.
249. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 335.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 336.
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and the Minister for Home Affairs.255 The court invalidated a mans
marriage to a second wife based on the finding that his first wife did
not consent to the second marriage.256 In doing so, the court held
that the first wifes consent was necessary for a valid polygamous
marriage.257 The court considered this the best compromise in order
to bring the customary law of polygamous marriage in line with the
requirement of gender equality in the Reform of Customary Mar-
riages Act and the Bill of Rights.258
Additionally, in the decades since the end of Apartheid and the
passing of the Constitution, the South African legislature has con-
sidered, and sometimes passed, a number of bills specifically relating
to customary law.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 (RCMA)
extends official State recognition to traditional marriages performed
under customary law.259 The RCMA created a system of registration
for customary marriages, including polygamous marriages, and ap-
plies to marriages entered into before and after passage of the Act.260
The legislature brought the customary laws regarding traditional
marriage in line with the Bill of Rights by making women equal
partners in marriage and mandating that ownership of property be
shared.261 However, critics point out that beyond idiosyncratic tin-
kering to accommodate polygyny . . . there is now little substantive
or procedural difference from the common law when it comes to
customary marriage.262
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of
2003 (TLGFA) lays out the powers and responsibilities of tradi-
tional leaders.263 The TLGFA aims to restore the legitimacy of tradi-
tional leaders, stating that they should be appointed according to
255. Chuma Himonga, Mayelane v. Ngwenyama andMinister for Home Affairs: A Reflection
on Wider Implications, CUSTOM CONTESTED (Jan. 25, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.custom
contested.co.za/mayelane-v-ngwenyama-and-minister-for-home-affairs-a-reflection-on-wider
-implications/.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 33.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 162.
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customary practices and should work to clarify and develop customary
law.264 The TLGFA attempts to bring traditional leaders in line with
the Constitution by requiring genderequality and a one-third presence
of women in traditional councils.265
The customary succession practice of male primogeniture, under
which the eldest male descendant inherits property to the exclusion
of female relatives and younger male relatives in exchange for the
obligation to provide for dependents, was declared unconstitutional
in the 2007 Constitutional Court case of Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha
and Others.266 The Reform of Customary Law of Succession Act and
Regulation of Related Matters Act of 2009 (RCSA) codified the Bhe
courts finding and statutorily overrode customary law by requiring
that female and younger male relatives inherit their fair share.267 It
is argued that succession under customary law now mirrors its com-
mon law counterpart.268
The South African legislature has struggled to pass a bill that
would redefine the role of traditional courts269 applying customary
law.270 The South African Law Reform Commission (The Commis-
sion) began investigating the role of customary law and traditional
courts in 1996. The Commission did extensive research, consultations,
and studies on how best to reform traditional courts and in 2003 sub-
mitted a report and draft bill to the South African Department of Jus-
tice. In 2005, the Legislature repealed the Black Amendment Act but
temporarily extended provisions regulating traditional courts until
replacement legislation was passed.271 The Department ofJustice did
not introduce the Commissions draft bill to the Legislature and in-
stead began its own review and drafting process in 2006.272 In 2008,
264. B. Mmusinyane, The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws
in Accordance With the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa, POTCHEFSTROOMSE
ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD 161 (2009), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2009
/15.html.
265. Id.
266. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 33.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. As discussed above, traditional courts were established by the Black Administration Act
of 1927 and are viewed by many as having been used as a tool of oppression. See Sibanda, supra
note 207, at 162; see also Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71.
270. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 163.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 166.
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the Department of Justices Traditional Courts Bill was introduced
into the legislature, in which it generated enormous and divisive
controversy.273 The Traditional Courts Bill failed to pass in 2009 and
again floundered upon its reintroduction in 2011.274 To date, the
legislature has not passed the Traditional Courts Bill.275
The Legislatures difficulty with the Traditional Courts Bill high-
lights contemporary debates on the role of customary law in South
Africa.276 Almost all sides in the dispute agree that the Constitution
recognizes traditional justice systems and customary laws. There is
also a general consensus that the State should support customary
law systems and work to bring customary laws in line with the
Constitution.277
The devil is in the details. For example, stakeholders disagree
about whether individuals should be able to opt out of the customary
law system.278 Likewise, they disagree on whether appeals from deci-
sions of the traditional justice system should go to higher traditional
courts or directly to common law courts.279 The degree of female par-
ticipation that should be required in traditional courts is at issue.280
Whether legally trained attorneys or traditional individuals should
staff courts is also a point of contention.281 Additionally, some see the
Traditional Courts Bill as an attempt to put the indigenous population
under the control of broadly empowered traditional leaders.282
E. Greenland
Native populations do not always seek to elevate their traditional
customs to formal law. For example, in Greenland, customary law has
273. Id. at 166.
274. Traditional Courts Bill (TCB), CUSTOM CONTESTED (July 18, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www
.customcontested.co.za/laws-and-policies/traditional-courts-bill-tcb/.
275. Id.
276. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 163.
277. Id. at 166.
278. Id. at 167.
279. Id. at 167.
280. Id. at 167. The current wording of the Traditional Courts Bill ensures that women may
participate in court but does not ensure that they will be decision makers. Id. at 172.
281. Id. at 172. Currently, in traditional courts lawyers are barred, and the traditional leaders
cross examine witnesses themselves. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71.
282. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 34.
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been largely abandoned even though the ruling government is almost
entirely composed of indigenous persons. Much like in South Africa,
the situation in Greenland provides a good example of the complex re-
lationship between customary practices and modern realities among
some indigenous populations.
In the first part of the twentieth century, customs largely defined
life in Greenland.283 In particular, hunting was closely linked with the
customary way of living.284 As Greenland has developed, customary
ways of living have been replaced by more modern lifestyles, espe-
cially in the most populous parts of the island.285 Although Greenland
has a large indigenous population and has been under indigenous
home rule since 1979,286 the government of Greenland has neglected
to implement custom as a source of law.287 Custom has not been in-
tegrated into law due to foreign elements in the central government,
the strongly local nature of customs, apathy towards customary life
among young Greenlanders and women, and the fact that the govern-
ment has no need to rely on customs in order to achieve legitimacy.288
In particular, the transformation from hunting-based lifestyles to a
modern society has revolutionized gender roles, which has had a neg-
ative effect on the continued viability of certain gender-based customs.
However, some Greenlandic customs survive as myths and watered-
down traditions that have become integrated into modern ways
283. Custom largely determined ways of living within extended families, organization in
communal activities such as hunting and sharing food, and defining gender roles. See Callies
et al., supra note 122, at 72.
284. Greenlanders hunted seals, whales, and caribou. Hunting was seen as a means of
survival, an important public activity, a cohesive way of structuring the community, and a source
of identity. See Callies et al., supra note 122, at 7072.
285. Under Danish rule, a social democratic, modernized, industrial way of life was intro-
duced as a political, economic, and legal model. See Callies et al., supra note 122, at 66.
286. Until 1953 Greenland was a Danish colony. From 1953 to 1957 Greenland was an equal
part of the Danish realm. From 1979 to 2009 Greenland had home rule, under which a Green-
landic parliament and government were established while judiciary remained Danish. See
Callies et al., supra note 122, at 66.
287. The Greenland government has adopted a Danish legal system because it is heavily
dependent on imported academic staff from Denmark and looks to outside models of governance
for guidance. See Callies et al., supra note 122, at 67.
288. See Callies et al., supra note 122, at 6869. Especially in the early years of home rule,
the mere fact that representatives were Greenlandic, endowed them with a strong legitimacy,
which probably did not need a strong underpinning through explicit and formal consideration
of customs in home rules regulations. Id.
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of living.289 Greenlandic customs often emphasize dependence on
nature and sustainable practices.290 Curiously though, Greenlanders
do not necessarily regard customary practices as superior in achiev-
ing sustainability.291
In 2009, Greenland achieved Self-Rule, which replaced Home
Rule.292 The Self-Rule Act granted Greenland expanded power to ex-
ercise executive, legislative,and judicial power in a number of fields.293
The Act also established procedures for the eventual independence
of Greenland.294 The expanded autonomy under Self-Rule, especially
in the area of the courts, may allow for greater integration of custom-
ary law into Greenland governance.295
For example, customary law may play a role in the future of the
Greenland judiciary. Greenland utilizes a Danish-style justice system
and has not yet created a separate indigenous legal system.296 How-
ever, local customs play an informal role in the justice system.297
Under the judicial system created in 1956, Danish-style laws are ad-
ministered, but lay assessorsand lay judges administer local courts.298
These lay judges informally incorporate customary laws into the
judicial system by taking traditional ways of thinking into consider-
ation when rendering discretionary decisions.299 As of 2010, the courts
remained under the control of Denmark but, under the provisions
289. See Callies et al., supra note 126, at 424.
290. See Callies et al., supra note 126, at 424.
291. In fact, many customary practices, such as hunting, may conflict with environmental
regulations and a Western idea of sustainability, although such hunting practices were tradi-
tionally sustainable. See Callies et al., supra note 126, at 427.
292. This Act was passed by the Danish parliament following two Self-Rule Commissions
and a referendum in Greenland. Mininnguaq Kleist, Greenlands Self-Governance, in THE POLAR
LAW TEXTBOOK I 171, 171 (Natalia Loukacheva ed. 2010).
293. THEGREENLAND SELF-GOVERNMENTARRANGEMENT,STATMINISTERIET, http://www.stm
.dk/_a_2957.html (last visited June 1, 2015).
294. Id.
295. However, some academics doubt that true Inuit self-governance, in terms of customary
law, can ever occur under the framework of a foreign, Western-style government. See NATALIA
LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE: LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND
NUNAVUT 64 (Univ. of Toronto Press Inc. 2007).
296. Id. at 79. The Inuit possessed a legal framework that depended on myths, elders,
shamans, traditional ceremonies, and self-restraint to maintain order. Id. at 85.
297. Id. at 91.
298. Lay assessors and lay judges have limited legal training but are recruited from the local
population and speak Greenlandic. Id.
299. Id.
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of the Self-Rule Act, will eventually be transferred to Greenland,300 a
transition that some academics hope will allow for greater incorpo-
ration of Inuit customary law into the court systems.301
The state of customary law in Greenland provides an interesting
contrast to the other nations discussed in this section. Although
Greenlands government is comprised of an Inuit majority that is
sensitive to Inuit concerns and working towards autonomy,302 native
traditions, structures, and values continue to play a minimal role in
the governance of Greenland.303 Clearly there is a complex interplay
between native customary law, formal Western-style government,
and indigenous populations.
III. THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOM IN U.S. TAKINGS LAW:
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES SAFE HAVEN FOR GOVERNMENT IN
TOTAL REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Lucas and Background Principles
The most significant and far-reaching effect of customary law in
the United States exists in the context of land use. In the 1992 case
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,304 the United States
Supreme Court created its now famous categorical rule for regula-
tory takings. Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the rule requires the government to provide just com-
pensation whenever it denies a property owner all economically ben-
eficial use of land.305 Neither the purposes behind the denial nor the
circumstances under which the land is acquired can diminish the gov-
ernments liability.306
The Lucas Court did, however, establish two exceptions to the
otherwise inflexible categorical rule, declaring that the rule does not
apply if, first, the challenged regulation prevents a nuisance or, sec-
ond, the regulation is grounded in a states background principles of
300. See Mininnguaq Kleist, supra note 292, at 184.
301. See NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, supra note 295, at 79.
302. Id. at 64.
303. Id. at 65.
304. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
305. Id. at 1019.
306. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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property law.307 Because the law of nuisance is full and comprehensive
as well as comprehensible, the first exception presents little diffi-
culty.308 Leaving nothing to chance, the Lucas Court explained that
the nuisance exception would allow the government to prohibit the
construction of a power plant on an earthquake fault line or the fill-
ing of a lake-bed that was likely to result in flood damage to a neigh-
bor without incurring takings liability.309 By contrast, the Court was
silent with respect to the meaning of the second exception of back-
ground principles of state property law.310
A major and often unexplored question in takings law is the extent
of the background principles exception. The subject is important for
two distinct reasons. First, it is not always easy to discern what com-
prises such background principles. Second, once defined, the princi-
ples can, when subject to expansive interpretation, seriously erode
the basic Lucas doctrine meant to provide compensation for regula-
tory takings that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use
of land. A related issue is the extent to which background principles
analysis overlaps with the continuing discussion of the role of invest-
ment-backed expectations in Lucas situations (there should be none)
and the so-called notice rule arguably raised by pre-existing state
statutes in either total (Lucas) or partial (Penn Central Transporta-
tion) taking analyses.
Although Lucas failed to provide explicit guidance concerning the
definition of the background principles exception, it noted that
restrictions premised upon such principles inhere in landowners
307. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 102032.
308. See, e.g., M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
coal company had no right to conduct nuisance-like activities while surface mining in West
Virginia); Aztec Minerals Corp. v.Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holdingthe same
under Colorado nuisance law); see also Colo. Dept of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo.
1994) (en banc) (holding that federal statutes restricting the disposition of uranium mine tail-
ings fell within the background principles exception so as to deny a landowner use of a sixty-
one acre parcel, even though the applicable statutes were enacted after the landowner acquired
the property). For a collection of recent exemption cases (and a summary of takings law gen-
erally), see ROBERTMELTZ ET AL.,THETAKINGSISSUE16795 (1999); David L. Callies, Regulatory
Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from
Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON
L. REV. 523 (1999).
309. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
310. Id. at 102930.
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title itself.311 On the basis of this statement, governments312 and
commentators313 have turned to state common law property doctrines
to identify underlying title limitations and, thus, background princi-
ples. From this scrutiny, it is now clear that at least three sources of
state property restrictions may qualify as background principles
within the meaning of Lucas: statutory law existing prior to the ac-
quisition of land,314 custom,315 and public trust.
B. The Oregon Cases on Custom
Several courts in the United States have declared public rights or
rights of a huge class of strangers to cross private land based ex-
clusively on some version of customary law. Perhaps the most fa-
mous of these is State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,316 in which plaintiffs
sought to prevent the Hays from constructing improvements on the
dry-sand beach portion of their lot between the high water line and the
upland vegetation line. Rejecting the proffered bases of prescriptive
rights and easements, the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs sua
311. Id. at 1029.
312. See Michael M. Berger, Inverse Condemnation and Related Governmental Liability,
ALI-ABA Course of Study, Annual Update on Inverse Condemnation 11, 35 (Oct. 1996) (noting
that [s]ince Lucas, government agencies have been combing their archives in search of arcane
matters that might be said to have been part of a property owners title and that severely
restricts the use of land).
313. See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands
and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the public trust
is a background principle that allows regulation of barrier beaches without just compensa-
tion); Katherine E. Stone, Sand Rights: A Legal System to Protect the Shores of the Sea, 29
STETSON L. REV. 709 (2000) (arguing that the public trust doctrine can be expanded to restrict
development on non-trust lands for the purposes of preserving public beaches without trig-
gering a taking).
314. See generally R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory
Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001) (discussing the role of pre-existing statutes
in regulatory takings analysis).
315. See David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrections of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM.L.REV. 1375 (1996); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background
Principles of State Property Law?, 30 ENVTL.L.REP. 10003 (2000); Paul M. Sullivan, Customary
Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawaii, 20 U. HAW. L. REV.
99 (1999) (discussing the analysis of custom, including its application to takings).
316. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
2015] BEYOND BLACKSTONE 193
sponte, extending customary rights to virtually the entire population
of Oregon along its entire coastline:
Because many elements of prescription are present in this case,
the state has relied upon the doctrine in support of the decree
below. We believe, however, that there is a better legal basis for
affirming the decree. The most cogent basis for the decision in this
case is the English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, pre-
scription applies only to the specific tract of land before the court,
and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with
tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom,on the other hand,
can be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands
from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to be
treated uniformly.317
Lest the reach of custom be misunderstood in a per se, total regulatory
takings context under Lucas, the same court in Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach318 responded to a takings claim over the refusal of local
government to grant a seawall permit on customary rights interfer-
ence grounds and held that the customary law of Oregon preventing
such construction was a background principle of state property law
and therefore an exception to the categorical totals taking rule when
a property owner was left with no economically beneficial use of
his land.
CONCLUSION
Custom is rising Phoenix-like from the ashes of Blackstones
limitations on the English common law that forms the basis of com-
mon law in the United States. It arises both from renewed interest in
the rights of Native Americans and from the background principles
of state property law exception to the doctrine of regulatory taking.
In the first, custom can provide a means for guaranteeing certain
rights of native peoples in lands owned (technically held in fee simple)
by others. The argument that a true customary right survives trans-
fer from one owner to another is strong, although, as the cases in the
foregoing sections demonstrate, custom is always subject to control
and destruction by legislative act. The growing recognition of native
317. Id. at 676.
318. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
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customary rights has assumed global proportions. However, as the
above international case studies demonstrate, it can be difficult to
integrate systems built around indigenous customary laws into mod-
ern statutory schemes.
In the second, custom can provide a basis for a local, state, or federal
land use regulation that will survive constitutional challenge as a tak-
ing of property without compensation even if it leaves a landowner
with no economically beneficial use of the land. Akin to its twin nui-
sance exception, such a background principle of a states law of prop-
erty is not a part of the landowners bundle of ownership sticks to
begin with, so that its taking by regulationlike the perpetration of
a nuisanceis not protected by the Constitutions Fifth Amendment.
Property rights, however, and particularly private property rights,
are hedged with restrictions governing rights in the land of another
such as easements, profits, licenses, and covenants. One with no right
to enter the land of another is a trespasser, as is demonstrated by
a majority of land cases. This right to exclude is a critical part of
American jurisprudence with respect to private property rights. As
the American Law Institute noted in its Restatement of the Law of
Property:
A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has a physical
relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree of phys-
ical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such con-
trol as to exclude other members of society in general from any
present occupation of the land.319
Another commentator describes the notion of exclusive possession
as implicit in the basic conception of private property.320 The Su-
preme Court has many times made the same point. Thus, in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States321:
In this case, we hold that the right to exclude, so universally held
to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within
thiscategory of interests that the Governmentcannot take without
compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is
319. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936).
320. RICHARDA.EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:PRIVATEPROPERTY ANDTHEPOWER OFEMINENTDOMAIN
63 (1985).
321. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an
insubstantial devaluation of petitioners private property; rather,
the imposition of the . . . servitude . . . will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina. And even if the
Government physically invades only an easement in the property,
it must nonetheless pay just compensation.322
Again, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.323:
Moreover, an owner suffer aspecial kind of injury when a stranger
directly invades and occupies the owners property. As [another
part of the opinion] indicates, property law has long protected an
owners expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least
in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the
owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally
adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is quali-
tatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even
a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since
the owner may have no control over the timing, extent or nature
of the invasion.324
Indeed, the right to exclude has achieved international status with
the 1999 opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in Case of
Chassagnou and Others v. France.325 Before the Court was the French
Loi Verdeille326 which provides for the statutory pooling of hunting
grounds. The effect on the plaintiffs (three farmers) was to force them
to become members of a municipal hunters association and to trans-
fer hunting rights to the association, with the result that all mem-
bers of the association may enter their property for the purpose of
hunting.327 The government of France claimed that the interference
with the applicants property rights was minor since they had not been
deprived of the right to use their property, and all they lost was the
right to prevent other people from hunting on their land.
However, the Court found that while it was undoubtedly in the
general interest to avoid unregulated hunting and encourage the
322. Id. at 17980 (citations omitted).
323. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
324. Id. at 436 (citations omitted; emphasis included).
325. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1999)
326. Law No. 64-696 of July 10, 1964.
327. Chassagnou, 3 Eur. Ct. HR. 23, ¶ 13.
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traditional management of game stocks,328 (clearly the purpose of
the Loi Verdeille), the interference with the applicants fundamental
right to peaceful enjoyment of their land was disproportionate:
[N]otwithstanding the legitimate aims of the Loi Verdeille when
it was adopted, the Court place the applicants in a situation which
upsets the fairbalance to be struck between protection of the right
of property and the requirements of the general interest. Com-
pelling small landowners to transfer hunting rightsover their land
so that others can make use of them in a way which is totally in-
compatible with their beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden
which is not justified.329
Such obvious intrusions on private propertyin particular the well-
documented right to exclude needsmust comply with certain re-
strictions and criteria common to the concept of custom. Blackstone
provides such criteria not only as a matter of reason but also as a
matter of law because he is almost always cited in the reported Amer-
ican cases on custom and customary law.
As the discussion in section IV of this Article demonstrates,
American courts usually get it wrong. Of the seven criteria set out in
the Commentaries, the most critical appear to be certainty, reason-
ableness, and continuity. Contrary to the language in the Thornton
case from Oregon, reasonableness is not a matter of present use but
of original legal unfairness at its inception. Customs that unduly bur-
den property rights of the landowner or which favor unduly one group
or person over others are unreasonable. If a custom is reasonable in
these terms at its inception, then it is reasonable. Thus the courts
statement that reasonableness is satisfied by evidence that the
public has always made use of the land in a manner appropriate to
the land and to the usages of the community330 is beside the point
and wrong.
The Blackstonian criterion of certainty goes to the clarity of the
customary practice or right, the restrictive certainty as to locale (some
legally recognized division like a county, a city, a town, or a village),
and certainty as to a class of persons or section of the public. The
328. Id. ¶ 79.
329. Id. ¶ 85.
330. 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969).
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Thornton courts statement that certainty is satisfied by the visible
boundaries of the dry sand area and by the character of the land,
which limits the use thereof to recreation uses connected with the
foreshore331 is vague as to the first requirement, far too broad with
respect to the second, and altogether fails to deal with the third.
As to continuity, the court says that a customary right need not
be exercised continuously, but it must be exercised without an inter-
ruption caused by anyone possessing a paramount right.332 True for
the first part, false for the second part. As Blackstone (and the cases)
make abundantly clear, it is the right of use which must be continu-
ous. The use itself goes to evidence of that continuity of right, but
the use itself is otherwise irrelevant.
To sum up, American courts cite (appropriately) Blackstone when
finding custom as a basis for permitting what would otherwise be a
trespass on private land. Unfortunately, they usually get it so wrong
that the basis in custom must certainly fail. Without another basis
for justifying such invasive intrusions on private property, those
exercising such rights are trespassing, and governments that permit
(or require) such trespass are taking private property without com-
pensation contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
Custom is amorphously defined somewhat differently when refer-
ring to customary practices of native and/or indigenous people. Na-
tive customs are usually defined as a usage or practice over time that
is universally recognized as a rule governing behavior by most if not
all people affected by it. Some add that the custom responds to spe-
cific societal needs over time. Others, like the expert and commenta-
tor Peter Orebech, would argue that the practice needs to be public,
justified, reasonable, and morally well founded.333 In Hawaii such
indigenous customs have been recognized as a defense to trespass,
although they are subject to certain criteria and limitations.
It is clear that the proper role and scope of custom as a source of
law will continue to be an important and controversial topic both in
the United States and abroad well into the twenty-first century.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Peter Orebech, How Custom Becomes Law in Norway, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY
DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 224, 23340 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
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Forrest McDonald remarkedthatthe adoption of the contract clause
at the constitutional convention is shrouded in mystery.1 To unravel
this mystery, one must start by considering the economic changes
experienced by the American colonies during the eighteenth century.
As the colonies grew and became more prosperous, they gradually
rejected the doctrine of mercantilism inherited from Great Britain,
with its emphasis upon governmental controls, in favor of an emerg-
ing market economy. Wage and price regulations, as well as the sys-
tem of exclusive public markets, gradually atrophied.2 Moreover, the
law governing real property was revamped little by little to facilitate
land transactions, thereby treating landed property increasingly as
a market commodity.3
As price controls and regulated markets declined and land specula-
tion quickened, contracts assumed a more prominent role in the grow-
ing commercial society of the eighteenth century. In an expanding
economy merchants were more likely to trade with or extend credit
to persons who were strangers. Under such circumstances, transac-
tions could no longer be grounded in custom or trust. Hence, private
bargains in an impersonal market were increasingly determined by
written agreements. Parties became accustomed to making deals and
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This Article is drawn from a book manuscript examining the history of
the contract clause. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Center of Law and His-
tory, Washington and Lee School of Law, April 8, 2005, and at the Darlington Foundation Orig-
inalism Works-in-Progress Conference, University of San Diego School of Law, February 2022,
2015. I want to thank David J. Bodenhamer, Robert Mikos, and Herbert A. Johnson for their per-
ceptive comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I also wish to acknowledge the skillful re-
search assistance of Carolyn R. Hamilton of the Massey Law Library, Vanderbilt University.
1. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 271 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1985).
2. James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67787 (2008).
3. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 27 (3rd ed. 2005); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 128 (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992);
Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 385, 40858 (2006).
199
200 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:199
looking out for their own interests. Contracts provided a vehicle by
which individuals could bargain for their own advantage.4 The prod-
uct of private negotiation, not governmental authority, contractual
exchanges not only encouraged economic efficiency but also under-
scored the autonomy of individuals. To achieve these goals, the sta-
bility of contracts was essential. It was necessary that bargains be
honored and not subject to subsequent legislative interference.
A careful study of Virginia bears out the waxing of contract law and
a market economy. William E. Nelson found that a vibrant market
economy based on tobacco sales developed as early as the mid-seven-
teenth century. This robust economy gave rise to complex commer-
cial transactions and commercial litigation. Nelson concluded that
by the 1640s in Virginia, the hallmark doctrine of market capitalism,
that individuals should be free to enter into contracts which courts
would then enforce, was firmly in place.5
I. POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
The troubled conditions of post-Revolutionary America, however,
presented serious challenges to an economy based on private bargain-
ing. Independence from Great Britain caused considerable economic
dislocation. It ended the trade restrictions imposed by the British Nav-
igation Acts but also brought about the loss of markets with Great
Britain and its other colonies. In addition, the Revolution caused
wholesale interference with private economic relationships by state
legislatures. Reacting to the depressed economic climate in the wake
of independence, state lawmakers enacted a variety of debt-relief laws
to assist debtors at the expense of creditors. They passed laws stay-
ing the collection of debts, allowing the payment of debts in install-
ments, and authorizing the payment of debts in commodities.6 South
4. WOOD, supra note 3, at 16264.
5. William E. Nelson, Authority and the Rule of Law in Early Virginia, 29 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 35760 (2003); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA,
VOLUME 1: THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 16071660, 3536 (New York, Oxford Univ.
Press 2008).
6. ALLANNEVINS, THE AMERICANSTATES DURING ANDAFTER THEREVOLUTION, 17751789,
4045, 537, 571 (New York, Macmillan Co., 1924); JEROME J. NADELHAFT, THE DISORDERS OF
WAR:THEREVOLUTION IN SOUTHCAROLINA 15572 (Orono, Me., Univ. of Maine at Orno Press,
1981); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal
System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 113840 (1980).
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Carolinas Pine Barren Act of 1785 was a particularly egregious
measure. Under this act debtors could tender distant property or
worthless pineland to satisfy outstanding obligations.7 State lawmak-
ers also issued quantities of paper money and made such paper cur-
rency legal tender for the payment of debts. These measures not only
hampered commerce by frustrating the enforcement of contracts but
seemingly portended threats to the security of property generally.
Creditors and merchants saw these laws as little more than a confis-
cation of their property interests.
Although popular in some quarters, legislative tampering with
agreements aroused intense criticism. In 1786, for example, Noah
Webster, later the author of a famous dictionary, declared:
But remember that past contracts are sacred things; that Legis-
latures have no right to interfere with them; they have no right to
say, a debt shall be paid at a discount, or in any manner which the
parties never intended. It is the business of justice to fulfil the
intention of parties in contracts, not to defeat them.8
Alexander Hamilton, while Secretary of the Treasury, pictured state
legislative interference with contracts as rendering commerce
uncertain and as weakening the security of property.9 Likewise, Chief
Justice John Marshall later recalled the deleterious impact of laws
meddling with contracts on society in the newly independent United
States:
Thepowerof changing the relative situation of debtorand creditor,
of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every
man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every
individual in those things which he supposes to be proper for his
own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess by
the State legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse
of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but
to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private
faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was an object
7. James W. Ely, Jr., American Independence and the Law: A Study of Post-Revolutionary
South Carolina Legislation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 939, 94243 (1973).
8. Noah Webster, The DEVIL is in you, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 130 (Bos., 1790).
9. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, May 28, 1790, reprinted in
6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 436 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1962).
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of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of
this great community, and was one of the important benefits ex-
pected from the reform of the government.10
Legislative interference with contractual arrangements was not
confined to debt-relief laws. Consider the controversy over the revoca-
tion of the charter of the Bank of North America. The first incorpo-
rated bank in the United States, the Bank of North America, received
charters from the Continental Congress in 1781 andthe Pennsylvania
legislature the following year. Given doubts about the authority of
Congress to grant charters of incorporation, the Bank was generally
regarded as a Pennsylvania institution. In 1785 the Pennsylvania leg-
islature, responding to pressure from radicals and agrarians, moved
to annul the charter. Critics maintained that the Bank encouraged
the accumulation of capital and hampered the issuance of paper
money by the state. The repeal proposal triggered a bitter debate in
the state.11 James Wilson, a prominent lawyer and later a member of
the constitutional convention and a Supreme Court justice, took the
lead in defending the Bank. In a widely circulated pamphlet, Consid-
erations on the Bank of North America, Wilson attacked repeal as
economic folly. More important for our purposes, he argued that the
act incorporating the Bank amounted to a contract between the state
and the corporation that the legislature was bound to respect. Wilson
insisted that while the terms are observed on one side, the compact
cannot, consistently with the rules of good faith, be departed from
on the other. Noting the practical significance of corporate charters,
he added: To receive the legislative stamp of stability and perma-
nency, acts of incorporation are applied for from the legislature. If
these acts may be repealed without notice, without accusation, with-
out hearing, without proof, without forfeiture; where is the stamp of
their stability?12 In a nutshell, Wilson contended that a state was
obligated to honor its own undertakings and that stability in regard to
10. Ogden v. Saunders, 27 U.S. 213, 35455 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
11. JOSEPHSTANCLIFFEDAVIS,ESSAYSINTHEEARLIERHISTORYOFAMERICANCORPORATIONS:
EIGHTEENTH BUSINESS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 31013 (New York, Russell &
Russell, 1965) (1917); F. Cyril James, The Bank of North America and the Financial History of
Philadelphia, 64 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOG. 6266 (1940); Janet Wilson, The Bank of North
America and Pennsylvania Politics, 17811787, 66 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOG 313 (1942).
12. James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North America (1785), in 1 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 7172 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, eds., Indianapolis, Liberty
Fund, 2007).
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corporate charters was essential for successful enterprise.As Jennifer
Nedelsky pointed out: Not only did [Wilson] think that upholding con-
tracts was extremely important economically, he saw the obligation
of contract as part of the fundamental obligations to fulfill promises
which makes society possible.13 Other legislators echoed Wilson,with
one insisting that charters are a species of property.14 These argu-
ments did not prevail in 1785. Defenders of the repeal law denied that
a corporate charter should be treated as a contract and stressed the
power of the legislature to revoke charters.15 Although the charter was
rescinded,Wilson had anticipated much constitutional jurisprudence.
Indeed, one scholar has contended that the contract clause was an
outgrowth of the arguments about Pennsylvanias authority to breach
its own contract.16
Wilson was not alone in advancing these views. In 1786 Pelatiah
Webster, a Philadelphia merchant and author of several pamphlets
on finance and government, reiterated the points stressed by Wilson.
Maintaining that [c]harters (or rights of individuals or companies,
secured by the State) have ever been considered as a kind of sacred
things, he denied that legislatures could repeal the grant and destroy
the rights of the grantee. Webster even argued that the sacred force
of contracts binds stronger in an act of state, than in the act of an indi-
vidual, because the whole government is injured and weakened by a
violation of the public faith. . . .17
As these comments indicate, state interference with the rights of
creditors, when coupled with the revocation of an important corpo-
rate charter, bitterly disappointed many political leaders of the post-
Revolutionary era. They became convinced that state protection of
13. JENNIFER NEDELSKY,PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICANCONSTITUTION-
ALISM:THEMADISONIANFRAMEWORKAND ITS LEGACY 299 n.141 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990).
14. As quoted in 2 JOHN STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 313 (Cambridge, Mass., 1917).
15. Id. at 31215 (finding that state legislatures at the end of the eighteenth century
asserted the power to alter or repeal corporate charters but rarely exercised such power).
16. William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 910 (2008).
17. Pelatiah Webster, An Essay on Credit in Which the Doctrine of Banks is Considered at
3738 (Philadelphia, 1786). A similar argument was advanced by Noah Webster in 1788. He
maintained that when a legislature makes grants or contracts it act[s] as a party, and cannot
take back its grant or change the nature of its contracts, without the consent of the other party.
A state has no more right to neglect or refuse to fulfil its engagements, than an individual. Noah
Webster, Principles of Government and Commerce, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS . . . ON MORAL,
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 4041 (Boston, 1790).
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economic rights was inadequate. Historians generally agree that the
establishment of safeguards for private property was one of the prin-
cipal objectives of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Perhaps the
most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American con-
stitutional period, Stuart Bruchey has cogently pointed out, was
their belief in the necessity of securing property rights.18 Delegates
repeatedly stressed this theme during the convention. For instance,
James Madison asserted at the Philadelphia convention that the
primary objects of civil society are the security of property and
public safety.19
The first provision protective of contractual rights was part of
the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787. Passed by the Confederation
Congress while the Constitutional Convention was meeting in Phila-
delphia, the Ordinance established a framework for territorial gover-
nance in the Old Northwest. Articulating a number of fundamental
principles, the Ordinance had much of the character of a constitu-
tional document.20 The Ordinance contained several important provi-
sions regarding the rights of property owners, including one ensuring
the sanctity of private contracts. Article 2 of the Ordinance stated:
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is under-
stood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have
force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever,
interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona
fide, and without fraud previously formed.21
This language may have been inserted in response to Shays Rebellion
in Massachusetts, which sought to prevent the collection of debts. It
has also been seen as part of a larger scheme to encourage commer-
cial development in the largely unsettled territories. Viewed in this
light, the protection of agreements was a crucial step in attracting
eastern investors. The territorial government was prevented from
18. Bruchey, supra note 6, at 1136.
19. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 147 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale
Univ. Press, 1937).
20. See Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 92968 (1995).
21. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West
of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787, in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 17741789
340 (Roscoe R. Hill, ed., 1936). The Ordinance was reenacted in 1789 by the first Congress under
the Constitution. 1 Stat. 50 (Aug. 7, 1789).
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abridging private economic deals, which created a hospitable climate
for outside capital.22 The contract clause in the Northwest Ordinance
was the first prescient step in forging a constitutional guarantee of
existing contracts.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Given the concern shared by many delegates to the Constitutional
Convention that state governments were invading property and con-
tractual rights and hampering commerce, it is hardly a surprise that
the new Constitution contained a cluster of provisions designed to rec-
tify the abuses at the state level. Thus, the Constitution prevented the
states from enacting bills of attainder and from making anything but
gold or silver legal tender for the payment of debts.
A provision barring the states from impairing contracts was added
late in the conventions deliberations and with surprisingly little de-
bate, given its subsequentsignificance in American constitutionalism.
On August 28, 1787, the delegates were considering constitutional
limitations upon the authority of the states. Rufus King of Massa-
chusetts moved to insert into the Constitution language in the
words used in the Ordinance of Cong[ress] establishing new States,
a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.23 Kings
proposal faced a cool reception. Gouverneur Morris declared his op-
position, observing:
This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to
bringing actionslimitations of actions & which affect contracts
The Judicial power of the USwill be a protection in cases within
their jurisdiction; and within the State itself a majority must rule,
whatever may be the mischief done among themselves.24
James Wilson supported Kings motion. James Madison was some-
what ambivalent but was generally favorable. He admitted that
22. Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 409, 44852 (2013); John M. Morrison, The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, in
5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY 33132 (1889); Andrew R.L. Cayton,
The Northwest Ordinance from the Perspective of the Frontier, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK 21 (Robert M. Taylor, Jr., ed., Indianapolis: Ind. Historical
Society, 1987); Duffey, supra note 20, at 938, 960.
23. Farrand, Records, supra note 19, at 439.
24. Id. at 439.
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inconvenience might arise from such a prohibition but thought on the
whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it. Anticipating later
issues, Madison added: Evasions might and would be devised by the
ingenuity of the legislatures.25 George Mason joined Morris in re-
sisting Kings proposal. He stated:
This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that can
not be foreseen, where some kind of interference will be proper &
essentialHe mentioned the case of limiting the period for bring-
ing actions on accountthat of bonds after a certain (lapse of
time,)asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the States
from making provision in such cases?26
In response, Wilson argued that only retrospective interferences with
contracts would be prohibited by the proposed ban. This comment
interjected a note of confusion into the deliberations. It prompted
Madison to ask: Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post
facto laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences
null & void. 27John Rutledge moved to substitute for Kings motion
the words nor pass bills of attainder nor ex post facto laws. This mo-
tion carried by a vote of seven to three, and the suggested contract
clause was shelved.28
A day later John Dickinson declared that he had examined William
Blackstones Commentaries and had found that the terms ex post
facto related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently
restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that
some further provision for this purpose would be requisite.29 But
the convention never debated the question of a contract clause again.
Nonetheless, the Committee of Style and Arrangement, charged with
preparing a final document, placed a differently worded contract
clause into Article I, section 10, which contained various restrictions
on state power. The proposed language barred the states from alter-
ing or impairing the obligation of contracts. The convention deleted
the words altering or without recorded discussion, and the contract
25. Id. at 440.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Virginia voted against the motion.
29. Id. at 44849.
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clause was adopted as part of the Constitution.30 The clause could
be seen as an extension of the ban on ex post facto laws to measures
involving contracts.31
Authorship of the clause is uncertain. The committee was composed
of Alexander Hamilton, William S. Johnson, King, Madison, and
Morris. Only Morris had spoken in opposition to a provision protect-
ing contractual rights. King had initially proposed a qualified clause
limited to private contracts, and Madison had offered a guarded en-
dorsement. Neither, however, seems a likely source for a broad restric-
tion on state powerovercontracts.32 McDonald persuasively speculates
that Hamilton, with his modern understanding of contracts, was the
probable author.33 Other scholars have suggested that Wilson, who
was not a committee member but who was a close friend of Hamilton,
may have proposed the final wording.34 Thus, Jennifer Nedelsky has
concluded that it seems entirely likely that Wilson would have in-
serted such a clause.35
In any event, the convention as a whole did not revisit this issue.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts warmly endorsed the principle be-
hind the contract clause. He entered into observations inculcating
30. Id. at 619.
31. As adopted, Article I, section 10 provides in part: No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bills of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or any Title of Nobility. U.S. CONST.
art I, § 10.
32. But see ROBERTERNST,RUFUS KING:AMERICAN FEDERALIST 11112 (Univ. of N.C. Press,
1968) (discussing Kings role in the adoption of the contract clause, and concluding the King was
persistent and persuasive and may have convinced other members of the Committee of Style
to include the provision).
33. McDonald, supra note 1, at 27273; see also RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 22122 (New York, Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1985) (asserting it is most probable the Hamilton persuaded his colleagues on the
Committee of Style to add the contract clause).
34. WARREN B. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 11516 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1919); MAX M. MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 201 (Univ. of Okla. Press, 1970); See also PAGE SMITH, JAMES
WILSON:FOUNDINGFATHER,1742179824748 (Univ. of N.C. Press, 1956) (noting that Wilson
has been credited with authorship of the contract clause, but concluding: While there is no evi-
dence definitely disproving Wilsons authorship, certainly no evidence exists to prove it.); MARK
DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON, 17241798 137 (Univ.
of Mo. Press, 1997) (finding little solid evidence that Wilson was the author, but stressing that
Wilson believed that legislatures should not violate the sanctity of contracts).
35. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 299 n.141.
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the importance of public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put
on the States from impairing the obligation of contracts. Gerry sought
to apply the contract clause to the new federal government, but his
motion to this effect failed for lack of a second.36 This underscores the
fact that the ban on contractual interference was deliberately applied
just to the states.37 The framers seemingly realized that laws violative
of contracts might be necessary in some circumstances but felt that
such measures should only be enacted by Congress. To that end, Con-
gress was empowered to establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. Congress, it was felt,
could better assess public need and was less likely to be influenced
by local considerations and particular interest groups. Moreover, it is
striking that, despite its circuitous path into the Constitution, the
framers thought a specific ban on state impairment of contracts was
sufficiently vital to include at the very time they were arguing that a
bill of rights was unnecessary.38
The contract clause fit comfortably into the larger scheme of the
Federalists to foster a commercial society. Federalists proposed, in
sum, two scholars have concluded, to place the new land in the main-
stream of acquisitive capitalism.39 As we have seen, by the late eigh-
teenth century contracts played a critical role in a growing market
economy. The reliability of agreements was essential. Lawrence M.
Friedman has pointed out that business had to be able to rely on the
stability of arrangements legally made, at least in the short and mid-
dle run.40 The contract clause was designed to provide that stability.
Analyzing the purpose of the contract clause, Charles A. Beard tell-
ingly observed: Contracts are to be safe, and whoever engages in a
36. Farrand, Records, supra note 19, at 619.
37. For an exploration of why the contract clause was applied only to state governments,
see Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relation-
ship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF.L. REV. 26795 (1988).
38. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 537
(1989) (This was the Federalist effort to link the eighteenth centurys affirmation of individ-
ual liberty with the rhetoric of contract and private property. Thus, the Federalists valued
market freedom so highly that they forbade the states from impairing the obligation of
Contract in the original 1787 Constitution, at a time when they believed an elaborate Bill of
Rights unnecessary.).
39. KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 72
(2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
40. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (3d ed., New York, Touch-
stone, 2005).
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financial operation, public or private, may know that state legislatures
cannot destroy overnight the rules by which the game is played.41
III. RATIFICATION DEBATES
Consistent with republican theory that political authority rested
on popular consent, the framers submitted the proposed Constitution
for ratification by popularly elected state conventions. During the en-
suing ratification debates, the proponents of the Constitution termed
themselves Federalists and dubbed critics of the Constitution as
Anti-Federalists. The ratification debates primarily turned upon far-
ranging political and constitutional issues, in which the contract
clause did not figure prominently. The Federalists tended to be com-
mercially minded individuals, such as merchants and planters pro-
ducing crops for export, who looked with favor on the contract clause.
A writer in the New Hampshire Spy in November of 1787 expressed
the Federalist viewpoint, observing the Constitution also expressly
prohibits those destructive laws in the several states which alter or
impair the obligation of contracts; so that in future anyone may be
certain of an exact fulfilment of any contract that may be entered into
or the penalty that may be stipulated for in case of failure.42
It is useful to review the arguments of both proponents and critics
of the Constitution as they pertain to the contract clause. The various
restrictions on state power contained in Article I, section 10, including
the contract clause as well as the prohibition of paper money and ex
post facto laws, were often linked together for the purposes of debate.
Leading Federalists pictured this cluster of restrictions as essential
for preserving credit and encouraging commerce. Writing in the Fed-
eralist, Hamilton assailed state infringement of contracts as atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice. Still, he focused on
the dire implications for trade among the states posed by laws abridg-
ing agreements. Laws in violation of private contracts, Hamilton
41. CHARLESA.BEARD,ANECONOMICINTERPRETATIONOF THECONSTITUTIONOF THE UNITED
STATES 179 (New York, Macmillan Co., 1913); see also Paul G. Kauper, What Is A Contract
Under the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution?, 31 MICH.L.REV. 187, 193 (1932) (The
framers of the Constitution were practical-minded men, most of them of the creditor class; one
of their chief objects in establishing a federal government and placing limitations on state action
was to insure stability in commercial and mercantile transactions by providing against legis-
lative interference dictated by whim, caprice, or class prejudice.).
42. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE SPY, Nov. 3, 1787.
210 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:199
warned, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those states,
whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another
probable source of hostility.43 He expressed concern that such con-
tractual infringements would invite retaliation by other states,under-
cutting the goal of a commercial union. Similarly, Charles Pinckney
of South Carolina, also a delegate to the constitutional convention,
characterized Article I, section 10, as the soul of the Constitution at
the South Carolina ratifying convention.Echoing Hamilton, Pinckney
explained: Henceforth, the citizens of the states may trade with each
other without fear of tender-laws or laws impairing the nature of
contracts. Moreover, he anticipated that these limitations on the
states would restore American credit in foreign markets. No more
shall paper money, no more shall tender-laws, Pinckney declared,
drive their commerce from our shores, and darken the American
name in every country where it is known.44 Wilson, addressing the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, likewise emphasized the inter-
state dimensions of contracts. He insisted that Article I, section 10,
alone would be worth our adoption.45
Other prominent Federalists saw Article I, section 10, as a vehicle
to bar state debt-relief legislation. David Ramsay of South Carolina,
for example, observed that this provision will doubtless bear hard on
debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but it will be a real ser-
vice to the honest part of the community.46 Likewise, William R.
Davie of North Carolina, who had served in the military during the
Revolutionary War and represented North Carolina at the Constitu-
tional Convention, championed the contract clause as a curb on irre-
sponsible state relief measures. Picturing the provision as essential
for the interests of both agriculture and commerce, he warned that
South Carolina
might in the future, as they have already done make pine barren
acts to discharge their debts. They might say that our citizens
shall be paid in sterile, inarable lands, at an extravagant price.
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
44. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 33336 (2d ed., Jonathan Elliott, ed., Salem, N.J., Ayer 1987)
(183659) [hereinafter ELLIOTS DEBATES].
45. Id. at 486.
46. David Ramsay, An Address to the Freeman of South Carolina on the Federal Constitution
(Charleston, 1788), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 37980 (Paul
Leicester Ford, ed., New York, Da Capo Press, 1968) (1888).
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They might pass the most iniquitous installment laws, procrasti-
nating the payment of debts due from their citizens for years,
nay, for ages.47
James Madison in the Federalist defended Article I, section 10, in
different terms, stressing broad considerations of justice. He pictured
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws abridging contracts as
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation. Madison described the restrictions in
this section as a constitutional bulwark in favor of personal secu-
rity and private rights. With the contract clause evidently in mind,
he added:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy
which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret
and with indignation, that sudden changes, and legislative inter-
ferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the
hands of enterprising and influential speculators; and snares to
the more industrious and less informed part of the community.
They have seen too, thatone legislative interference is but the first
link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding.48
This sketchy record makes clear that leading Federalists, despite
differing explanations of the contract clause, saw the provision to be
of crucial importance. At the same time, their brief and ambiguous
comments give little guidance as to the intended scope of the clause.
Indeed, there was a range of opinion about the meaning of the con-
tract clause, and the framers did not all share a common under-
standing. The clause meant different things to different men in
17871788, Steven R. Boyd aptly concluded, and throughout the
early national period.49
Several proponents of the Constitution expressed the opinion that
the limitations on state authority found in Article I, section 10, gener-
ated much of the opposition to ratification.50 There is little evidence,
47. ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 44, at 157.
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
49. Steven R. Boyd, The Contract Clause and the Evolution of American Federalism,
17891815, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 531 (1987).
50. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 297 (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., Univ. of Va. Press, 1977) (attributing much
of the opposition to the proposed Constitution to the articles on paper money and contracts).
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however, to support this position with respect to the contract clause.
Anti-Federalists rarely focused on the clause in urging rejection of
the proposed new government. In fact, several Anti-Federalists ad-
mitted that the states had often acted irresponsibility regarding con-
tracts. Thus, in February of 1788, James Winthrop of Massachusetts
suggested amendments as a basis for accepting the Constitution.
One proposal declared: It shall be left to every state to make and
execute its own laws, except laws impairing contracts, which shall
not be made at all.51 Another Anti-Federalist endorsed the restraints
of Article I, section 10: These prohibitions give the most perfect secu-
rity against those attacks upon property which I am sorry to say some
of the states have but too wantonly made, by passing laws sanction-
ing fraud in the debtor against his creditor.52 His concern was not
with the contract clause itself but with the means of enforcement.
This writer insisted that state, not federal, courts should be trusted
with deciding cases arising under this section.
Although discussion of the contract clause by those opposed to the
Constitution was infrequent, one prominent Anti-Federalist, Luther
Martin of Maryland, vigorously attacked the denial of state power to
interfere with contracts.Speaking before the Maryland House ofDele-
gates in November of 1787, Martin recognized that the contract clause
might have a broad reach. In often quoted language, he asserted:
I considered, Sir, that there might be times of such great public
calamities and distress and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as
should render it the duty of a government, for the preservation of
even the most valuable part of its citizens, in some measure to in-
terfere in their favor, by passing laws totally or partially stopping
the courts of justice, or authorizing the debtor to pay by install-
ments, or delivering up his property to his creditors at a reason-
able and honest valuation. The times have been such as to render
regulations of this kind necessary in most or all of the States, to
prevent the wealthy creditor and the monied man from totally
destroying the poor though even industrious debtor. Such times
51. Agrippa, Letter XVI, Feb. 5, 1788 (James Winthrop), in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST
56 (2d ed., W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd, eds., Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2002).
52. Brutus, Letter XIV, Mar. 6, 1788, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART TWO:
DEBATES IN THE PRESS AND IN PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 265 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., New York,
Lib. of Am., 1993).
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may again arise. I therefore voted against depriving the States
of this power, a power which I am decided they ought to possess,
but which, I admit, ought only to be exercised on very important
and urgent occasions.53
Focusing on debtor-creditor relationships, Martin stressed his belief
that the states should retain the power to abridge contracts in periods
of economic emergency. This view, of course, was squarely opposed to
that of the Federalists.
IV. SCOPE OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
With the ratification of the Constitution, debate over the contract
clause shifted to ascertaining the scope of its ban on state contrac-
tual impairments. No doubt the immediate impetus for the inclusion
of the clause was to curtail state debt-relief measures, which weak-
ened the security of private agreements. This has caused some schol-
ars to reach the dubious conclusion that the framers expected the
contract clause to be confined to debtor-creditor relationships.54 One
cannot infer the extent of the contract clause, however, solely from
the necessities of the moment. There is no evidence that the clause
was directed solely at creditor-debtor legislation. It is phrased in gen-
eral terms and appears calculated to safeguard all contractual rights
from legislative interference.55
Perhaps the most vexing question for historians is whether the
contract clause was expected to reach contracts made by the states,
as well as agreements among private parties. Starting in the 1870s
a number of commentators expressed doubt that the framers antici-
pated inclusion of public contracts within the ambit of the clause. As
53. Luther Martin, Genuine Information, Nov. 29, 1787; Farrand, Records, supra note 19,
at 21415.
54. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 16768 (Yale Univ. Press, 1919).
55. Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 53334 (1987). The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly rejected the argument that the contract clause was aimed solely at debt-relief laws. See
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 2056 (1919) (Marshall, C.J.) (The Convention appears
to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable.); Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 n.16 (1978) (Stewart, J.) (The even nar-
rower view that the clause is limited in its application to state laws relieving debtors of obli-
gations to their creditors is . . . completely at odds with this Courts decisions.).
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a corollary, these scholars maintained that the Supreme Court under
the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall expanded the scope
of the contract clause beyond the limited objectives of the framers
to safeguard private arrangements.56 In a 1919 study, for example,
Warren B. Hunting reviewed some of the evidence pertaining to the
meaning of the clause and concluded without explanation that the
convention had in mind only the contracts of private individuals.57
There was a growing tendency during the Gilded Age to question the
application of the contract clause to public agreements.
This narrow interpretation of the contract clause, which gradually
gained currency, was endorsed by Benjamin F. Wright in his leading
study, The Contract Clause of the Constitution (1938). [T]he men of
17871788, he declared, discussed the clause only in relation to pri-
vate contracts, i.e., contracts between individuals. Wright added: A
careful search has failed to unearth any other statements even sug-
gesting that the contract clause was intended to apply to other than
private contracts.58 Writing at a time when New Deal constitution-
alism was gathering strength, Wright reflected the tradition of the
Progressive historians who were deeply skeptical about the tradi-
tional role of the federal judiciary as a safeguard of the rights of prop-
erty owners and who celebrated the growth of governmental powers
over the economy. Surely it is significant, Wallace Mendelson co-
gently noted, that he produced The Contract Clause during the Great
Depression . . . when the Progressive Movements disdain for govern-
ment by judges was still a rampant force in liberal circles.59 It be-
came an article of faith that Marshall took an expansive view of the
contract clause in order to protect vested property interests. This
Progressive attitude may have led Wright to downplay contrary evi-
dence. Nonetheless, Wrights work has been highly influential. Al-
though his interpretation has been increasingly called into question,
56. See, e.g., Clement H. Hill, The Dartmouth College Case, 8 AM. L. REV. 189, 196 (1874).
For the shift in scholarly interpretation of the contract clause during the 1870s and 1880s, as
well as increased criticism of Marshalls view that public agreements were covered, see Robert
L. Clinton, The Obligation Clause of the United States Constitution: Public and/or Private Con-
tracts, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK J. 35357 (1988).
57. Hunting, supra note 34, at 120.
58. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15, 16 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1938).
59. Wallace Mendelson, B.F. Wright on the Contract Clause: A Progressive Misreading of
the Marshall-Taney Era, 38 W. POL. Q. 263 (1985).
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it is still common for scholars to assert that the framers expected the
contract clause to cover only private agreements.60
I wish to challenge this conventional wisdom and to propose a
contrary thesisthat the contract clause could fairly be construed to
safeguard both private and public contracts from state abridgement
and that the contract clause decisions of the Marshall Court were well
grounded. As we have seen, the framers of the Constitution and the
delegates to the state ratifying conventions did not focus to any great
extent on the nature of the prohibition contained in the clause. Given
the sketchy record, I recognize that it is difficult to establish with cer-
tainty what the contract clause was expected to accomplish. Further,
it is unlikely that all who supported the clause had the same anticipa-
tion as to its impact. Still, I contend that a conscientious review of the
admittedly fragmentary evidence fails to support the frequent state-
ment that the contract clause was confined to private agreements.
We should start by examining the wording of the contract clause.
Wright and others appear to proceed on the problematic assumption
that the clause was simply intended to replicate the earlier provision
in the Northwest Ordinance. But Kings motion to that effect was de-
feated, and the Committee of Style markedly changed the wording of
the clause as finally adopted. Specifically, the committee deleted the
words private as well as bona fide, and without fraud previously
formed, which appear in the Northwest Ordinance. Wright never
really comes to grips with this changed wording, which on its face
gives the contract clause a much broader scope. It is curious, to say
the least, to maintain that the language as adopted was the equiva-
lent of wording that was explicitly rejected. Instead of this reasoning,
I submit that the best evidence of what the framers intended is what
was written and adopted. We should be skeptical about the notion that
the unqualified language of the contract clause was somehow thought
to reach only a limited range of contracts. As Mendelson has pointed
out, [i]f the Constitutional Convention had wanted the clause to cover
60. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation
of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 600 (1987) ([A] fairly strong case can be
made that . . . the clause was not thought to impose a general duty on state governments to
honor their own obligations.); Bruchey, supra note 6, at 1144; See also CHARLES F. HOBSON,
THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHNMARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 73 (Univ. Press of Kan., 1996)
(The prevailing view of Marshalls contract clause jurisprudence is that he substantially en-
larged the meaning of the clause beyond the intention of the framers.).
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only private contracts, it could have easily said so. 61The model of
the Northwest Ordinance was immediately before the convention.
Instead of following the private-contract approach of the Northwest
Ordinance, the framers adopted more general wording. This signifi-
cant change went unchallenged by any delegate, strongly indicating
that it reflected the sense of the convention. As Robert L. Clinton has
cogently observed, the proceedings at Philadelphia offer no basis for
believing that the Founders intended to make a sharp distinction be-
tween public and private contracts.62
The debates at the state ratifying conventions lend little support for
confining the protective reach of the contract clause to private agree-
ments. Only one Federalist unequivocally affirmed that the contract
clause would apply solely to private obligations. At the first North
Carolina ratifying convention, held in July of 1788, Anti-Federalists
warned that the various provisions in Article I, section 10, and par-
ticularly the contract clause, would compel the state to redeem its de-
preciated securities at face value. William R. Davie responded:
Mr. Chairman, I believe neither the 10th section, cited by the
gentleman, nor any other part of the Constitution, has vested the
general government with power to interfere with the public secu-
rities of any state. I will venture to say that the last thing which
the general government will attempt to do will be this. They have
nothing to do with it. The clause merely referstocontractsbetween
individuals. That section is the best in the Constitution. It is
founded on the strongest principles of justice.63
It goes without saying that a single statement, made in the course
of a debate, is a slender basis for generalizations about the thoughts
of the framers regarding the scope of the contract clause.
Other infrequent references to the contract clause by Federalists
are too discursive to cast light on the subject. Discussing the monetary
clauses of Article I, section 10, Charles Pinckney told the South Caro-
lina ratifying convention that the states should not be intrusted with
the power of emitting money, or interfering with private contracts;
or, by means of tender-laws, impairing the obligation of contracts.64
61. Mendelson, supra note 59, at 265.
62. Clinton, supra note 56, at 345.
63. ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 44, at 191.
64. Id. vol. 4, at 334.
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This observation tells us little, because the contracts impacted by
debt-relief laws were invariably private. Moreover, Pinckney does not
purport to be addressing the meaning of the contract clause.
More telling is the exchange between Patrick Henry, a leading
Anti-Federalist, and Governor Edmund Randolph, who had served
as a delegate to the constitutional convention. At the Virginia ratify-
ing convention Henry insisted that the clause would require states
to redeem paper money at face value.
How will this thing operate, when ten or twenty millions are
demanded as the quota of this state? You will cry out that specu-
lators have got it at one for a thousand, and they ought to be paid
so. Will you then have recourse, for relief, to legislative interfer-
ence? They cannot relieve you, because of that clause. The expres-
sion includespublic contracts, aswell asprivate contracts between
individuals. Notwithstanding the sagacity of the gentleman, he
cannot prove its exclusive relation to private contracts.65
Henry clearly saw the potential sweep of the contract clause. Equally
revealing is the response by Randolph. He correctly maintained that
Congress, which had issued a good deal of paper money, was not
bound by the contract clause. Randolph continued:
I am still a warm friend to the prohibition, because it must be
promotive of virtue and justice, and preventive of injustice and
fraud. If we take a review of the calamities which have befallen
our reputation as a people, we shall find they have been produced
by frequent interferences of the state legislatures with private
contracts. If you inspect the great corner-stone of republicanism,
you will find It to be justice and fairness.66
Although Randolph indeed mentioned state interference with private
contracts as a particular mischief, he does not contradict Henry or
in any way suggest that the protection of the clause was restricted
to private agreements.67
65. Id. vol. 3, at 474.
66. Id. at 478.
67. Hunting, supra note 34, at 113 (It will be noticed that Randolph nowhere denies Henrys
contention that the contracts clause refers to the contracts of States as well as to those be-
tween individuals.).
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The observations of other participants in the ratification debates
do not draw a distinction between public and private contracts. Martin
flatly opposed any limitation on state authority over contracts and
consequently had no reason to address the issue. In the Federalist,
Madison defended the clause in terms of the unfairness of violating
agreements. Since he invoked principles of the social contract and
was anxious to safeguard personal security and private rights, it
seems unlikely that he thought states were free under the contract
clause to dishonor their own obligations.68 It bears emphasis that in
most situations, state impairment of public contracts would nega-
tively affect the very private rights that Madison sought to protect.
Lastly, the views of Wilson and Hamilton deserve particular atten-
tion, as both have been identified as probable authors of the contract
clause. Wilson, it will be recalled, was already on record as believing
that state legislatures could not abridge their own agreements. It
therefore seems highly likely that Wilson fully expected the contract
clause to reach public contracts. Likewise, Hamilton was a strong
supporter of a comprehensive reading of the provision, a point dis-
cussed further later in this chapter.
My purpose is not to demonstrate that the collective intent of the
framers was to embrace both public and private contracts within the
constitutional ban on impairment. The fragmentary nature of the ex-
tant evidence makes it impossible to establish conclusively the think-
ing of the various framers, who may well have harbored somewhat
different ideas as to the extent of protection afforded agreements. But
historians have leaped too quickly to the conclusion that the clause
was meant to govern only private agreement, virtually ignoring a
good deal of contrary evidence. There is certainly room to doubt that
the framers drew a bright line between public and private contracts.
V. INITIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Courts, legislators, and interested parties early grappled with the
meaning of the contract clause. Despite the apparent clarity of its
language, the contract clause posed a number of interpretative is-
sues. When did the clause take effect? Did it apply to already existing
agreements? What agreements amounted to a contract for purposes of
protection under the clause? Did the clause prevent state lawmakers
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
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from making any adjustments to the rights and obligations of
contracting parties?
As would be expected, the initial invocation of the provision con-
cerned a debt-relief measure. In November of 1788, just months after
ratification of the Constitution but before the new government was
organized, the South Carolina legislature passed a revised install-
ment law allowing debtors to pay their obligations over five years.
Several South Carolinians protested that the statute was an unconsti-
tutional impairment of contract. Despite some expressedreservations,
most legislators felt that laws enacted before the effective date of gov-
ernment under the Constitution were not affected by the clause.69
This position was eventually ratified by the Supreme Court.70
The first-known federal court decision invalidating a state statute
was grounded on the contract clause. At issue in Champion and
Dickason v. Casey (1792) was a 1791 Rhode Island private act extend-
ing for three years the time in which the debtor Silas Casey could
settle his accounts with his creditors. The act also exempted Casey
from all arrests and attachments for three years. Casey was a promi-
nent Rhode Island merchant who suffered business reversals during
the War of the American Revolution. He used his political connections
to win passage of the stay law. Two British merchants brought suit
in the United States Circuit Court for Rhode Island against Casey to
recover unpaid debts of nearly $20,000. In defense, Casey raised the
Rhode Island act as a bar to the suit.71 The case was heard by Chief
Justice John Jay, Justice William Cushing, and District Judge Henry
Marchant. They sustained a demurrer to Caseys plead in abatement.
Although the decision was never officially reported, newspaper ac-
counts explained the outcome:
The Judges were unanimously of Opinion, that, as by the Consti-
tution of the United States, the individual states are prohibited
69. Boyd, supra note 49, at 535. For the legislative debates, see CITY GAZETTE, or THE DAILY
ADVERTISER (Charleston), Oct. 24, 27, & 28, 1788.
70. Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. 420 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that Constitution did not
take effect until March 1789 and that contract clause did not apply to state law enacted before
that date).
71. Patrick T. Conley, Jr., The First Judicial Review of State Legislation: An Analysis of the
Rhode Island Case of Champion and Dickason v. Casey (1792), in LIBERTY ANDJUSTICE: AHIS-
TORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND, 16361998 21823 (Patrick T. Conley, Jr., ed.,
Providence, R.I. Pub. Socy, 1998); D. KURT GRAHAM, TO BRING LAW HOME: THE FEDERALJUDI-
CIARY IN EARLY NATIONAL RHODE ISLAND 12829 (DeKalb, N. Ill. Univ. Press, 2010).
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from making lawswhich shall impair the Obligation of Contracts,
and as the resolution in question, if operative would impair the
Obligation of the Contract in question, therefore it could not be
admitted to bar the action.72
Most of the historical assessment of this case has emphasized its
importance in the emergence of federal judicial review. Yet the opin-
ion also demonstrates the high standing of the contract clause in the
law of the Early Republic and the willingness of federal judges to en-
force it. Not only did the decision arouse no opposition, but the Rhode
Island legislature adopted a resolution that it would not grant any
more individual exemptions for private debts.
These early harbingers of a muscular contract clause doctrine did
not address the scope of the clause. Two members of the Supreme
Court, as well as other leading commentators, however, squarely took
the position that a state could not repudiate its own agreements.
Wilson advanced this view in his separate opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia (1793).73 At issue was the authority of the federal judiciary to
hear suits brought against states without their consent. In Chisholm,
a citizen of South Carolina, acting as the executor of a deceased cred-
itor, instituted a suit against Georgia to recover for supplies deliv-
ered during the Revolution. The Supreme Court asserted the right of
the federal courts to adjudicate this claim, igniting a political fire-
storm that resulted in the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.74 In
his separate opinion, Wilson analyzed the nature of sovereignty and
the federal union. Turning to the contract clause, Wilson made his
interpretation plain:
Another declared object is, to establish justice. This points, in
a particular manner, to the Judicial authority. And when we view
this object in conjunction with the declaration, that no State shall
72. UNITED STATES CHRONICLE, June 14, 1792; See also PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, June 16,
1792. Curiously, it appears that no judgment was entered at the June term of the Circuit Court.
At the November term Justice James Wilson, Justice James Iredell, and District Judge
Marchant adopted the conclusions of the previous panel and entered final judgment. Conley,
supra note 71, at 222.
73. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
74. For the controversy aroused by the Chisholm decision, see ALFRED H.KELLY,WINFRED
A. HARBISON, & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
(7th ed., New York, Norton, 1991); MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIB-
ERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2011).
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pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts; we shall probably
think, that this object points, in a particular manner, to the juris-
diction of the Court over the several States. What good purpose
could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a
law impairing the obligationof itsown contracts; and be amenable,
for such a violation of right, as to no controlling judiciary power?
We have seen, that on the principles of general jurisprudence, a
State, for the breach of a contract, may be liable for damages.75
In this language Wilson emphatically linked his view, first sug-
gested in his remarks on the repeal of the Bank of North America
charter, that a state could not abridge its own obligations to the
contract clause.
Going a step further, Justice William Paterson, in the well-known
case of Vanhornes Lessee v. Dorrance (1795), ruled that a Pennsylva-
nia statute that sought to resolve conflicting land claims in the Wy-
oming Valley of the Susquehanna River by vesting title in one group
of settlers impaired the states contract.76 The conflict originated in an
inter-state dispute over the settlement of these territories. During
the colonial era a group of settlers from Connecticut acquired title to
the disputed tract from Connecticut and from Indians rather than
from the proprietors of Pennsylvania. The heirs of the proprietors,
however, sold the land in question to Pennsylvania speculators and
farmers. This gave rise to a bitter dispute as Pennsylvania and Con-
necticut settlers both claimed the same land. In the mid-1780s some
of the settlers from Connecticut talked of creating a separate state,
which could resolve any question as to the validity of their land titles.
In order to secure the allegiance of the Connecticut settlers, the
Pennsylvania legislature in 1787 enacted a law confirming the title
to all land actually settled.77 Under the statute, the Pennsylvania
claimants were to receive other vacant land by way of compensation
for being divested of their property. But a year later the Pennsylvania
75. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 465. Justice William Cushing, concurring, mentioned that the
contract clause and other constitutional provisions designed to establish some fundamental
uniform principles of justice curtailed state sovereignty. Id. at 468.
76. Vanhornes Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (Cir. Ct. Penn. 1795).
77. See generally Christopher Collier, Article III, Section 2, and the Bloody Background of
Van Hornes Lessee v. Dorrance, in CONSTITUTION DAY 15781 (Patrick T. Conley, ed., Provi-
dence, R.I. Pub. Socy, 2010); J.P. Boyd, Connecticuts Experiment in Expansion: The Susque-
hanna Company, 17531803, 4 J. ECON. & BUS. HIST. 36 (193132).
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legislature suspended the confirming act and repealed it in 1790. The
validity of the confirming act was challenged in a test case. The plain-
tiff, who grounded his claim on a chain of title from proprietors of
Pennsylvania, brought an ejectment action to, in effect, quiet title to
the land. The defendant sought to demonstrate a superior title. His
claim rested upon the 1787 confirming act, which purported to vest
title in the settlers from Connecticut.
Paterson had been a leading member of the constitutional conven-
tion and later a Senator before being named to the Supreme Court.78
He played a key role in a number of the important decisions of the
1790s and emerged as a champion of judicial review. In Vanhornes
Lessee, he presided with Judge Richard Peters in the United States
Circuit Court for Pennsylvania. In his extensive charge to the jury,
which has the character of a philosophical address on the nature of
constitutional government, Paterson found infirmities with the con-
firming act. First, he asserted that the measure amounted to an un-
constitutional taking of property because it failed to provide just
compensation. Constitutional principles, he insisted, required that
just compensation must be in money. Second, and more important for
our purposes, Paterson determined that the confirming act ran afoul
of the contract clause. Although he recognized that the confirming act
and the suspending act were enacted prior to adoption of the United
States Constitution and were not affected by it, Paterson evidently
reasoned that the 1790 repealing act was subject to the new Consti-
tution and thus afforded him an opportunity to consider the larger
issue of state legislative authority over land grants. With respect to
the confirming act, Paterson told the jury:
It impairs the obligation of a contract, and is therefore void. . . .
But if the confirming act be a contract between the Legislature of
Pennsylvania and the Connecticut settlers, it must be regulated
by the rules and principles, which pervade and govern all cases of
contracts; and if so, it is clearly void, because it tends, in its oper-
ation and consequences, to defraud the Pennsylvania claimants,
78. See Daniel A. Degnan, William Paterson: Small States Nationalist, in SERIATIM: THE
SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., N.Y. Univ. Press, 1998);
Julian P. Boyd, William Paterson: Forerunner of John Marshall, in THE LIVES OF EIGHTEEN
FROM PRINCETON 123 (Willard Thorp, ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 1946); Leonard Boyne
Rosenberg, Ph.D. dissertation, The Political Thought of William Paterson (New Sch. for Soc.
Research, 1967).
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who are third persons, of their just rights; rights ascertained,
protected, and secured by the Constitution and known lawsof the
land. The plaintiffs title to the land in question, is legally derived
from Pennsylvania; how then, on the principles of contract, could
Pennsylvania lawfully dispose of it to another? As a contract, it
could convey no right, with the owners consent; without that, it
was fraudulent and void.79
In this jury charge, Paterson treated a land grant as a type of contract
and maintained that Pennsylvania could not abrogate its first dispo-
sition of land to the Pennsylvania claimants. Not surprisingly given
this instruction, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.80
Other historical evidence is also consistent with an interpretation
of the contract clause as protective of both private and public agree-
ments. The 1795 sale by Georgia of vast western public lands, known
as the Yazoo, to four land companies set the stage for the most fa-
mous pre-Marshall explication of the contract clause. The Yazoo land
grants constituted a large part of the present states of Alabama and
Mississippi. Amid allegations of widespread fraud and bribery, anti-
Yazoo forces gained control of the legislature in November of that
year. They promptly enacted a law nullifying the Yazoo land sale. By
this time, however, much of the land had been resold by the original
grantees to parties who claimed to be bona fide purchasers. For exam-
ple, millions of acres were acquired by a group of Boston investors
organized as the New England Mississippi Land Company. This tan-
gled situation raised the fundamental issue of whether the Georgia
legislature could legally declare its prior action void and annul the
land titles under the 1795 grant. The investors sought compensation
for the land they had purchased, and a protracted controversy ensued
over the validity of Georgias actions. It eventually gave rise to the first
Supreme Court decision pertaining to the contract clause, Fletcher v.
Peck (1810). Our focus at this point, however, is on the earlier stages
of the dispute.81
79. Vanhornes Lessee, 2 U.S. at 320.
80. The Paterson jury charge was printed in pamphlet form and widely circulated in 1796,
two years before its publication by Alexander Dallas in volume 2 of the United States Reports.
See THE CHARGE OF JUDGE PATERSON TO THE JURY IN THE CASE OF VANHORNES LESSEE AGAINST
DORRANCE (Philadelphia, 1796).
81. For the background of the Georgia land controversy and the persistent efforts of the
Yazoo claimants to secure compensation, see C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC 149 (Brown Univ. Press, 1966).
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William Constable, a New York merchant and land speculator,
sought a legal opinion from Hamilton, who was then practicing law in
New York City, concerning the title of the grantees and their assigns.82
In a famous opinion, dated March 25, 1796, Hamilton argued that
the Georgia rescinding act was unconstitutional. He reasoned:
In addition to these general considerations, placing the revocation
in a very unfavorable light, the constitution of the United States,
article first, section tenth, declares that no state shall pass a law
impairing the obligation of contract. This must be the equivalent
to saying, no state shall pass a law revoking, invalidating, or al-
tering a contract. Every grant from one to another, whether the
grantor shall be a state or an individual, is virtually a contract
that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted against
the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me,
that taking the terms of the constitution in their large sense,
and giving them effect according to the general spirit and policy
of the provisions, the revocation of the grant by the legislature of
Georgia, may justly be considered as contrary to the constitution
of theUnited States, and, therefore, null; and that the courtsof the
United States, in cases within their jurisdiction, will be likely to
pronounce it so.83
For Hamilton, then, the contract clause covered agreements to which
a state was a party. Moreover, grants of land by a state constituted
a contract with the original grantees. Hamiltons opinion letter was
incorporated into a pamphlet and widely circulated, providing valu-
able ammunition for defenders of the Yazoo claimants.84
Similarly, in August of 1796 Robert Goodloe Harper, a prominent
South Carolina attorney and then a member of the House ofRepresen-
tatives, rendered a formal opinion declaring that the attempted nul-
lification of the land sale by the Georgia legislature was void. He
emphasized the contractual nature of the transaction, observing the
following:
These sales moreover were contracts, made with the utmost
solemnity, for a valuable consideration, and carried deliberately
82. 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 38284 (Julius Gobel, Jr. & Joseph H.
Smith, eds., Columbia Univ. Press, 1980).
83. Id. at 43031.
84. Id. at 384.
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into execution. It is an invariable maxim of law, and of natural
justice, that one of the parties to a contract cannot by his own act,
exempt himself, from its obligations. A contrary principle would
break down all the ramparts of right, dissolve the bonds of prop-
erty, and render good faith, to enforce the observance of which, is
the great object of civil institutions, subservient to the partiality,
the selfishness, and unjust caprices of every individual. There is
no reason why governments, more than private persons, should be
exempt from the operation of this maxim; nor are they consid-
ered as exempt by our constitution or our laws. The state of Geor-
gia, being a party to this contract, could no more relieve itself
from the obligation, by any act of its own, than an individual,
who had signed a bond, could relieve himself from the necessity
of payment.85
Thus, Harper joined Hamilton in concluding both that the Yazoo land
grant amounted to a contract and that the Constitution barred abro-
gation by a state of its obligations.
The precepts of natural law also informed the emerging contract
clause jurisprudence. Belief in the existence of fundamental rights
derived from natural law philosophy was widely shared by late eigh-
teenth-century jurists. Under natural rights theory certain rights
were deemed so basic as to be beyond the reach of governmental au-
thority. Written constitutions, state or federal, did not encompass the
full range of individual liberties. In the famous case of Calder v. Bull
(1798), Justice Samuel Chase famously invoked natural law: There
are certain vital principles in our free republican governments,which,
will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legis-
lative power. Giving examples of prohibited legislative actions, he
maintained that state legislatures could not violate the right of an
antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property.86
Chase explained that lawmakers could not abridge agreements even
if there had been no explicit provision barring such interference in the
Constitution. In other words, he saw the contract clause as an addi-
tional guarantee of the rights of contracting parties, which deserved
protection under natural law. Indeed, in the early nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court looked to natural law concepts as a basis to inter-
pret or supplement the protection afforded by the contract clause.
85. Robert Goodloe Harper, The Yazoo Question, 5 AM. L.J. 395 (1814).
86. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
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VI. STATE DEVELOPMENTS
Developments at the state level also attested to the importance of
contractual rights in the constitutional order. As they revised their
own fundamental laws, many states included a contract clause based
on the federal model. In 1790, for example, Pennsylvania and South
Carolina added a contract clause to their new constitutions. The
Pennsylvania Constitution stated: That no ex post facto law, nor any
law impairing contracts, shall be made. The newer states typically
followed suit. The Kentucky Constitution of 1792, the Tennessee Con-
stitution of 1796, the Mississippi Constitution of 1817, and the Illinois
Constitution of 1818 each contained a contract clause. Such wide-
spread adoption of constitutional provisions supporting contractual
rights at the state level strongly indicates broad acceptance of the
principle of contractual stability in the face of legislative interference.
It also meant that state constitutions could serve as an independent
basis on which to challenge infringements of agreements. Further, it
is noteworthy that no state differentiated between private and pub-
lic contracts in framing its ban. Clearly state constitution makers
were not sufficiently concerned about the Wilson-Hamilton-Harper
interpretation of the federal contract clause to make a move to limit
the range of protection afforded by similar state provisions.
Moreover, in 1799 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
became the first state court to invalidate a state law as a violation
of the Federal Constitution. The case, involving a suit to enforce a
promissory note, arose from the 1795 Yazoo grant discussed above.
In a decision that anticipated the jurisprudence of John Marshall,
the Massachusetts Court ruled that the Georgia repeal act was void
as an infringement of the obligation of contract under Article 1,
section 10. It found that title to the land was legally conveyed by the
Georgia grant.87
The failure of Congress to enact a permanent bankruptcy law until
1898 gave rise to constitutional problems. The absence of federal leg-
islation left open questions as to the authority of the states to pass
bankruptcy or other debt-relief measures without running afoul of
the contract clause. Notwithstanding early federal and state court
decisions enforcing the contract clause, state legislatures initially
87. Derby v. Blake (1799), reprinted 226 Mass. 61825.
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did much to define the scope of the provision in the late eighteenth
century. They compiled a mixed record. A number of states, such as
South Carolina, continued to enforce debt-relief measures adopted
before the effective date of the Constitution. In addition, some states,
including New York and Maryland, experimented with bankruptcy
laws. Moreover, a number of jurisdictions gradually curtailed impris-
onment for debt.88 All of this legislation potentially weakened the
rights of creditors under existing contracts.
Of greater long-term significance, some legislators and commen-
tators took the position that legislatures remained free to alter the
means of enforcing contracts without impairing the underlying obli-
gations. For example, Joseph Jones, a Virginia legislator and judge
who also was also a member of the state ratifying convention, wrote
Madison in December of 1787 that the legislature was considering a
debt-relief measure that would postpone execution sales for a year
unless the property was to be sold at three fourths of its value. To gain
this relief the debtor was required to post a bond to secure payment at
the end of the one year. Jones explained that the execution law was
seen as calculated to give some relief to Debtors, without any direct
interference with private contracts.89 Thiselusive distinction between
contractual rights and remedies found expression in other states
and would vex contract clause jurisprudence for more than a century.
Nonetheless, the contract clause apparently had some immediate
impact on legislative behavior. State lawmakers interfered with con-
tracts less frequently and in more restrained ways than before adop-
tion of the Constitution.90
VII. PROSPECTS FOR A ROBUST CONTRACT CLAUSE
Uncertainty over the protection given contractual arrangements
under the contract clause was widespread in the years immediately
following the adoption of the Constitution. Clearly the provision was
not generally understood as barring any state legislation affecting
88. PETERJ. COLEMAN,DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 16071900 286 (1974) (By the end of the eighteenth century,
imprisonment for debt commonly lasted only until the defaulter qualified for relief.).
89. Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison, Dec. 18, 1787, in 10 THE PAPERS OFJAMES
MADISON 32930 (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., 1977).
90. Boyd, supra note 49, at 548.
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contracts. Probably few would have anticipated the emergence of the
contract clause into one of the most important provisions of the Con-
stitution during the nineteenth century.
At the same time, the potential for a muscular reading of the
contract clause was established well before the Supreme Court first
addressed the question in 1810. The very inclusion of the contract
clause in the Constitution demonstrated the commitment of the fram-
ers to contractual stability. As J. Willard Hurst observed, the contract
clause represented a striking intervention of national law into fields
of policy that would ordinarily be the domain of the states.91 More-
over, not only had federal courts invoked the clause to strike down
state laws infringing contracts, but key figures had endorsed a far-
ranging application of the provision as a shield for agreements.
Changes in the economy also underscored the pivotal place of con-
tracts and, consequently, for the contract clause. The principal engine
of economic growth was the expanding national market. The constitu-
tional text protecting agreements from legislative adjustment by the
states harmonized easily with a public policy promotive of national
economic development.The language of the contractclause thus proved
a base for the courts to safeguard the rights of contracting parties as
a means of encouraging the ascendancy of market forces.92
91. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY: DIFFERENT
MODES OF BARGAINING AMONG INTERESTS 12 (1982).
92. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6367 (3d ed. 2008).
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EPSTEIN. I want to make some observations about what Marc said
about the relationship of process to property rights. One of the key
consequences of his position is that the just compensation element
simply disappears from the equation. We are thus left with a pure
administrative state model in which a broad class of stakeholders
each seeks to gain the largest share of a pie that shrinks with each
additional move. Historically, we know very well that when those
games get played, the transaction costs consume most of the poten-
tial gains. It is therefore not uncommon to find cases like Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,1 where essentially disputed de-
velopment applications can run on nearly twenty-year cycles without
any clear agreement precisely because these bargaining games have
no unique solution. With each breakdown in negotiation, the cycle
starts again. The antidevelopment forces surely have the upper hand.
1. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
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Yet keep the social objective in mind: the object of this exercise is
not to maximize transaction costs; its to minimize transaction costs
along the path to mutually beneficial solutions. Open-ended negotia-
tions in a system of weak and indefinite property rights move matters
in the wrong direction. Nor is the problem made any easier because
of disagreements as to how to treat exactions. One of the great mis-
takes of Justice Kennedys concurring opinion in Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel2 is that the basic analysis somehow changes when the anal-
ysis moves from the Takings Clause to the Due Process Clause on
the view that an exaction of money does not count as a taking of
private property.
But this is, again, an odd and unproductive distinction to say the
least. Just think of the way in which the process works. Suppose it
turns out that the coal companies decide not to pay the money into
the fund. Well, whats the government going to do? Its going to im-
pose a tax lien on the property in order to collect it. A tax lien is in
fact a form of property of the government. Now, we know from cases
like Armstrong v. United States3 that the government takes property
when it manipulates or destroys liens on property without just cause.
The people whose liens get demoted or dissolved are entitled to get
full compensation for the consequent loss in value.
The great danger in this area is to fragment property rights into
obscure subclasses in order to avoid the consequences of having to
decide cases in accordance with a general theory. Vagueness, which
is to some people a nice word, is in fact one of the most costly words
in the English language. Another term for it is uncertainty. What
that uncertainty does is create an endless cycle of delay and bar-
gaining costs. The correct rules on compensation minimize the cost
of these negotiations by reducing them to disputes over the value of
the partial interests taken to obtain some environmental benefit.
The task here is not to maximize political participation; it is to mini-
mize stress and confusion.
2. 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998). In his opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Our cases do not support the pluralitys conclusion that the Coal Act takes
property. The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial burden on the petitioner,
Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without regard to
property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and
it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest.
3. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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Now, there still remains a serious area for political deliberation,
for the government has to determine collectively the value of the in-
terest, as with the lateral easement in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.4 One reason why it is so difficult for governments to get
their act together is that they possess, under current law, well-nigh
complete discretion in choosing how to structure their tax regime.
Since the political process is corrupt on the taxation side, collective
deliberations do not necessarily yield reliable signals to regulated
parties. But it is never wise to try to counteract the political break-
down on one side of the process by creating an equal breakdown on
the other side of the process. What is needed is a return to first prin-
ciples on taxation to develop a system that corrects the mistakes in
the taxing system, which requires creating a regime that allows the
government to achieve any desired revenue level with a minimum of
political discord. Solving that problem raises the same issues that
occur with takings.
And how do we accomplish that? The best way is to take a leaf from
Justice OConnors fine First Amendment opinion in Minneapolis Star
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.5 Shes as sound
on that issue as she is shaky on property law.6 She basically required
a flat tax in speech cases in order to avoid abuse without limiting
revenue constraints. Well, the law should follow her lead and avoid
dangerous ad hocery with other property taxes with the host of spe-
cial exemptions and multiple rates that increase political drag with-
out raising revenues.
The moral is clear. It is not possible to cure the problems in public
deliberations of taxation by messing up takings law. It is necessary
to fix both problems. Two wrongs only make things worse. The sec-
ond wrong never corrects the first.
EAGLE. The whole purpose of property rights is to have clear, defini-
tive, defined, advance assignments of who owns what, so people can
then exchange things to their mutual benefit. When you start with
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
6. See Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Decisions of Justice Sandra Day OConnor:
When Pragmatic Balancing is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J.
177 (2012).
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Penn Central and you start creating prongs and subprongs and start
creating Ptolemaic epicycles on the nature of property, then it gets so
confusing that of course we seek recourse in the kind of administra-
tive process that Marcs talking about. But as my mentor, Myres
McDougal, once said: to rearrange the piles in the Augean stables is
not to cleanse them. What we really have to do if were talking about
redistributive elements is to go to the top level possible, which is,
namely to say, what kind of tax system we want, as Richard just said.
Once you figure that out, you find a way of empowering other people,
and then people can negotiate freely over particular entitlements.
POIRIER. Just a thought on the question of uncertainty. Clearly with
regard to environmental matters and I think with regard to land use,
there is often an unavoidable uncertainty. Its not clear whats going
to happen when people do stuff. The people who make decisions, if
you rely on pure property rights, may not be informed, or they may
not care, and afterwards there are lots of costs, and its hard to undo
the decisions. And when you try, you get transaction costs that may
be greater than including people in negotiations up front.
I also want to suggest again, because my view is that many natural
resources (often including land) have many stakeholders, that there
is an important communitarian element to facilitating negotiations.
Its messy. Its not perfect. But I think the alternative can in many
cases be worth it.
EPSTEIN. No. Strong Disagreement. What youre doing is youre
playing the uncertainty card, but youre playing it in the wrong way.
That is, we often have private disputes with respect to land use be-
tween neighbors where there are uncertain consequences. There are
two ways in which the law can try and solve that. One is that it can
adhere to the common law rule that says to let the owner go ahead
and develop in whatever fashion he or she wants, but the moment
that development causes actual or imminent harm, the law will shut
it down with an injunction, no questions asked, until the problem is
fixed. Knowing that this remedy is available creates powerful incen-
tives for developers to cleanse their stables before they pollute their
neighbors. In consequence, very few harmful interactions arise.
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What youre proposing is, in the alternative, a system in which,
before anybody does anything, everybody else gets to review every-
thing. And the difference in legal regimes is that yours shuts out not
only the bad, but also the good. Your program imposes costs in 1,000
cases instead of one. The process of legitimate development can be
slowed to a crawl.
There are better ways to handle uncertainty without relying on
an endless permit process, which completely deviates from all the
private rules that have been used for centuries in issuing injunctions.
The private law approach is far superior to the modern permit sys-
tem. It is a dangerous form of mistake to posit that some set of com-
munity values mystically alters the equation under direct regulation.
That conclusion is wrong.
The way to protect the community is through a strong injunction,
which allows all people to organize their lives in peace. The permit
system is not about protection but about aggression in the effort to
intervene so early on in the process that property owners will be
stopped by government officials unless they buy those officials off.
Uncertainty, in effect, is a strong argument for the common law rules,
not for the administrative process.
MERRILL. Hi, Im sorry to play lawyer here, but the theory of Nollan
and Dolan, I thought, was rather clearly anchored to a concept of the
eminent domain power and the idea that what was happening in
those cases was that the government was engaging in a taking of
property that would ordinarily require just compensation but was
doing so in the guise of this quid pro quo exaction. The Takings
Clause is applicable in those cases, I think, because the underlying
exchange involved something that would ordinarily be governed by
eminent domain and require just compensation.
When you get to Koontz, the one thing that all the Justices seem
to agree upon is that ordinary taxes are not going to be subject to the
Takings Clause. But Richard and Steven want to take Koontz and
build on top of it this sort of ideal taxation regime which is going to
coincide with the sort of principles that the Takings Clause reflects.
EPSTEIN. Thats correct.
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MERRILL. Unfortunately, the thing the Justices all agreed upon is
that theyre not going to go down that path. Theyre not going to cre-
ate an ideal
EPSTEIN. Shame on them.
MERRILL. tax regime under the Takings Clause.
EPSTEIN. Theres no question that these guys resist generalization
and serious theories. Our job as law professors is not to give excuses
for their wretched intellectual performance. Its to decide whether
theyre right or wrong. In these cases, they are dead wrong. Thats
the lawyers answer.
MERRILL. Maybe in some ideal universe theyre wrong, but
EPSTEIN. Well, thats what the justices have to do. They have to think
from first principles instead of deciding cases based on their own
twisted precedents. Once they do that, they will basically take a
rather different view of the world if they do it
MERRILL. Thats your vision of how things ought to work.
EPSTEIN. Yeah.
MERRILL. Im sort of stuck in the world where things are going to
work the way theyre going to work, and maybe you can nudge them
one way or another. For better or for worse, the Court is not going to
subject taxation to the Takings Clause or to any kind of takings anal-
ysis. And so, what youre really talking about is sort of reforming the
law of equal protection as it applies to taxes or something like that,
which is a project that has hardly been started.
I think the real battleground in Koontz is going to be over whether
or not Koontz is limited to in lieu exactions, which are exactions of
money that are offered as a substitute for a specific real property
transfer, or whether somehow its going to break free of the unconsti-
tutional conditions moorings in the context of eminent domain and
become some kind of free-standing intermediate scrutiny doctrine
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for financial exactions. My prediction would be that its going to be
limited to in lieu exactions because that is the thing that is anchored
to the theory that underlies Nollan and Dolan, which is what this is
all aboutevasions of the power of eminent domain.
EPSTEIN. Property rights also include restrictive covenants, right?
And indeed, the modern law says that restrictive covenants and
easementsone possessory, one non-possessoryare servitudes
covered by the same private law principles. So now, under your the-
ory, whats going to happen when somebody says that the require-
ment of a setback is in fact the state-imposed restrictive covenant?
May the state now demand a lateral easement in order to remove
that restriction? Does the law now exempt every zoning law from
scrutiny, or it does subject them to a property analysis based on the
simple proposition that the state has taken a restrictive covenant
under a zoning law? I think youd have to say that the exemption of
zoning laws is total. But in principle the answer is that there are no
strong grounds for distinction.
So I agree with you on the prediction that zoning laws will rou-
tinely prevail. But I dont understand where the normative case for
that proposition comes from.
EAGLE. I have problems with the in lieu concept here as well. Years
ago, Gideon wrote an article called Tennis, Anyone?. It was a nice
article about Ehrlich v. City of Culver City7 and the notion that ei-
ther you put artwork in your new building or you have to pay a city
a 2% fee in lieu of putting artwork in your new building.
Gideon asked, quite correctly, Does this mean that if I put up a
building, Im limiting the space in the city where artwork could oth-
erwise be displayed? I mean, that was a silly concept to begin with.
And attaching it as an in lieu fee doesnt make it any more coherent.
EPSTEIN. Look, Im going to put it another way. Theres no way to do
takings law right on a partial equilibrium basis. What happens is
private property is our most comprehensive and systematic legal con-
ception. Takings and taxes are not categorically distinct. So what
happens is all these efforts to develop these artificial subcategories,
7. 911P.2d 429 (1996).
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which make the judges feel comfortable with themselves, dont work
to organize the field. It is interesting to compare with this First
Amendment law where the justices actually care about whats going
on. There magically all these supposed distinctions between taxes,
regulations, and liability rules disappear. The justices dont have one
set of rules for takings, another set of rules for regulations, one set
of rules for injunctions, and another set of rules for fines. What they
do is they have a consistent theory, which is why their performance
is much better there than in the takings area.
And so whats happened is that with property rights, the justices
celebrate this endless ad hocery, which is the legacy of Penn Central,
right? Ad hoc solutions are in fact the fundamental source of the
current judicial error.
. . . .
AUDIENCE. You also said that the power of eminent domain exists
to overcome holdout problems. You also said there is no holdout
problem in. . . .
EPSTEIN. But I also said that takings law was designed to deal with
the problem of indefinite rights. The holdout problem arises when
everybody tries to impose the liability for public expenses on every-
body else. Essentially there is no unique solution to that game. Its a
common pool problem with respect to liabilities, and we have eminent
domain solutions for oil and gas that stabilize rights and increase
production. We need to have similar rules for taxation and regulation.
If we dont do it, then perhaps incremental changes will produce mod-
erate amelioration, but well never get maximum improvement. That
was the point of my takings book. Thats what you, Tom, disagreed
with when you reviewed it. You wanted to do theory on a part-time
basis, which I resisted. Once we start down the road with a coherent
theory, we should take it all the way. First Amendment law does a
better job of that even if it is not perfect. Takings law never tried.
What you have to fear in the end is becoming a Penn Central ad hoc
basis guy if you continue to push down this line of argument
MERRILL. You have a principled theory on the Takings Clause. You
said it implies when the government takes unrecognized property
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EPSTEIN. No, because all these things are property. Money is not
property, so if the government announces Mr. Merrill, we are now
charging you $100,000
. . . .
EPSTEIN. Well, I mean, if they take all your money in your banking
account, thats not property? Sure it is.
MERRILL. I justI see it differently. I think the hardest part is to see
the mess. And it sets the minimum standards. Why arent you rail-
ing at Congress instead of at the United States Supreme Court?
EPSTEIN. I do. Im not selective. Ill rail at both branches of govern-
ment. I mean, I think the Congress is often bankrupt as well on
these issues. The point here is this: just because the Courts are inept
doesnt excuse Congress from being inept and vice versa. All of them
work according to the same ad hoc theory. That approach is bad no
matter who relies on it. So I think that we should attack both
branches with equal vigor and for the same reason.
MERRILL. You know that, that is a quixotic pursuit.
EPSTEIN. All intellectual work is quixotic.
MERRILL. No, all intellectual work is not quixotic.
EPSTEIN. It essentiallywhat happens is
MERRILL. Sometimes you cant travel down certain roads.
EPSTEIN. What happens is you see major system difficulties taking
place in this country, and your response is to patch this little hole
and let this other one get larger. And my view is that
KRIER. Weve been living with this same structure since Pumpelly
and Mahon.
EPSTEIN. No.
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KRIER. If you look over the cases, essentially the system has been
stable. Most of the things that have happened since Mahon, though
exactions are an interesting side case, have just been logical
purely logicalextensions of Mahon.
EPSTEIN. No. I think thats just dead wrong.
KRIER. I disagree.
EPSTEIN. I do. Euclid is a massive extension that goes beyond either
Pumpelly or Mahon. Period.
KRIER. Euclid was not framed as a takings case.
EPSTEIN. But it is a takings case. I mean, the fact that somebody
doesnt call it thatthats what the trial judge did down below. He
called it a takings case.
AUDIENCE. But the opposite strategy doesnt work either, Richard.
Not everything is a takings case.
EPSTEIN. All the worlds a taking, some of which are justified and
some of which have implicit compensationthats the point about
being systematic. When you modify the property rights for your ad-
vantage, youve taken them.
BURLING. To interject here just a little bit, because I hear these argu-
ments, and theyre wonderful arguments, but when I go to court
EPSTEIN. We dont care about that
BURLING. I have to deal with judges who dont get any of this. We
have to explain in the simplest terms possible. And of course, Id love
to have Richard as my expert witness, but it aint going to happen.
It aint going to work.
So my challenge is to take these ideas or these words and to try to
get a court to have a basic understanding, and that is very tough, be-
cause the judges are basically illiterate about property law, property
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rights, and theyre certainly totally illiterate about what any of the
professors have talked about today.
BERLINER.So, Jim, my question is directed to you, although obviously
other people may have a view on it. But its about whats going to hap-
pen with legislative exactions. Where do you think thats going? And
then also, I was wondering whether legislative exactions actually
sound in due process in addition to takings. Lets say you have an ex-
action that has no mooring at all. You want to build something, and
whatever that something is, youve got to pay $100,000 to a local
charity. The requirement has no relationship to what you are build-
ing, to the property, to anything. So, it doesnt have nexus. It doesnt
have proportionality. You can analyze it as a property question, but
isnt it a substantive due process problem as well? So, I have two
linked questions about legislative exactions.
BURLING. The first part of the question is, where is this likely to go?
I think if the courts look at this seriously and intellectually properly,
theyll go back to the dissent, to the denial of cert in the Georgia
Parking Authority case where Justices Thomas and OConnor said
that there is really no intellectual difference between an exaction
thats imposed adjudicatively or legislatively. Despite the fact that
in the Ehrlich v. Culver City case, the California Supreme Court said
that legislative exactions were open to the full air of sunlight, and
therefore, youre not going to have the oppression animating Nollan
and Dolanthats just nonsense. You have just as much oppression
from legislative bodies with a majoritarian impulse as you do from
adjudicative bodies.
So when youre talking about an exaction thats totally unhinged
from anything, you can look at it in the context of either takings or
due process. My problem with due process is that due process in 2014
is rational basis, meaning no review at all if you can come up with
any idiotic excuse for this at all. And I was telling Robert Thomas
earlier today,duringmyfirst trip to Honolulu I opened the newspaper,
and the mayor was quoted saying, I think for every golf course we
should demand $100 million in exactions.
So its exactly your situation. No connection whatsoever. I think Id
much rather look at that in the takings context, because theyre taking
your underlying right to develop that golf course, your development
240 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 4:229
of that right of that property. And thats where the taking stems
from. If you start only looking at it in due process terms, looking at
whether theres a rational basis for stealing $100 million dollarsof
course theres a rational basis for stealing $100 million. I could do
a lot of good things for everybody here if I had $100 million. Trust
me. I would.
EPSTEIN. Thats why the Kennedy due process opinion in Eastern
Enterprise means its five justices against a strong stand on retroac-
tivity as opposed to five justices for. When he made the case turn due
process, every subsequent challenge has failed.
EAGLE. You know, you can talk about legislative versus administra-
tive exactions, or you could try to split the difference by talking about
giving credence to comprehensive rezoning but not giving credence to
small-scale rezoning. But the essential difference between exactions
and taxes is that taxes should be broad based. And if theyre broad
based, theyll be voted by the people only if in fact you get this kind of
welfare-improvingmove that Richard was talking about earlier.When
the Euclid case was decided, you know that George Sutherland was
a believer in substantive due process. But he had this notion of mobs
and contagion and revolutions about which he was so concerned. In
a kind of Hobbesian move, he was willing to give power to the govern-
ment to arbitrarily divide the cities into districts to prevent foment,
and that, I think, is still the basis of a large part of the judicial men-
tality here, which is that if we go back to this notion of looking at
property rights instead of the notion of looking at stakeholder inter-
ests, people are going to rebel, and were going to be in trouble.
KANNER. This is wonderful, and Im informed and enlightened and
amused, but theres one thing that you guys slid over a little too
quickly. And I hear the same story from New York. The great major-
ity of judges are former prosecutors. I scan the legal papers to see
who gets appointed, and were talking about something like twelve,
fourteeneleven to one. There was one guy who was in private prac-
tice, and everyone else is a former deputy this and assistant that and
what not.
Now, these are people who dont know a thing in a great majority
of cases, because the sure ticket to election to court in California,
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which is a semiits really an appointed thing, but it has an elective
elementis to identify yourself as being a prosecutor. So if you pick
up your ballot when you get home, Jim, youll find that every one of
these bozos identifies himself as a criminal gang prosecutor. Because
thats the road to wherever they want to get.
BURLING. The developers and criminal gangs are no different.
KANNER. Thats right. You anticipate my next point. Theres a ten-
dency on the part of these guys almost involuntarily to believe that
the people who are litigating against the government are really bad
people, because if they werent, they wouldnt be disagreeing with the
good government that wants to govern them.
So, the bottom line of what Im suggesting is that whatever won-
derful system you come up with, it is going to have to take the form
of and be reduced to a system of rules that is capable of being ratio-
nally administered bypardon the expressionthose Herman Wouks
idiots who sit on the bench and who have never seen a case like that
in their career.
EPSTEIN. We are doomed. If thats true, then were doomed.
KANNER. We are doomed.
EPSTEIN. To a steady rate of decline. Mediocrity will become the new
American exceptionalism.
KANNER. Look, you can easily collect cases which contain some of the
most outlandish absurdities. And if you were a practicing lawyer,
since they dont fit into the grand scheme of things, you know about
them, whereas the professorspardon medont know about them.
AUDIENCE. We all want the same thing. . . .
KANNER. I will give you only one example, and Im not making it up.
Theres a rule in eminent domain law that says that business losses,
loss of goodwill, are noncompensable. If you trace it back to its origin,
youll find that it comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.the
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very onewhile he was still on the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
And he justified it by saying that business is so uncertain in its
vicissitudes that it plumb cant be valued. Thats why we dont do it.
EPSTEIN. On the other hand, its bought and sold every day.
KANNER. Its bought and sold every day, its taxed, its divided in
divorces, its valued in torts cases, and nevertheless, that is the black
letter of the law. So you are out. Oliver Wendell Holmes was no
dummy. He was very smart. But it is common among these guys to
search for something to offer some rational-sounding reason for rul-
ing this way or that way, and its become a judicial culture in this
field that they sometimes reach for absurdities. So whatever system
you come up with will have to be relatively easy to administer if it
is to retain its rationality.
EAGLE. But Holmes was cynical, and he wrote in a letter to his friend
Pollock thatthe question at the end was, whos going to be the
grabber and whos going to be the grabbee?
EPSTEIN. And on that principled note, we end.
